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THE

DISCOVERY

OF THE

SCIENCE OF LANGUAGES;

IN WHICH ARE SHOWN

THE REAL NATURE OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH;

THE MEANINGS WHICH ALL WORDS CARRY IN THEMSELVES,

AS THEIR OWN DEFINITIONS;

AND THE ORIGIN OF WORDS, LETTERS, FIGURES, ETC.

BY MORGAN KAVANAGH.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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THE

DISCOVERY

OF THE

SCIENCE OF LANGUAGES.

THE reader who has not read thus far slowly and attentively, and who has consequently passed by many things in this work which he has not clearly and fully understood, should, before proceeding any farther in it, go over the whole of the first volume again. This advice I take here the liberty of giving, from knowing that the following discoveries, which lie more hidden than any we have yet seen, cannot be at all conceived without an intimate acquaintance with all those by which they are already preceded.

The feminine of *mon*, *ton*, *son*, that is, *ma*, *ta*, *sa*, as well as the supposed plural number of both genders, that is, *mes*, *tes*, and *ses*, are now to be explained. The *a* in *ma*, *ta*, and *sa*, is also for *one thing* or *the thing*, and it corresponds with *ea* in Latin. Then *ma* is the same as *me ea*, or *ea me*,

and means, "the thing to me." And in like manner are *ta* and *sa* to be accounted for. But *mes*, *tes*, and *ses*, are no more in the plural number than *mon*, *ton*, and *son*, or than *ma*, *ta*, and *sa* are; since it is only the single pronoun *es* which is added to *m*, *t*, and *s*, just as *on* and *ea* are added to these letters for the masculine and feminine singular.

This at first sight will appear incredible; but let Frenchmen reflect upon it seriously for only five minutes, and they will admit that, though it appears very strange indeed, it is, however, very true. Then this *es* is on such occasions preferred, that it may correspond in form with the other *es* by which it is followed. Thus in *mes livres* the meaning is, "to me this book book," literally, in French, *à me ce livre livre;* but in order not to name the word *livre* twice, the pronoun *es* is employed in its stead. This we may more clearly perceive when we recollect that *livre* ought to be written *liver*, for it is no other than the Latin *liber*, the *v* being used for the *b*, as this frequently happens. Then *mes livres* is for *me es liver es*, "to me it book it." Hence the pronoun or *article* going before *liver* in the above instance, might as well be *on* or *er* as *es;* but as the pronoun which follows *liver* in "m*es* liver*es*" stands, both as to meaning and number, in exact apposition to that pronoun by which *liver* is preceded, it should, to have the agreement perfect, correspond with it in form also, and this in the French language very fortunately happens. But when we say in English "m*y* book*s*," we have not

this agreement as to form; since *my* is *me-i* and not *me-es;* but *me-i* is as much in the plural as *me-es*, which implies that *me-es* is by no means in the plural; for *me i* (my) is evidently in the singular, since it means "to me one," or "to me it." In like manner, in *your books*, that is, *to you er book es* ("to you it book it"), *er*, which stands in apposition to *es*, does not correspond with it in form, but in every other respect it does; and it is as much a plural as *es* is; that is, it is not by any means a plural. Hence it is as evident as any thing can possibly be, that there is not any difference whatever as to number between *mon*, *ton*, *son*, and *mes*, *tes*, *ses;* and the same may be said of *ma*, *ta*, *sa*, and *mes*, *tes*, *ses;* all these words being equally in the singular.

I shall have presently to account for the pretended plurals of *notre* and *votre*, that is, for *nos* and *vos;* but I have first to explain their singular forms.

At least *notre* and *votre* appear to be thoroughly known, and to come from the Latin words *noster* and *vester;* and on this point no grammarian or lexicographer can entertain a doubt. Yet notwithstanding how greatly *notre* and *votre* (anciently *nostre* and *vostre*) resemble *noster* and *vester*, they are not, by any means, derived from them. Indeed words, like the beings that make use of them, are, with very few exceptions, ever natives of the land to which they belong; and the learned ought to reflect seriously before they assert that a word *ever*

known to exist with a people, was borrowed from another language.

I can conceive that when a people may be supposed to have had no word for naming a certain thing before they had become acquainted with another people, from whom this certain thing was received, they may be allowed to have borrowed such a word, since they stood in need of it. Thus in our days there is in England a part of a man's dress called a *Mackintosh;* and as Frenchmen have never hitherto had such a part of dress, they have been led, on receiving it, to give it the English name. Now all the learned (there is not a single exception to be found) say that the French words *main* and *pied* have been borrowed from the Latin language; that is, from *manus* and *pes;* which is not only an error, but an egregious blunder; for it implies, when examined closely, that at the time these two words were borrowed, Frenchmen had neither hands nor feet of their own; since it were just as easy to make a whole nation change words so frequently in use as those for *hand* and *foot*, as it were in those rude times to make them all become academicians. And hence there is not in the whole world a single language that has been borrowed from another.

Nostre is composed of *nos* (which is equal to *nous*) and of *être*, for which I have already accounted several times. *Vostre* is in like manner composed of *vos* (which is equal to *vous*), and also of *être*. Then *nostre livre* means *nous être livre*, that is, *à*

nous l'être livre, "to us the thing book." And *vostre livre* in like manner means *vous être livre*, which is the abbreviated form of *à vous l'être livre*, that is, "to you the thing book." The word *être*, in these instances, may be also very well rendered by an article or a pronoun, and we may say that *nostre livre* is equal to, "us the book," that is, "to us the book;" or that it is the same as, "us it book;" that is, "to us it book." But when we thus consider *être*, we take it in its collective sense, for we must not forget that it is composed of several words, of *es*, *it*, *re*, which means, "it is the thing." We may also consider it as being composed of only two words, *est re*, which must have first been *ir est*, and then *er est*, and finally *ester* or *estre*. As the two words *er est* are the original of the English word *erst* (formerly), we have another proof of what has been already sufficiently proved, namely, that a present time repeated was the first means to which men had recourse for indicating a past time, for *er est* are really equal to *go go*. Nor have *œra* and *ibi*, when analysed, different meanings, since the former becomes *er-ea* (it it), and the latter *ib-i*, which is also equal to *it it*, or *go go*. Then what difference is there, as to meaning, between *on*, *ea*, *es*, in *mon*, *ma*, *mes*, and this *être* in *notre* and *votre?* None whatever: they all equally mean *it*, *the*, or *the thing*.

Now as nobody will say that the word *être*, when used separately from *nostre* and *vostre*, is borrowed from a certain Latin pronoun or article, why should this be said when it makes a part of *nostre* and

vostre, since it is still the same word? But I may be told that, as nobody ever suspected the well-known word *être* to form a part of *nostre* and *vostre*, any more than it was supposed to make a part of such verbs as *connaître*, *paraître*, &c., it is not fair to accuse Frenchmen of reasoning in this illogical manner; for when they do say that *nostre* is from *noster*, this arises from their not knowing that the well-known word *être* enters into the composition of *nostre*.

As an additional proof that *nostre* and *vostre* are not taken from *noster* and *vester*, it may be observed that Frenchmen do not say *vestre* or *vetre*, instead of *vostre* or *votre;* however, the pretended original of *vostre* or *votre* is *vester*, and not *voster*.

Now as *être* or *estre*, in *nostre* and *vostre*, make, when analysed, *est-re*, which may be translated by *it is;* so does the *ter* in nos*ter* make when analysed *it er*, which may be also translated by *it is;* or it may be rendered indifferently, like *estre*, by *the thing*, *it*, or *the*. Indeed the *ester* in *vester* is precisely *estre*, but *vostre* is not on this account derived from *vester*. If, in this instance, borrowing had occurred on either side, it would be far more plausible to say that the Latin pronouns have been taken from the French, since *être* or *estre* exists in the latter tongue apart from every other word, and is in very frequent use, whereas it is not at all, when thus considered, to be found in Latin.

The Latin pronouns *nos* and *vos* should now be

accounted for, to the end that less difficulty may lie in my way towards showing their nature, when I shall have to consider them as French words, that is to say, as the pretended plural forms of *notre* and *votre*.

The word *nos* may be analysed thus, *in os*, of which the meaning is, *one one*, or *the one one*. It may be also analysed thus, *in o is*, but the meaning is not different, since this latter form may be rendered by *one one it*, or *it one one*, or still, *the one one*. Hence the one analysis does not differ from the other but in form, for though the latter has a word more (*it*) than the former, this word does not name an additional idea, since it is one of those words called articles (an adjective in the positive degree).

Numerous instances, in the analysis of words, have been already given, showing that *in* means *one*, or *the one;* so that I need not, in the present instance, make, respecting this word, any farther inquiry. But as there is still a very curious and difficult question connected with it, I intend, when I have done with the words now to be accounted for, to take particular notice of it.

Os also means *one*, on account of its being one of the names which the sun must have had; this great object in nature, from its appearing to be alone in the world — that is, without an equal — having been with the moon (as we have already seen) that which first gave man the idea of unity or singleness. But how, it may be asked, do I know that *os* was a name for the sun? From its analysis

being *is o* (the sun), which, from the *is* having been dropped, became *os*.

This short notice of *os* will also suffice for the present; but, like the word *in*, it deserves a more detailed account, and I shall, a little farther on, refer to it again.

Now as *ego*, the singular of *nos*, becomes when analysed *eg-o*, which means *the one* — for *eg* does not here differ in meaning from the English word *the* — and as a plural number was in the beginning named by the repetition of a singular, as we have already seen, hence it is very reasonable that *nos*, the plural of *ego*, should literally mean *one one*, or *the one one*. Then *nos* is a contraction of *inos*.

Ego may be also analysed thus: *eg io;* but the meaning will not be different, since this literally makes, *it the one*. The most ancient form for the first person singular, must have been *io*. Even the *eg* in *ego* becomes, when closely examined, *io*, to which a word meaning height or pre-eminence was added, as we shall see in the account to be given of *g*.

By thus giving to each of these words (*in-os*) a separate meaning, we consider them in their earliest state, that is, when every word named by itself an idea; for were they to be viewed otherwise, it might be said that they meant only *the one*, and this would be to regard *in* as not naming an idea apart from *os*, but as filling the place of one of those words called articles.

We have now to find out — and for this we shall see the necessity presently — how *nos* was first

formed; for by the view just taken of it, we have only seen of what it is composed. Then how did men, in this instance, first say, *one one?* Did they begin thus, *in o* (*one one*)? or thus, *in os* (*one one*)? or thus, *in o is* (*one one is*, or *it*)? Of course the form *in o* was first chosen, it being the most simple, and requiring the least number of letters; and of this we may be convinced by seeing what form *nos* bore when in another situation. Thus an analysis of the word *nobis* (which makes *in o be is*, that is, *no-be-is*, and which means, *us be it*, that is, *to us be it*, in other words, *it is to us*, *it belongs to us*,) shows us that men first said *in o* (*one*, *one*), and that this became by contraction *no*. Then to *no* they afterwards added *is*, thus, *is no*, which meant *the thing we*, *the being* (named) *we*, or *the we*.

As an inquiry made respecting *is*, when in such a situation as it here holds, cannot but give rise to many observations, I must also delay the notice I have to take of it until I come to consider the words *in* and *os*.

As we thus discover that *nos* was in the beginning *in o*, and that these two words became *no*, we are, when considering *nos* as a French word, that is, as the pretended plural of *notre*, to analyse it thus: *no-is* (to us it); then *nos livres* will, when analysed, be *no-is livre es*, or *no is livre*, "is to us the book book," or "to us it book it," the *it* which precedes the word *book* being in this instance the same as *the*, and the *it* which follows the word *book* being a substitute for this word.

Hence we plainly see that the word *nos* is not the plural number of *notre;* for as this latter word is composed of *nos être*, "the thing to us," (we are not in this instance to consider *nostre* more minutely,) so is *nos* also composed of two words (*no-is*), meaning, "the thing to us." But might there be in this case a plural number? There might, and with great propriety. Thus if the French said, *noles livres* instead of *nos livres*, *noles* would be a plural number, since when analysed it becomes *no-il-es*, of which the meaning is, "to us IT IT," that is, "to us *them*." Then *noles livres* would mean, "*to us them* (namely) books;" that is, "*to us it it* (namely) book book." Thus we see that the article or pronoun *les* is composed of *il es*, or, as it might also be, of *il is*. Here I may be told that if this be true, *la* must be also a plural number, since when analysed it will be *il ea*, which may also mean *it it*, and consequently *them*. But in this instance there is only one thing referred to, and which is, the *earth*, for *il ea* literally means, "that spot, *that place*," *ea* being the first name for earth, and which name still exists in the Saxon language. Hence there is no difference between *la* called a French article, and *là* (there) called a French adverb of place. Even so is it in English, since this word *there* becomes when analysed *the ere*, but which ought to be written *the ear*, that is, "the earth, the place." For *ear* (that is, *ea ir*) must have been formed from *ir* having preceded *ea* (when it

meant *the*), and having afterwards fallen behind it, thus making with *ea* one word (*ear*), and meaning *earth*. I have already observed that the *th* at the end of *earth* is also another article (namely, *the*), which, like *ir*, fell also behind. An analysis of the three words, *place*, *flat*, and *plat*—the latter being the French of *flat*—confirms this statement with regard to *la* and *ea*, since these words become, when analysed, *ip il ea is* (on the earth *is*); *if là it* (*the ground it*—*il ea* having here become one word); *ip il ea it* (on the ground it).

But what, every body will ask to know, does *ea* itself mean when analysed? In these two letters there are three words, and yet there is no ellipsis. They become when analysed *e-o-i*, of which the exact meaning is, "the round one." I hope the reader will pardon these digressions, but I cannot avoid them, the many ideas to which every word gives birth being too important to be passed over. *Ea* enters also into the composition of the word *man*, since the analysis of this word is *im ea in*, which may be explained in various ways as to form, and be made to have several meanings, without any one of them being in contradiction to the others. The two words *ea in* are literally *earth in* or *earthern*, and as *im* means *the life* (*iv*), as we shall see hereafter, hence *man* literally means, "the life in earth;" that is, *of earth*. *Im-ea-in* mean also *him earth in*, that is, "him of earth;" or when we make these three words take this order *in im ea*—and such must have been their primitive state—the meaning is, "the live earth" (*iv iv ea*).

Man may be also analysed thus: *im-o-i-in*, which four words mean "the round one in," that is, "the round one of," "of the round one," "of the earth." The name *Adam* differs in meaning very little from *man;* it may be analysed variously, but its meaning will be still the same — *ea id am.* Here *am* means the first life, just as it means still the first person in English; and it must in the beginning have preceded *ea id*, which two words mean *earth had*, that is, *earthly*, *earth of;* but as the *id* is here the same word which has been already explained in the account given of *eu* in French and *u* and *ivi* in Latin, the very literal meaning of *ea id* is, *earth once*, that is, *to earth once*, and this is the meaning of *earthern*, *earthly*, or *earth of.*

Then when Adam stands thus, *am ea id*, "the first life earth had," and when we give here a more detailed analysis of *am*, that is, when we make it *ea im*, we shall have, *ea im ea id;* and as the three words *im ea id* imply *the thing done* or *finished*, the four words, *ea im ea id*, must mean, *earth made*, that is, *of earth made.* Hence, the real orthography of made is *mead.*

I shall have occasion to give, farther on, other accounts of *man*, *Adam*, &c., which, without contradicting any of those given above, will, however, differ from them very considerably.

Having digressed thus far, I cannot here omit noticing the word *woman;* it becomes when analysed *an wom*, that is, *a womb*, or *the womb;* for this *b* at the end of womb must have in the begin-

ning gone before it thus, *bewom* (the womb), and this accounts for this word being still pronounced as if written without the *b*. The word *wom*, which makes when analysed *iv-o-iv*, or *vie o vie*, or *iv o vie*, means *all life;* for here *o* may either signify *life*, or be equivalent to *all*, from its being the name of the sun. If we allow *o* to be for *life*, *iv o vie*, or *vie o vie* will mean "the life life." From the womb being the place of generation, this meaning of *all life* is very appropriate as applied to such a word. Then from *womb* and *woman* being the same word, it must follow that *woman* means "all life," which meaning is also appropriate, since she is the mother of all mankind.

The correctness of this account of the name *woman* is proved by an analysis of the same word in other languages. Thus *fœmina* must have first been *ina fœm*, *ina* being here what the word *an* is in wom*an*, or what the French word *une* is in *une femme*. Hence the French word *femme*, which ought to be written *foem*, or (which were still more correct, as we shall see presently,) *fam*, is a much more ancient word than *fœmina*, and hence it is not derived from this latter word, but it is this word itself in its primitive state. Now when we analyse this ancient word *fœm*, we have *iv-oim*, for *f* is here the same as *v*, and this is for *iv* or *vie*, which is equal to *the life* or *thing*, as I have often shown, and the *e* in foem (*fœm*), might just as well be *i;* then if we take from *iv oim* the word *iv* (the), we have the radical part alone remaining in *oim;* and

if we here sound the *oi* as we do in the French word *oi*-seau (a bird), that is, as if written *wa* in English, *oim* will become *wam*, which is no other than *womb*. Now the *m*, as we shall see when accounting for this letter in the alphabet, is here equal to *iv*, *vie*, or *if;* then supposing we were to write *oim*, *oi if*, and still pronounce the *oi* as above, what shall we have for *oi if* but *waif*, which is no other but *wife*, and which many persons do really pronounce as if written *waife* or *woife?* just as many persons pronounce the English pronoun *I* as if written *oï*, (that is, in two syllables,) rather than as if written *ai* or *aye*. As the *b* is also used frequently for the *f*, if instead of *waif* we write *waib*, what shall we have but the German word for *wife*, which is written *weib?* The Saxon word for *womb*, pamb (wamb), is, when we consider that the Saxon *w* is the same as an *f*, evidently *fam be*, that is, *woman be*, the being woman; and this proves that the French word *femme* ought to be written *fam*, as it is pronounced. The form of this word (*fam*), when analysed, is *foim;* that is, when we consider the letter *a* alone, to the formation of which I have thus already openly hinted several times; but the following observation must put every body in the way of discovering the original of this letter. When instead of *foemina* we write *fœmina*, what do we do? We make the *o* and the *e* become one letter. Then if we make the *o* and the *i* in *foimina*, which is more correct than *foemina*, become one letter, what shall we have but *fam-ina?* Then what is

the letter *a?* This *foim* (the analysis of *fam*) becomes itself, when analysed, *if oim*, or *iv oim*, in which *iv* is for *the*, and *oim*, when we give to *oi* the sound of *wa*, is for *wam*, and this is evidently *wom* (*wom*-be).

What does all this prove? That *woman* and *womb* are but one and the same word, which we clearly see when we make the two words *an* and *be*, with which *woman* and *womb* (*wombe*) end, precede as they must have primitively done these words; as, for instance, *an wom*, *be wom*. But what else does all this prove? That the several words *woman*, *womb*, *fœmina*, *femme*, *wife*, *weib*, and *wamb*, are all radically the same; that is, not derived from one another, but all *one and the same word.*

The reader will please to remember, that those observations on man, woman, Adam, &c., have risen out of an explanation given of the word *la*, which, though composed of *il ea*, is not a plural number, since *il* refers, like a word called an article, to *ea*, which here means *earth* in general, and becomes definite or limited from its juncture with *il*. Such is the origin of the two words, or to speak more correctly, of the one word *la* or *là*. Thus we see that *nos*, that is, *no is*, is no more a plural number than *notre* or *nostre*, that is, *nos être*. But how are we to account for *nous*, which is the French of the Latin *nos?* Very easily. We know that this *nos* was first *no*, then when it had this form some men attached *os* to it instead of *is*, so that it became *noos* instead of *nois;* and as the *o* is a letter which is not so easily

dropped as *i* is, hence *noos* never became *nos* in French, but it has been erroneously written *nous*, and this accounts for *oo* and *ou* being equal in sound. But what difference is there as to meaning between *os* and *is?* None; and hence it is that these two words, which belong to those called pronouns or articles, might, when the word *nous* was yet only *no*, have been used with it indifferently by the same persons; just as any body may now employ the words *it* and *that* indifferently; as when we say, *it is* IT, or *it is* THAT.

This account of *nos* will apply to *vos*, the *supposed* plural of *votre*, it being in like manner the contraction of *vo-is*, and consequently no more a plural than *vos-etre;* but though what has been said of the formation of *nos* will apply to *vos*, yet something may be said respecting the formation of *vos*, which will not at all apply to *nos*. The latter has had but two forms; at first *no*, this being the contraction of *in o* (one one), and then *nos*, this being the contraction of *no is* (we it, or we that); but *vos* must have had three forms: at first *i i* (one one), which two words, from their having coalesced, became one letter (*u*), and this was also, as we have seen, written *v*. When this letter had acquired this short sound, men must have begun to make it refer to single objects, and hence it became with time equal to one *i*, and so meant *one go*, or *one thing*, or which is still equal, *one being* or *one life*. But how, it may be asked, can I prove this statement to be correct? From knowing that *i* meant *one*, and that *one one*

was a plural number. But I have another means of proving the correctness of this statement; it is that an instance exists in Latin of *u* or *v* being for *vos*, and this is shown in the analysis of *vester*, which is for *v-ester* (*vos-ester*), the word *ester* being here what *être* or *estre* is in French, and the single *v* being in like manner equal to the French word *vous*, or the Latin word *vos*. Hence, when *i i* became shortened to *u* or *v*, and that it was generally made to refer to only one thing, an *o* was used with it to signify *one one*, or several persons, and after this it took the word *is*, just as the word *no* did. I said when accounting for *nos* (*in-o-is*), that here *in* stands for one; but as the letter *i* did, without the *n*, stand for one also, it is now difficult to discover what first led men to add still another letter to this *i*, since they did not, by their doing so, intend to name an additional idea, but to express the same thing over again. This apparent singularity must have happened in the following manner: the letter *n*, as here formed, is, like the *u* (which is nothing more than an *n* turned up), composed of a double *i*, and hence it is the letter *u* in another situation. Now as the *u* did, from its being composed of a double *i*, stand for two, men saw there was a necessity, when this compound character was made to signify only one, to give it on many occasions a different sound, in order to avoid the confusion that might otherwise arise. Hence when *u* meant one, and that there was a probability of its meaning being then mistaken, it received a nasal sound; and

this short emission of the voice was the more expressive of what was meant, from the lips being kept wide apart, whilst for the sounding of the *u* and the *v* they were allowed to approach, as if thus, from their being composed of two, to indicate a plural number. In writing, this limited meaning of the *u* was signified by its taking an *n* after it, as *un*, which means *u*, but *u* when it stands for one. This character *n* must have even become necessary for showing more clearly on certain occasions when *i* meant only *one* as to number; for we must not forget that this character (*i*) had several other meanings, such as life, motion, &c. But men found other means besides putting an *n* after a *u* for showing in writing that the latter character stood only for one, or that it was not to be considered as it usually was. Thus in Greek it was changed from υ to the more contracted form of ν, whilst the Roman character (*u*) was merely turned upside down (*n*). Now this knowledge of *n* leads to several important discoveries, without counting the assistance it will lend in the analysing of words. We now discover the origin of the letter *n* when bearing this form *N*. We see it arose from the ι and the ν in Greek (ν) having come frequently together for the purpose stated above—that of clearly indicating one—and from their having then coalesced thus, ιν, and having so become *N*. We have seen that the *n* alone has been added to *u* (*un*), to show that the latter character then meant one; but from the frequent occurrence of *in* having this meaning, it is

natural to suppose that, on many occasions, it must have been used instead of a single *n*. Thus the English word *one*, when analysed according to its sound (and great attention is to be paid to the pronunciation of words in familiar use) becomes *oine*, by which we see that to *o* was added not an *n* but *in;* and this accounts for this word being generally pronounced as if written *wan;* for the primitive sound of *oi* was, as it is still heard in French, equal to the English syllable *wa*. But men who have made orthoepy the study of their lives, tell us that the English word *one* should be pronounced as if written *won*, and that it is very vulgar to pronounce it *wan;* but then they never suspected that *one* is for *oin;* for they have known just as much about letters as grammarians have known about words. Thus from their having in common with all animals that can see, the power of distinguishing two objects of different forms from one another, they plainly saw that A is not B; and in like manner, from their having in common with animals the power of distinguishing different sounds from one another, they knew that A was not pronounced like B; but notwithstanding all that has been written upon orthoepy, their knowledge of letters never went any farther, either as to form or sound.

We can now, also, see how it happens that *a*, *an*, and *one*, in English, mean *one*. We have just seen that *o* took *in* with it, to show more particularly—since *o* has other meanings—that the number *one* was then meant. But *o* might have also, for

the same purpose, taken a single *i*, and this it must have done previous to the formation of *in:* hence *a*, which is nothing else than *oi* contracted, has been made to signify *one;* as, for instance, when we say *a book*, by which we mean *one book* (that is, *oi* book), though we do not write the word *one;* and of this we may be very certain, by remarking that *an* has not a meaning different from *a*, since by both these words we understand precisely the same thing when we say, "Give me *a* book," and "Give me *an* apple." Now this being admitted, it must follow, that if *an* can be shown to be precisely equal to *one*, *a* must be equal to *one* also; since two things exactly equal to one another must be both equal to a third thing, provided either of them be equal to it. Then as we know — for we have had many undoubted proofs of it — that *a* when analysed becomes *oi*, it must follow that *an* is for *oin*, which makes, when *oi* is sounded as it ought to be — that is, as *wa* — *wan*, and this is precisely the same as *one*, or, as it ought to be written, *oin*.

Now, too, we can account for the letters *n* and *v* being allowed, in different languages, or even in the same language, to have a similar meaning. We know that it arises from these two letters being in reality the same letter, though having a very different sound. Hence English verbs ending in *en* — as spok*en*, writt*en*, &c. — are, in this termination, precisely the same as those that end in French in *eu* or *u* — as *teneu*, *reçeu*, or *tenu*, *reçu*. Now, also, we can tell how it happens, in French, that these different

syllables, *in*, *im*, *ain*, *aim*, *ein*, and *eim*, are all pronounced in exactly the same manner; and we can also correct a very erroneous opinion, which French orthoepists have entertained respecting these syllables. For the benefit of such persons as know nothing of French pronunciation, it will not be here amiss to observe, that some notion of the sound of these syllables may be acquired by its being stated that they are all pronounced like an English A when it is very short — such as in the word h*a*t, — and that we should then give to this letter a nasal sound, taking care when we do so, not to allow an *n* or a *g* to be heard. I make this latter observation, because most Englishmen tolerably acquainted with French, do believe that both an *n* and a *g* are ever heard in French nasal sounds; and though no Frenchman will admit that a *g* is on those occasions heard, still they all maintain that an *n* is; but this is a great mistake, as I am now going to prove. The letters *n* and *m* have in French, critically speaking, the same sound and the same name they have in English. Thus *en*, in the English word EN*ergy*, has precisely the same sound *en* has in the French word EN*ergie;* and *em* in EM*erald* has also the same sound we give to *em* in EM*eraude.* These two syllables *en* and *em*, as heard in these instances, are also the names given to *n* and *m* in both languages.

Now, though both *n* and *m* are here sounded and named very differently, yet the two syllables *ain* and *aim* have precisely the same sound. Yet

nobody will say that the two letters (*ai*), which here precede *n*, differ in any manner whatever from the two letters (*ai*) which precede *m*. Indeed every body in the world will admit that these two letters (*ai*) are in both these instances as clearly and as evidently equal to each other as *one* is equal to *one*. Then, this being granted, it must be allowed that we have here two things equal to one another, and that, consequently, no single thing can be made to have an effect on either of these two things in a certain way, without its having an equal effect on the other, if applied to it in precisely the same manner.

Now as *ai* differs in sound from *ain*, it follows that this difference has occurred by this single letter the *n* having been placed after it; and as *ai* has exactly the same sound when *m* is put after it, it follows that *ai* cannot in both instances have been affected by different things, but by one and the same thing. Then what is this thing? Is it an *n?* It is not; for the moment we allow the *n* to be heard, which we may do by placing a silent *e* after it, thus, *aine*, the syllable *ain* has no longer the same sound. Then is *ai* in *ain* or in *aim* made to have the sound it has from its being affected by an *m?* Not in the least; for when we allow the *m* to be heard, which we may do by putting a silent *e* after it, thus, *aime*, this syllable has no longer the same sound. We may, moreover, remark, that though *ain* and *aim* are, whilst thus written, equal in sound, they cease to be any longer so when this same character (*e*) is

applied to them equally, for *aine* is not at all sounded like *aime*. Now as all the letters in both these words, *aine* and *aime*, are, with the exception of *n* and *m*, equal, it follows that the difference in sound of these two syllables must proceed from these two letters not being equal. And if by the mere sounding of these two letters—which may be done by placing after them a silent *e*, that is, such a letter as only allows the consonant by which it is preceded to be heard—*ain* and *aim* have no longer the sound they had before, it is evident that neither the *n* nor the *m* can give to *ai* the peculiar sound which this syllable has when followed, as in the above instance, by these two letters. It must besides appear very strange that even the French syllable *in*, notwithstanding how greatly *i* differs, as to sound, in French from *ai* and *ei*, does not differ except in form from *ain*, *aim*, *ein*, and *eim;* whilst the moment we allow the *n* or the *m* to be heard in these syllables, they all differ widely from *in*, whether we pronounce this syllable as it is here written, or allow the *n* to be heard by putting a vowel after it.

Now here is the key to this mystery. Just as the letter *u*, when it meant *one*, took an *n* or an *in* after it, to signify what its meaning then was, so *ai* and *ei* took an *n* or *in* after them to show that they, like the *u*, were then to be taken for *one*, that is, for *in*—this being the sign which then indicated *one*. Then *ain* and *ein* are contractions of *ai-in* and *ei-in;* but it is only the meaning of *ai* and *ei* which is here heard, and not at all these syllables.

Nor is this meaning (*one*) the sound of an *n* or an *m*, but that of a very short *a*, to which a peculiar nasal sound is given. Thus *nain* (a dwarf), as it becomes when analysed *no-iin* (no one), or *ne oi in* (still *no one*), the pretended nasal sound of *ai* is here the word that stood anciently for *one;* and if we even write this word *nein*, it will be when analysed *ne in* (*no one*), in which we have still the word for *one*.

As to the syllables *aim*, *eim*, and *im*, we shall see, when we know thoroughly the nature of the *m*, that they are still for *one*. Thus *daim* (a doe) makes, when analysed, *id-aim* (the deer's love) or *id-oi-if* (the deer's wife*); yet both *love* and *wife* mean, when analysed, *one*, without taking into account the other ideas which these words name. We have just seen that *n* and *v* or *u* are in reality but one and the same letter; hence *love* is for *lone*—that is, what is single. Or we may analyse both words (*love* and *lone*) thus, *il one*, *il one*—that is, *the one*. If we analyse *love*, thus, *il-o-iv*, "the one life," that is, "the one thing," so may *wife* be analysed *iv-i-if*, "the one life," or "the one thing;" meaning by

* This word *daim* is also the same as *dame*. In the analysis of the latter word (dame), the *id* is to have its primitive meaning, which is that of *head* or *chief*, hence *dame* becomes when analysed, *id-oi-if*, and this means *head wife*. The literal meaning of *doe* is also *the head one* or *the chief one*, that is, as to motion; the *o* being also for life or motion, from its serving as a name for the *sun*. Thus the word *deer*, which ought to be written *dir*, is for *id ir*, that is *chief goer; ir* being here the same as *ire* (to *go*). As the *d* or *id* in *d*eer is the more audible part of this word, it has been chosen to represent the entire word *deer* in *daim* and *doe*.

this what is single; which meaning is appropriate, since a wife is a woman belonging only to one man. Wife may be also analysed so as to mean, as we have seen, woman or womb. From the great use made of this word *one* in the composition of words, it would seem that men in the beginning must have been often puzzled to find out what particular idea it named on certain occasions; but this was always known from its being preceded or followed by different words. Thus though *dove* and *love* have, when analysed, exactly the same meaning—*the one*, *the one* (*il one*, *id one*)—still they could never be mistaken for each other, as the one begins with *il*, and the other with *id*.

This peculiar French sound, heard in the syllables *aim*, *eim*, *ain*, *ein*, *im*, and *in*, accompanies also the *o* on many occasions; but the French word *on* was formed from *o n*, that is, by the addition of *n* only to *o*, since this single character (*n*) did, even without the *i*, mean in the beginning *one*. Hence this word *on* is of great antiquity; since, if we do not allow it to be a contraction of *o-in*, it must be older than *in*. This observation will also apply to the English preposition *on*, which is equal to *ov*, the radical part of *ov-er;* and when we here assign to *o* the meaning of *one*, we are to think of the sun, and to say that it means *one above*, such really being the meaning of *on*. But this we can understand still better by giving to *o* a meaning which it frequently has, that of *high*, and to *n* that of *it*, it being for the pronoun *en* or *in;* then these two

words, *high it*, are the two parts of which *height* is composed, when we do not account more minutely for this word.

As I promised, when accounting for *nos* and *vos*, to refer again to *os*, I may here do so.

When this word *os* is analysed, it becomes *o Be* (one Being), because the *is*, to which the *s* in *os* is equal, becomes, when analysed, B; but this remains yet to be shown. Hence there is no difference as to meaning between *os* and *ob*, for both mean "the one Being," or "the one thing," or "the one time." Now, as I have already said that the French termination *ois* has a similar meaning, it must follow that *ob*, *os*, and *ois*, are all equal in meaning, to which also may be added the *as* in *was* (*vie as*), since I have shown that this word (*as*) does not, in this respect, differ from *ois*. The reader may also remember, that in the account given of *ois* I allowed him to understand, by a comparison made between *was* and *fois*, that there could not be a letter more in *ois* than in *as*. To that statement I beg now to add, that not only as to meaning, but as to the number of the letters of which they are composed, there is no difference whatever between the words *ob*, *os*, *ois*, *as*; hence these four words, to which may be also added the word *ab*, were in the beginning but one and the same word.

The account of *is* in *nos* (*no is*), meaning *we that*, *we it*, to which I have already alluded, may be given here. The English pronoun *I*, as we now pronounce it, has also in its composition such an addi-

tional word as the *is* in *nos;* for *I* is really in sound *aï*, which must be a contraction of *ea i*, the meaning of these two words being, *that I* or *I that*, and hence this pronoun *I* does not differ in either sound or meaning from the familiar affirmative *ay*, which must be the contraction of *ea-i*, meaning *that I;* nor could these two words have always held this situation with regard to each other, for the *ea* must have fallen behind the *i*, thus, *iea* (I that); and in this we discover the other affirmative *yea*, and by shortening *iea* to *ia*, we have in this *ia* the German affirmative. Thus, too, the French *je* is to be accounted for, since it is nothing less than a compound of *is i*, the *s* in *is* having fallen under the pronoun *i* by which it is followed, as we may see by arranging and writing them thus: *i j*. Hence the French pronoun *je* ought to be written thus, *ij*, but the *i* has been dropped. By this we discover that the letter *J* is, as its form, when it is written thus, *j*, sufficiently indicates, made by the juncture of an *i* and an *s*. Of this circumstance we may be convinced, by observing that the English word *glazier* might, as to sound, be written *glajer*, admitting that we here give to *j* its French sound; for as *glazier* is for *glassier*, or rather *glasier*—for no word should have a double consonant—it has received its present sound of *glajer* from the *s* having fallen under the *i*. As a further confirmation of this fact, it may be also observed that children, before they can sound *j*, allow us to hear a *z* instead of this letter. Even grown persons—the Italians for instance—do the

same. Thus English children pronounce the name *Julia* as if written *Zulia*, and French children, as well as nine Italians out of ten, pronounce *Julie* as if written *Zulie*. Here I may be reminded, that it is not requisite to prove that *j* and *z* are naturally the same, but that *i* and *o* combined are equal to *j*. But this I do prove by showing that *j* and *z* are equal; for as I can produce very high authority to show that *z* is the same as *is*, it follows that it must be equal to *j* also, or two things equal to one another are not so with regard to a third. The very high authority to which I allude, is the wise man, whoever he was, that named the sixth letter of the Greek alphabet (ζῆτα); for this precious word tells us, when analysed, that *is* and *z* are equal, as we shall see when we come to it. But the analysis of a word or two in which there is a *z*, must on this matter remove all doubt. The word *zone*, when analysed, becomes *iz-o-in*, of which the primitive order must have been *in-iz-o*, which means *it is o;* that is, *it is round.*

By this instance we see that *z* is evidently for *is;* and as *z* is equal to *j*, so must *is* be equal to it also. *Zero*, which makes when analysed *iz-er-o*, and consequently means *is the o*, furnishes another proof that *z* is equal to *is*, and that *j* and *is* must for the same reason be equal. I seldom look into old books to confirm by quotations what thus appears too evident to admit of any doubt; but a friend to whom I am indebted for many proofs of the truth of my discovery, has just informed me by

letter that many instances of *is* being used instead of *j*, as I have stated, occur in a translation of St. Augustin's Confessions by the Jesuit Ceriers, and which work was published as late as the year 1657. Thus *toujours* is written *tousiours*, and *deja*, *desia*, as we may see in the following passages :—" Vous voyez cela, seigneur, et vous vous taisez, patiens, tres misericordieux et veritable. Peutêtre que vous taisez *tousiours*." * " J'estois *desia* en consideration parmy les orateurs, cequi m'enfloit d'un orgeuil autant insupportable que vain." †

There is great necessity for inquiring thus minutely into the nature of a letter, as this may lead to the knowledge of many words. Thus, do we now want to analyse the French word *deja*, we know that the *j* may be a *z* or *is*, and we see that *deja* must become *id-iz-ea*, or *id is ea*, of which the meaning is, " it is that;" and this is, as if we were to say, "it is the thing," "it is the affair;" in short, *deja* is, according to this analysis, a simple affirmative; and this is confirmed by the same word in Latin (*jam*), which, when analysed, makes *im is ea* (it is that). This word may be also analysed thus, *is ea vie*, as we shall see hereafter; and as the order of these words ought to be *vie is ea*, the meaning is, " it is that." But *jam* may be even analysed thus, *is am*, which means *is ay*, for this *am* is another word for *I*, since it may be also thus analysed, *oi-im*, as the reader must know if he has profited by the several

* Livre i. chap. xviii. p. 32.
† Livre iii. chap. iii. p. 62.

indications I have given respecting the original form of *a*. This *oi-im* is literally *I im* (I am), and when we make *im* precede *oi*, we have *imoi*, which has been contracted to *moi*, the French pronoun. Lest it may be doubted that such a form as *is ay* has been ever used, I beg to remark that the affirmative *yes* is a contraction of *yea is*, which must have first been *is yea*. In like manner, do we now want to account for the English word *jealous*, we must look to *j*, and consider it as *is* or as *z*, and by this we shall be surprised to discover what was never suspected — namely, that *jealous* and *zealous* make but one word, and that, consequently, to be *jealous* is to be *zealous*. Hence jealousy is a more praiseworthy feeling than has been supposed, since it is no more than to be zealous, even to suspicion. How happily this is confirmed by the Greek language, in which *jealousy* is translated by ζηλος (*zelos*), which, when analysed, becomes *os-zel, the zeal;* from which it is evident that *zeal* and *jealousy* are equal. But how, the English scholar will ask, is zeal rendered in Greek? why by ζηλος to be sure, that is, by the same word that names *jealousy*. Hence, though in French and English we make some difference, as to form, between *zeal* and *jealousy*, the Greeks made none. As the French word *jalousie* makes, when analysed, *is-ea-il-os-i*, it is clear that it ought to be now written *jealousie*, and not *jalousie;* but this word is written so, from the *e* being not sounded. Nor should the *ous* in *jalousie*, any more than in the English word, be

preferred to *os*, as there is no necessity for it. *Jealousy* is to be thus analysed, *zeal-os-i*, and these words are then to take this order, *os i zeal* (the one zeal)—that is, "the one thing zeal," "the thing zeal." And then, if we wish to know what is meant by *zeal*, we are to analyse it thus, *is ea il;* in which instance *ea* serves as a qualifying word to *il* (another word for *being*), and it means, *the first*, from *a* being the first letter of the alphabet, and also from *ea* or the *ea*rth being the first of God's works. Then *zeal* will mean "is the first or chief being," —that is, "it is the first of life, its soul, its most lively part." Zeal may be also analysed thus, *il is ea;* but the meaning will be still the same, as this implies it is the first, the chiefest. But as the analysis *ea* gives *e-o-i*, and as this means "the round one," which may refer to the sun or the earth, hence *zeal* may mean, "it is the sun"—that is, "it is to the sun," "belonging to the sun;" in other words, it is like him—all life, all animation. The French orthography for *zeal* (*zele*) is also very correct, and it is to be analysed thus, *is-e-il*, which means "the life life," that is, "all life," "all animation;" for here *e* is for *life*, as we shall see when we know what the name Ητα, given to the seventh letter of the Greek alphabet means. If we even allow to the three words *is-e-il* this order (and such, too, they must have had), *il is e*, the meaning will still be, "the life life"—that is, "all life," "all soul."

As the English word *zeal* may also with great propriety be analysed thus, *e-al-is*, (all being, all life,)

it will be found to be literally as in French. We shall have thus often occasion to remark that the same word may be accounted for in various ways, whilst the meaning will be ever the same. This variety of form accounts for our having, to all appearance, many languages, though we have in reality but one; since all the words in the world are made out of the same few radical syllables, such as *ib*, *ic*, *id*, *ea*, *is*, &c., of which the meaning was in the beginning the same with all people. Hence these few radical syllables may be compared to the ten figures 1, 2, 3, &c., by means of which all numbers are formed.

These observations respecting the letter *j* have grown, the reader may remember, out of the account given of *nos*, of which the *is* (*no-is*) has the meaning of the word *it* or *that*. But I may add to the proofs just given on this head, that *eg o*, or *eg io*, is also for *I that;* and *Ich*, in German, which, analysed, makes *ic vie*, has not a different meaning.

The analysis of many words in the foregoing pages has been given rather superficially, as closer investigation could not, at those different times, be made without occasioning very considerable digressions. Of what I thus state I am now going to give an instance—and I hope an interesting one—by attempting an explanation of the first names man ever had for his own dwelling. It is observed in the note to the word Baron (vol. i. p. 389.) that the word *barrack* means, when analysed, *a warhouse*, the *b* being here, as it frequently is, the same as a *v* or

a *w*. I also then stated that the final syllable (*rack*) of this word ought to be *ac* or *ak*, and that it means, when analysed, *a house*, though I did not at the time show how this happens.

I am now going to make amends for this deficiency, and beg to apprise the reader that as the present inquiry is an important one, there is every necessity for supporting whatever I advance during its progress, by a critical analysis of the principal words to which I shall be obliged to refer. This latter circumstance I mention in order to account for the digressions which I foresee are in such a case inevitable. The reader must by this time have discovered how the letter *a* was first formed, and he must for this reason know that the word *ac* becomes, when analysed, *oi-ic*, and that the primitive order of these two words must have been *ic-oi*, of which the general meanings are "the round one," "the great one," "the high one," &c. As men had in the beginning but a few syllables to name all their ideas by, they were thus obliged to allow the same letter to have various meanings; but then there is nothing in this irrational, for as one thing may have several properties, so may a letter have different powers. Thus every body can conceive that as the O named the sun, it might mean *high*, *round*, or *one*, since men have always allowed the sun to have, besides its other properties, these three qualities. Hence we are, in the analysing of words, to observe well, when a letter or word offers thus several meanings, which is the one that can with

greatest safety be applied. The surest guide, when there is on such occasions any doubt, is to see how the same idea is named by a different people; and no more is required for doing this than an acquaintance with the characters of the language we wish to consult. Then let us, on the present occasion, see how man's habitation was named in other languages, in order to discover, if possible, the exact meaning of *ac* in barrack.

Bian in the ancient Saxon language meant habitation, and this word makes, when analysed, *bi-oin*, that is, *the one, the thing one;* and if we make these two words change places, the meaning will not be different, since in this case they will make *oin-bi*, that is, *one thing*. From this it would appear that by *ic-oi* (the analysis of *ac*) is simply meant *the one*, *oi* being here taken collectively. We have already had many instances of two vowels being thus employed for naming a single idea. We know, for instance, that even these two letters mean the single individual *I*, as in *aud*IO, *accip*IO, &c. Then so far the analysis of both these words is the same as to signification; and we see that *ac*, once a name for a house, has also another form, that of *ca;* and such it must have first been, since *ic oi* (the analysis of *ca*), from its literally meaning *the thing one*, is a more natural construction than *one the thing*, the latter being the literal meaning of *oi ic*, the analysis of *ac*. Now what difference is there as to meaning between the Saxon word for a habitation (*bian*) and the French word *bien*, as when we say,

mon bien (my substance, property, or wealth)? There is none whatever; for both words have, when analysed, the same meaning. Thus *bien* makes *ib ien;* and as we have already accounted for the termination *ien*, we know that this means *the one*. Even *bien* may, without causing the least change in its meaning, be analysed *ib ian*. Hence *bian* and *bien* make one and the same word; and as we know very well what *bien* means, we are led to the right understanding of *bian* also, and consequently we discover the exact idea which men first had in this instance of a house. We see that it was the same word they had for property; and this explains why this word is still in the French language used in this sense; whilst in English it means, when thus referring to one's substance, all that a man possesses in the world, as I have already shown in another part of this work* (vol. i. p. 194.).

* As I perceive on returning to page 194. that this word has not been sufficiently developed, I beg here to supply what I consider still necessary to observe respecting it. When we say, "John's *property* is very considerable," every body allows that by *property* is here meant all the property belonging to John. But when we say, "This book is John's *property*," all the dictionaries ever printed assert that property in such an instance has no longer the same meaning, and that it does not now mean "all things belonging to John," but only one single thing, namely, a book. Now as this word is still used in the sense of possession, is written and pronounced in the same manner, and is preceded by the same word as before (namely, John's), it must appear very extraordinary that it should differ in its meaning, and especially to such a degree. If we take another word, such as house, for instance, and use it in a similar manner, that is, put it in two similar situations, we dare not assert that it varies in meaning so, or that it varies at all. Thus if we say, "John's house is very considerable," or "This is John's house," nobody can suppose that the word house has here, on account of its different situations, undergone the least change

Now as *bian* is a compound word, that is, as it is composed of *bi* and *an*, of which only one can be the radical word for habitation, it is very requisite to know which of these two words was the radical one. This research leads to very important discoveries belonging to the present inquiry. After a short examination of *bi* and *an*, it is easy to perceive that the former is the real word for habitation, and that they both have this meaning: "property (to) *one*," that is, "The property belonging to one." And as the word *man*, without analysing it so minutely as I have already done (see vol. ii. p. 11.), makes *im an* (the one), *bian* means *the habitation to man*. Thus we perceive that it was not enough to know from the analysis of *bian* the meaning of each word separately considered, but that we should know the exact relation they bear to each other. If we allow the two words *bi-an* to change places, as *an bi*, the meaning will not on this account change, since they may even so imply, *to man the habitation;* but this is not their natural order.

as to meaning. Then why should the word property, when so employed, change any more than house? Hence this word does not change, but it ever has in the English language when used in this sense, that is, when it implies possession, one and the same meaning, and this is, *all things*. Hence, when it *seems* to mean but one thing, there is ever this ellipsis, "a part of," so that "This book is John's property," means, "This book is [a part of] John's property." This error arose from our not having hitherto known that words have four degrees of comparison; and this arose from our not having known what a word is, and this again from our entire ignorance of the nature of the human mind. I was here going to analyse the word *property*, but I perceive so many important discoveries rising out of it, that I cannot think of doing so yet.

Thus, from knowing that *bi*, which might as well be written *by* or *bye*, is another name for man's home, we discover what we never knew before, the meaning of *good bye:* we perceive that it is not a corruption of *good be with you*, as has been supposed, but that it literally means, *good home*, that is, *good home to you*, "A safe journey home to you;" and this is as logical as to say, "A good journey to you," or "Good day to you." Now as *good bye* cannot mean *a safe journey back*, we should never employ it when addressing a person who is leaving his home, but when he is going thither. From our having always had about as clear an idea of the meaning of this word *bye* as a parrot must have of its name, we have used it in every way. Our idea of the preposition *by* is just as clear as that of *bye* in *good-bye* has been; yet no word can be more frequently used than *by;* and how extraordinary it must appear that all the wit of man cannot tell what it means. The same word in French (*par*) is equally unknown, for no Frenchman living can tell what idea he has of it; and for a very good reason, which is, that he has no idea at all, or if one of any kind, it must be of a most confused description, that is, such as no human ingenuity can define. Yet there is no difference whatever between *by* the preposition and *bi* in *bian*, for which I have just accounted, and hence it is equal to one of those words called pronouns, or to the verb to *be*, or to the verb to *go*. This is clearly proved by an analysis of the French word *par*, which makes *ip ea ir*,

and means, *of the thing*, or *of it*; or still, *concerning the thing*, or *concerning it*. Then *by* has, like *par* and all other prepositions, such a word as *concerning* or *partly* understood, when, not already expressed, before it; but in *par*, this word, which indicates that less than the entire thing is meant, we see expressed by *ip*, which is here equal to *iv* or *of*, of which word I shall have occasion to speak fully when accounting for *alpha*.

Thus from discovering that *bian* means "a property to man," "belonging to man," we are led to suppose that *ac* is to be thus analysed, *oi-ic—to one it*, that is, *to man it*. But as *oi* is also for earth, it may be asked if *ac* does not mean *to earth it*, thus signifying that the first house was of earth or mud. I do not, notwithstanding the apparent strength of this objection, believe that any thing else than *man*'s habitation is meant by *ac*; for it is more important to know to whom or to what a dwelling belongs, than to tell of what it is composed. Besides I find, from an analysis of the word *caban*, (in English, but not in French, erroneously written *cabin*,) that when men wished to signify of what their dwelling was composed, they did so by making a suitable addition to its name. Thus *caban*, when analysed, becomes *ic-ea-bi-an*, which literally means, "the earth dwelling to one," that is, "to man," which implies that a *caban* was of earth or mud. In this analysis I suppose the name for a habitation to have been already *bi*, and not *ib*, which it must have primitively been. It might also seem that

the form of the house was signified in *caban*, and that it may mean, "the round one to man." This cannot be, unless we allow *ib* and not *bi* to have been the name of the dwelling when the whole word *caban* was made; and then we should analyse thus, *ic-o-ib-an*, which may, I allow, be contracted to *caban*, from the *o* going over to the *ib;* and then the meaning will be, "the round thing." But if such were the true meaning of *caban*, we should in all probability have this word written *coban* instead of *caban* or *cabin*. Thus *cob*, a coin, (*ic-o-ib*, the round thing,) has not become *cab*. Nor has *noble* (also a coin) become *nable;* yet it has the same meaning with *cob*, since it must have first been *el nob;* and *nob* makes *in o ib*, "the round thing." The same may be said of *knob* (a knot), which does not differ from *nob* but by its having an article more (*ik*), so that it also means, "the round thing." To these instances I might add several other words, in which *oi*, meaning a round thing, has not been contracted to *a;* but I perceive several in which, however, this contraction has taken place. *Nab*, a cant word for a head or hat, and which must have been *en-o-ib*, is not now *nob;* though I believe that this word is still familiarly used for *head*. Thus the ancient Roman coin *as*, which was first *ois*, and literally meant, "the round thing," has not become *os*. Nor has the English vessel called a *can*, and which must have also been coin, become *con;* yet it bears its name from its being of copper, of which *coin* is made. Even the

word *copper* itself takes its name from the round thing made of it, that is, from money, since it is for *cober;* and it must have first been *cob*, which was an ancient coin; and from the article *er* preceding this word, and then falling behind it, the word *copper* was formed. Thus, too, the English word *pan* (ip *oin*) means, *in one*, that is, "in money." Hence it is that *a copper* means a kitchen utensil, and also a piece of money. It must, however, appear strange that metals should take their names from the things made out of them, and not the things from them. This has, however, happened; and I cannot account for it, but by supposing that it arose from the frequent use and mention made of money, so that the primitive name for the substance from which it was produced was forgotten. This were an interesting inquiry, and I regret that I cannot here digress so far as to enter upon it; but the curious reader will find that over the whole world it was as I here state: coins received their names from their round forms, and so meant *one;* and hence the metals out of which they are made have, when analysed, a similar meaning.

A great deal might yet be said respecting *ac*, and doubts raised as to whether this word really means a dwelling belonging *to man*, *a round thing*, or, "*a thing* in earth." But I prefer its meaning of a dwelling belonging to man; and hence I explain the English word *house* in a similar manner. It makes in the analysis *he-oi-is* (it to man is). Here

I put *he* to show that *h* is the same as a pronoun or article, but it would be more correct, as we shall see, to render it by *iv* or *ii*, either of which is also equal to *he*. The *u* in *house* has been formed, the reader may perceive, from the *i* in *oi* going over to the *i* in *is*. The French word *maison* should be analysed thus, *mais-on*, meaning *man one*, that is, "to man the one," "the one belonging to man." Here *mais* does not differ from the word *man*, but by its having taken a different article (*is* instead of *in*). Hence *maistre* (master) is for *mais-être* (*être mais*), *the being man*, and hence we still say indifferently, "The man of the house," and "The master of the house." *Mais* may also mean (but then the sun or the Divinity is referred to) "the high one being" (*im-oi-is*). This, too, is the original of the word *mast* (of a ship), of *most* in English, and of *major* in Latin, and consequently of several other words of a similar description, to which I cannot in this place otherwise refer. *Mast* literally means, "the high one it is" (*im-oi-is-it*), and *most*, (which may be thus analysed, *im-os-it*, or thus, *im-o-ist*, but the meaning is the same,) "the sun it is." I have already accounted for *j*, and have proved it to be *i* (*is*): hence *maj* in *major* is for *mais*, which has been just explained. As to the *or* at the end of this word it is equal to *one being*, and is here in apposition to *maj*, so that the whole word means, when we make *or* take its primitive place, thus, *or-maj*, "the one being," or "the high one it is." But the word *mais* may simply

mean *one over*, that is, *one except*, "one besides," and even in this case reference is made to the sun. Thus the conjunction *mais* (*but*) signifies, "one thing over" or "above what is already admitted." And the English word *but* (*ib-oi-it*), which means "the high one it," has precisely the same meaning; for here *oi it* has been shortened to *out*, so that *but* is the same as *be out*, thus, "I should do that, BUT for John," means, "I should do that *be out* John," that is, "he being out of the affair." The other French word for *but* (*hormis*) has exactly the same meaning, since *hor* or *hors* means, as every body knows, *out;* and the whole, when thus analysed, *hor-im-is*, means, "out be it." But this will go, it may be remarked, to prove that *the high one*, or *the sun*, is synonymous with *out;* and so it is, as we shall see when accounting for *alpha*. But may we not even here remark, that *hor* or *hors* makes *he-o-ir*, which means, "the one being," or "the sun," or "the high being?"

The Latin word for *house* (*domus*) is, without considering the article at end, which is a modern addition, to be analysed thus, *id-o-iv*, *the one to life*, for *m* is also equal to *v*, as we shall see when accounting for the letter *m*. And when we give to *id*, in the analysis *id-o-iv*, its primitive meaning, these three words will mean "chief one to life," meaning by this one's *abode*, which must in ancient times have been the chief part of a man's property. Then when *dom* was thus far formed, it took the article *us* or *os* before it, which afterwards fell behind.

The Greek word for *house* is οικος, which must have first been ος οικ, *the house*, and hence the radical word is *oik*, and these three letters are the original of *ac* or *ak*, in *barrack* (*warhouse*), for when the *o* and *i* fall together they become *a*. Hence this must remove every doubt, if there be any, as to *ac*, for which I have already accounted, being the name of a *house*. I have therefore no observations to make respecting the word in Greek, since those which apply to *ac* will apply with equal propriety to οικ, they being one and the same word.

Another word of great antiquity is *castle*, which we know must have been *el cast;* and from this we discover that *castle* was at one time only *cast*, which is confirmed by *out-cast*, since this word means "one that has no house to go to," and it is consequently for *out of cast*, that is, *out of house*.

The animal named the *castor*, and which really means, when analysed, "the owner of a house," as, *cast-o-ir*, which was first *o-ir-cast*, and is, literally, "the great one to a house," that is, "the great animal that has a house;" from which circumstance it must have received its name. Now when we trace this word *cast* up to its very birth, we shall have *ic oi est*, which means, "it to man is;" and from an inspection of these three words, it is evident that the six following names for a house must have been formed from them. The first was *ic*, the second *ca*, the third *cas*, and the fourth *cast;* after which men said, *el cast*, and then *castle*

or *castel.* As the Greek name for a house (accounted for above) must have been *ik oi* before the *ik* fell behind, and that both words became *oik*, it follows that *cast* and *oik*, as well as *ac* in *barrack*, were once but one and the same word. From the French word *maison*, making in the analysis *im-oi-is-on*, it is evident that at least *im a*, *ma*, *mas*, and *mais* must have been so many different names for a house. At the time it was only *mas*, the English word *mason* and the French word *maçon* must have been formed; and these two words are consequently to be thus analysed, *on-mas*, "one to a house," that is, "one for a house," "a builder of a house." But we may discover, from an analysis of the word *camp*, that when *im a* existed the *im* fell behind, and both words became *am*, and it was then the word camp was formed, since it makes in the analysis *ic-am-ip* (the house in). And it was when the word for *castle* was yet only *cast*, that the Latin word *castera* (a camp) was formed, since it also means, "being in the house," or more literally, "it is to the house." The French word *caserne* was made when *cas* was the name for a house, since this word also literally means "house it in" (*cas-er-in*), that is, "it is in the house," "it is to be in the house." A more significant word than *camp*, *caserne*, or *castera*, is, we thus perceive, the English word *barracks*, since it means "a warhouse." What a pity that a word bearing so powerful a meaning should have appeared for so many ages as mere

jargon, since nobody could imagine what it signified by itself, or why a house, the most important of all others, was so named!

I beg now to give a few instances of the attention which will be required in the analysing of words, when the same qualities belong to very different things.

We know that *oi* means *the earth*, or *the round one*, yet as we have seen that it means also *man*, a *coin*, a *knot*, a *nab*, or *nob*, &c.; with a great many other words, of which every body may give instances. Then how are we to explain *cast*—which was, we have seen, once a name for a *house*—when this word means a *throw?* To discover this meaning we are to analyse *cast*, thus, *coist;* and as we know it must have been something round which men used anciently to throw, we are to look at this word very closely, and in case we cannot discover the one required, we are to change all its letters except the radical ones (*oi*) for others which we may suppose to be of equal value. This will lead us at once to what we look for; for when *coist* was only *cois*, it might have been *coit*, which is the original of *quoit*, and also its true pronunciation when we sound *oi* as *wa*, which is its present sound in French. Hence *coit* literally means, "the each round it" (*ic-o-it*); that is, each side of it is round. But how are we to explain this word, when it becomes contracted to *cat?* By "it to the round one is," which implies that it is addicted

to sitting — to be what the French call *coi*, that is, fixed, stationary; and hence come the words to *wait*, to *watch*, to be *quiet*, and to be *coy*, all of which were one time *oi*, that is, *sitting;* but it literally means, "to be on the round one," that is, "to be seated," "to be on one's hinder part." Then I may be told that at one time the radical words for *man*, the *earth*, a *quoit*, a *cat*, and the part of the body to which I have referred, made but one and the same word; and so they did, and they could only be distinguished from one another by the different words that followed or preceded them; and thus it must have been in all the languages in the world. But I may here be told that in the Greek or Latin word *discos* or *discus* (a *quoit*), there is no allusion made to *the round one*, since here there is neither an *a* nor an *o*, for *os* or *us*, as it is not the radical part (which is *disc*), cannot be considered in the analysis of *disc*us. But the reader will see, when he knows what the *s* is, that the word *disc* makes, when analysed, *dio-ic*, which was once only *io*, and then *id-io*, which became *Dio*, and was another name for the Divinity; and whilst in this state it took, in order to signify a *quoit*, *ic* before it, which fell afterwards behind. But men put before *Dio* the article *is*, instead of *ic*, when the Divinity was referred to, and from this too having fallen behind, the Spanish word *Dios* (God) has been formed. But even here the reader may perceive that the *disc* in *discos* or *discus* can be no other

than *disk*, the sun or the moon's phases. Even the French word for a *quoit* (*palet*) is, I find, on analysing it, a very ancient name for Apollo, as we may thus see; *ip-o-il-it*, which was first *it ip il-o*, and then it literally meant *God in the sun*. *Apollo* in its present form is to be analysed thus; *oi-ip-ol*, *il o*, "the God in the sun, the sun;" that is, "the God in the sun (it is), the sun."

It may also appear impossible to find in the word *tranquil* the idea named in *coi;* yet this word literally means, "to be upon one's keel," as we may thus see; *être oin qiil*, "to be on keel:" *oin* and *on* make, I have already often remarked, one and the same word; but if I am, however, to explain *on* in this instance, I must do so by the word *one*, so that it does not matter which word I adopt. If *one* be preferred, the analysis is to be explained thus; *être-one kiil*, "to be to the one thing keel." This word *kiil* had not always this form, for the *l* at the end must have gone first, thus, *il kii;* and here, if we allow the double *i* to become *u*, we shall have the French word at present in use for naming that part of the human body to which I have already referred. By this we discover that between the *keel* of a vessel and this word there is no difference. Hence *tranquil*, which appears a very elegant word, turns out, when closely examined, to be one of the plainest in the world. It is at present in French written *tranquille*, and when we take away *tran*, what remains is still the exact word

for keel in French.* And as this word is in Latin *tranquillus*, which must have first been *us tranquill*, we see the great antiquity of the form of French words, and how purely, in this instance, the primitive pronunciation must have been preserved, since this word *quille* is even still pronounced as if written *kiil*, and just as the English word *keel*. The double *i* in *kiil* is very significant, when we remark that the bottom of a vessel is composed of two parts. The most homely word in the English language for naming the part of the human body already indicated, has an *r* in it, and this letter is to be also found in the word *war*, and for the same reason, as we shall see in the analysis of the latter word when we come to it. The words *peace*, *pax*, *paix*, *peaceable*, and *paisible*, have all the same literal and homely meaning to be found in *tranquil*; and I have no doubt but the corresponding words

* When we take from the word *quille* its article part, namely, *ille*, but which ought to be *il*, what remains will give the present pronunciation of the forbidden word alluded to; but when written, a *c* is preferred to a *q*. In *cul-de-sac* (a blind alley) this word does not offend, yet its meaning is not lost, though Frenchmen have never suspected that the *l* is here for *il*, and that in the beginning it stood first. In the French word *cuisse* (thigh) we have also this word hidden from observation by its juncture with *isse* (to be), in which we have the Latin infinitive in its primitive state, that is, written *isse* (as in another part of this work I said it ought to be), and not *esse*. To understand the word *cuisse*, this final part must be made to go first, and take after it the word *to*, which is understood. The English word *thigh*, as it makes, when analysed, *the-ig-u* (*the great one* belonging to *u*) its meaning is the same as in French, since in the latter tongue we may see by analysing the same word minutely thus, *ic-u-isse*, that a single letter (*u*) is the real name of the word referred to; for the *q* or *c* by which it is preceded, is only the article — and is to be written *iq* or *ic* — indicating the radical part *u*.

of all other languages will be found to be still the same. The different words that mean *to sit* * are also, when analysed, very plain; nor are we to be surprised that words of this kind should be also names for a dwelling, since in our own days the word *seat* (also a very plain word when analysed) has this double use; for besides its being taken in the sense to which I allude, it means also a dwelling, as we may, on many occasions, say, indifferently, *a country house* and *a country seat.*

In our corrupt days, when such harmless allusions as those offend — and nothing can more forcibly prove our loss of that innocence which characterised men while the world was yet young — we may be led to pride ourselves on the growth of delicacy; but I could here, by the analysis of a few words, show that we have in this respect, as well as in every refined and noble sentiment, degenerated. The word *coi* in French is the same as

* This word may be analysed thus: *is it*, which is for *be it*, since *is*, as we shall see, is equal to B, that is, *be*, and as here the word *it* must in the beginning have gone before *be*, the meaning of *sit* is, when thus analysed, *it* (to) *be*, that is, "it is belonging to *be*;" and as B is not only equal to IS, but also to IO, hence *it to be* means, "it to the round one." Then *sit* was once *io-it* and also *oi-it*, which pronounced apart made *wa-it*, that is, *wait;* yet how great the difference that now appears between these two words! The words *peace*, *pax*, *paix*, *peaceable*, and *paisible*, are to be thus analysed: *Peace* — *ip-oi-is* (on the round one is); *Pax* — *ip-oi-ic-is* (on the round one it is); *Paix* (it is the same as *Pax*); *Peaceable* — *ip-oi-is-ib-il* (on the round one the being the), that is, "the being on the round one." We may here remark, that both the present pronunciation and manner of spelling *peaceable* are very faulty: it ought to be written precisely as in French; and, above all, the *ble* should not be preceded by *a*, but by an *i*. *Paisible* is to be analysed as *peaceable* has been.

coy in English, though the former is now used in the sense of *tranquille*, and the latter as being equal to *timid;* but both words had in the beginning, besides their other meanings, that of timidity or shiness. Now if we allow the *oi* in the two words *coi*, *coi*, to coalesce, we shall have, we may think, two very different words; but this is a mistake, for the meaning of these two different words is *coy*, *coy*, that is, "timid, timid;" and thus the same idea is named in all other languages. This we have been so far from suspecting, that now such words as these offend our ears; and persons in low life, from being aware of this circumstance, make frequent use of them when they have not the power of offending delicacy otherwise. Thus on the walls in Paris one of these words to which I here allude, is to be frequently seen; yet when analysed it literally means "always hid," which is synonymous with "shiness or timidity." It is the same in Latin, except that its form in the latter tongue is more modern, as it has an article more (*ea*), which must have first preceded the radical word before it fell behind, and became a single *a* by contraction.

As both these words are well known, there will be here no necessity for giving any more than their analysed forms; and as they are, with the exception of the article *ea*, the same word, the analysis of the one will serve for the other, when the radical part alone is thus analysed, *imer-id* (ever hid). Here *imer* is the same word as *ever*, which a knowledge of the letter *m* will prove hereafter. But in Ger-

man this word has its present form, if we except that the *m* is (and very improperly) doubled. As to *id*, it has a great many meanings, such as *hide*, *heed*, *head*, *hid*, *gone*, &c. And I cannot here avoid a happy use of it in the English word *die*, which literally means "to hide the eye," than which no definition can be more true; and it will appear doubly so when we discover by an analysis of the word *eye*, that it means "life;" so that to *hide the eye* literally means to "hide life." Of how many happy ideas we have been hitherto deprived for the want of this science.

I see no necessity for giving instances from other languages of the idea alluded to in the analysis of *imer-id*, since they are all alike. Even the rudest word in English used for this purpose, means *the shy*, that is, "the thing shy," or timid. Here too I discover that the pronoun *she* and this word *shy* are the same word; and in like manner that *shame* and *woman* are synonymous; since the former, when analysed, makes *is woim* (the womb); and I have already shown that *womb* and *woman* are the same word. But as I now discover that *she* must mean "life to him," (*is he*, or *be he*, or *io he*, or still, *vie he*,) it follows that *wom-an* literally means, "the life to man," for *an* is here for *man*, just as *he* is in *she*.

Here, to show the extraordinary wisdom displayed in the formation of words, I may introduce the different accounts of man, woman, Adam, &c.,

already promised in another part of this work.* And there the reader may remember the word womb was shown to mean all existence, but literally double existence. Now the word *am*, that is, the first person singular of the verb to be, makes also, when analysed, the *womb*, as we may thus see—*oim*, where *oi* is for "man," and is equal to *io*, or "I go." Then this leads us to discover that the radical part of the word *womb* is a single letter, or at most two, that is, when we allow an *i* to be understood before *m*, or otherwise, before *v*, *u*, or *w*, for we shall see that *m* is nothing less than these three letters. Hence in some languages *am* may be written *av*, *au*, or *aw*. What is then the meaning of *I go the womb?* it implies that "I exist to the womb," that "I belong to it," or "am of it;" in other words, "I of woman." Hence what has been stated† with regard to the *womb* meaning "all existence," is here fully confirmed, since every body may say *I am*, for the reason that every body is born of woman. But when we analyse *woman* merely thus, *wo-man*, it will literally mean, "the double one—man," that is, "the double one (to) man;" by which is meant, "the womb to man." And when we recollect that *an* is the radical part of man (*im an—the man*), if we analyse woman thus, *wom-an*, we shall still have "the womb (to) man." Hence *wo* and *wom* are here synonymous with *female*, and it is as if we were to say, "the female to man."

* See vol. ii. p. 11, &c. † Ibid. p. 12.

In like manner *man* means the male to woman, as we may thus see, *im-an* (*iv-oin*), *Eve one*, that is, to *Eve one*, the one belonging to Eve or woman. We thus discover that *man* and *woman* are really two names for *male* and *female;* and when we put the two radical parts of those two words together, thus, *anim*, we have the original of *animal*, which, analysed, makes *an-im-al;* but its primitive order must have been *al-an-im—all male and female;* that is, *all* (to) *male and female*, all things belonging to male and female, all things born of them.

As *al* in anim*al* is another name for the Divinity, this word means also, "male and female to God;" thus signifying that God is the author of life.

By this critical knowledge of the primitive words for man and woman, we also learn the original of *animare*, which, analysed, is *an-im-ea-re*, and it literally means, "male female the thing;" that is, "the thing (to) male and female," meaning by this, "the feelings belonging to male and female;" in other words, "the being as male and female;" *animate* is therefore for *an-im-ea it*, and means, "male and female it is;" that is, "it is (to) male and female," "to be as male and female;" and the French word *animer* makes also *an-im-er*, "male and female the thing," "the thing to male and female," or "male and female to be," that is, "as male and female to be." This leads us also to discover the exact meaning of *animation: an-im-ea-it-io-in*, which is, word for word, "male, female, it is," "male (and) female." Here, by the two words *male*

and *female* at the end, is meant "the being," or "the thing," so that when we make them take their primitive order, the meaning of the whole word will be, "it is the being" or "the thing belonging to male and female." Sometimes this idea, here expressed by *ion*, is named—as in Latin—by *io;* but still the meaning is the same, since *io* also signifies "a being." It will be now very easy to account for all words in *ion* or *io*. Salvation, for instance, when merely analysed thus, *salu-ea it io in*, means, "saved it is the being," that is, "it is the being saved." But if we wish to analyse *salu* itself, we are to do so thus, *is al iv* (is all life); or we may do so thus, *iv is al*, or *oil* (it is the sun); and hence the meaning will be still the same, the sun being here considered as all life.

The observation just made with regard to *animal*, meaning, "male and female belonging to God," will also apply to the words, *animare*, *animate*, *animer*, and *animation;* for *are*, *ate*, *er*, and *ation*, mean not only "the thing," but also "the thing to God," as we shall see hereafter by a more minute account of similar words. Hence it is that even in the Bible the power of giving life, which belongs solely to the Divinity, is frequently attributed to man, for the word *beget* literally means, "it be God" (*it-be-ge*); and this might be easily understood in the form *begot*, without a critical explanation of this word, were we, like the Germans, to take *got* for *God*, since then *begot* would make *begod*.

By the union of the male and female signs, *an*

and *im*, here also may be discovered the original of the idea named *soul*, since when we take from *animus* and *anima* the two articles *us* and *ea*, nothing remains but *an-im*. This is something very important, since it has puzzled the wisest men of all times to guess what this word and the corresponding one of other languages mean. It was, we may perceive from the knowledge just acquired, far beyond the reach of all penetration. Yet what is it compared to the idea named *being?* We are led to suppose that, like *animal* and *animus*, this word and the corresponding ones of other languages must have also hidden in them the names for *male* and *female*, and this is a true supposition. But where are we to find such names in the word *being* or *be?* Yet here they are to be found, and nothing in the world can be more evident, though nothing can surely be more difficult to discover. Indeed, without the light afforded by the wise men who have so happily defined the letters of the Greek alphabet, such a discovery could never be made. This word *be* is extremely curious; but I cannot yet say any more about it or the word *anima*.

As the terminations in *ate*, *are*, *er*, and *ion*, to which I here refer, are very numerous, this account of them will lead to the knowledge of a multitude of words in all languages. When we allow the *m* of *im* to be what it also is, namely, *v*, we shall perceive that *am* really means, (it being then analysed thus, *oi-iv*,) "I Eve," that is, "I to Eve." Then what does this prove? That, when

they are radically considered, *womb* and *Eve* make but one word. But in the second person singular, as, "thou *art*," we have no *Eve*. It is a mistake; here too we have *Eve*, that is a word meaning "all" or "double existence," or "the womb;" and it is expressed by the *ar*, which, analysed, makes *oiir*, and there must be some language or languages in the world, in which the *womb* or *woman*, or *Eve*, is thus written; for it will be found and admitted, some short time hence, by all enlightened men, that these three words make but one. Then the meaning of *art* is "goest" or "beest to the womb," that is, "thou art of the womb," "thou art of woman." The third person singular (*is*) makes also *iv*, or *Eve*, as well as *ib*, *be*, and *io*, as we shall know hereafter; and as to the *ar* in *are*, in the three persons plural, it is the same we have just seen in *art*.

Now though we may say that *ama* in *amare* is the word for *love*, still as *a* at the end is for *ea*, which must have first gone before it as an article; the radical part is really *am*, which is also the very word we have just seen. Then *amo*, that is, *am-io*, is for *io am;* and when we analyse *am* thus, *oiv*, which is very correct, we shall have for *io am*, *io oiv;* and if we here put the article *il* (*the*) before *oiv*, we shall have *io 'loiv*, by the *i* having been dropt; and if after this we make the *o* of *io* take the place which it has also held, that is, before *i*, we shall have *oi 'loiv* (I the love) instead of *amo*. The English pronoun *I* is even still pronounced by

such natives of Great Britain as have not lost the ancient pronunciation, as if written *oi*. Thus, though the two words *I love* differ widely in appearance from *amo*, yet, radically considered, they do not differ. Thus we discover what is meant by *love*, and how in the beginning of the world this idea was named. Hence, if we were to conjugate the verb *love* as men must have once done, we should say, "I woman, thou womanest, he womans," &c., or we might for this purpose choose, with equal propriety, any of the other names synonymous with this word. When woman loved, she must have employed in a similar way one of the names belonging to man.

Now if we analyse the radical part of the name *Venus*, which is *Ven*, for the *us* at the end is only the article, which has fallen there from its having first gone before, we shall have *Iv-en* or *Iv-in*, and this literally means "Eve the one," that is, "Eve the goddess"—*one* being, as we have already seen, a name for a divinity — or we may here put in place of Eve, *woman* or *womb*. And as *iv* in *Iven* is also equal to an article, hence this word means "the one," which is very appropriate, since *love* is single. Then were we to conjugate the verb *love* when thus considered, it would be equal to "I one, thou onest, he ones," &c. We may also remark, that as *n* is the same as *v*, the word *one* must be equal to *ove*, so that *love* also literally means, "the one" (*il ove*). Thus letters, like figures, are wonderful for their various powers. I often ask

myself, when they astonish me thus, as they frequently do, by the mysterious sagacity they display, if gods or men in the beginning of the world presided over them? If we are to consider them as but the productions of ordinary mortals, then must we conclude that the human mind has degenerated, and that man is no longer what he has been; for there is not on record the slightest trace of so much extraordinary wisdom as the analysis of words and letters proves once to have been; and in our degenerate days the utmost stretch of intelligence is, I find, to be able to understand this wisdom when clearly shown.

I have till now forgotten to give the second explanation of *Adam* already promised. If we analyse this name without considering of what the first has been made, we are to do so thus: *oi-id-oim—man, head woman*, that is, "man head (to) woman." Here by *man head* is meant, "man first;" so that *man head to woman* is equal to "man first to woman," that is, "the first man to woman." There is no necessity for remarking that *head* and *first* must have been anciently used indifferently on many occasions, since this happens even still, as when we say, "to be the head of the army," or "the first of the army." *Adam* may also with great propriety mean "the first chief," or "head to woman," since the letter *a* is also for "the first;" and then this character is to be analysed thus, *ii*, that is, "one one," as a knowledge of *alpha* will allow us to perceive. The following analysis of *Adam* is also very

correct, *ea id ea iv*, "the first chief or head (to) the first woman," or "the first chief or head (to) her Eve." In all these accounts I have considered the name Eve as being equal to a single *v*, or to *iv* short; but I might, according to its sound, especially to that which it bears in English, say that this name is a contraction of *ii-ii*, and that it is for *i-v*, the long *I* being here equal to the first *ii* and *v* to the second *ii*. The first *ii* may be rendered by *one one*, or the "first woman." But when this name is represented by the *m* in Adam, this letter cannot be considered as being equal to *i-v* or to *i-iv*, but to a single *v* or to *iv* short; and hence it is that the *a* here supplies the place of the long *I*, by its meaning "the first."

As several of those latter definitions will throw a great light on the morals of ancient times, I am happy that the English language has allowed me to be so far particular, notwithstanding that I have been obliged to suppress many important observations.

The words in Greek, Latin, and French, for *shame*, have, when analysed, precisely the same meaning this word has in English; and yet the analysis of these words cannot be given, from our having lost so much of the innocence and simplicity of ancient times. But of the three different ways of analysing *shame* in French (*honte*), one of them may, I perceive, be given, provided an explanation of this analysis be not again required. *Honte* is in this case a contraction of *vie-on-it* (fy on it); nor

does *vie-on-it* differ in the least from "fy on it;" so that *honte* is as much a contraction of the three English words as it is of *vie-on-it*. We shall see hereafter that *h* and *v*, and consequently *f*, make but one letter.

We may perceive from these latter words also that man had a true sense of delicacy in the most ancient times, though it did not, as it now ridiculously does, extend to words but to things. Of this we may be also convinced by an analysis of the French word meaning "*to smell offensively*," and that of other languages corresponding with it; in all of which allusion is made to the idea expressed in the words *keel* and *quille*, as shown above. For reasons which I need not explain, it will not be necessary to give more than the analysed form of one or two of those words; and those in French and English may be chosen for this purpose—*ip-u-er*. I have already observed that *ip* has several meanings, such as "in," "up," &c., and that the verbal termination *er* means "to be," or "the being," or "the thing." The *u* requires no explanation. This will be sufficient to satisfy philosophers—as they can from this most clearly understand the whole word—that not mere sounds, but sights, offended men in the beginning of the world. The corresponding word in English, which I am told is no longer scarcely heard, ends now with *nk;* but some time ago *que* occupied, and very properly, the place of *k*. In the analysis of this word it will be necessary to give its ancient form—*est-in-que*.

Here only one letter (the first), and which might be an *i*, has been dropped. Thus the meaning of the English word is, we may perceive, precisely the same as in French, though the forms of both words differ widely. This analysis may be given more minutely thus — *is-it-in-ic-u.* Here the two first words are of equal value, and may change places; and this will give us the two English words *it is;* after which, in order to discover the literal meaning of the whole word, we need only remark that *ic* means "the." This minute analysis leads to a very important discovery, namely, to the origin of the letter *q.* We see it has received both its form and its name from the two parts of *u* (*ii*) being added to the *c* in *ic* thus, ic^{i}_{i}; and this accounts for this letter (*q*) being always followed by a *u;* this in the beginning having been done to signify that *q* has a *u* in itself, and consequently means what is double. Then *q* is literally *c* double, or double *c*, the *ii* or *u* having the power of qualifying so. When this character is made to take this form *Q*, we have still *c c;* but placed opposite to each other thus, *cɔ;* and that they might not while in this state coalesce, they were separated thus, *cp*; which form still exists in Saxon, and the Roman Q is but a variation of it. This also leads to the meaning of the word *queue* (tail) in French, and consequently that in all other languages: it is to be thus analysed — *ique-e-u.* Here *ique* is the same as *ic*, and means *it;* the single *e* is the same as *is*, so that *ic e* means

it is; between these two words and the *u*, which requires no explanation, *to* — that is, "belonging to" is understood. It will suffice to analyse the English word *tail* to put every body in the way of analysing the corresponding word of other languages: it makes *it-oi-il;* but the primitive order must have been *il it oi.* Here *oi* is the same as *u*, and as *oi* in *coi*, already explained; and *il it* is equal to *il est* (it is); so that, as above, the words "belonging to" are here also understood.

The critical account given of *coi* has thus led to several important discoveries; but it must still lead to the right understanding of a multitude of words to which I cannot here allude even by name. Thus we now know that *squat* is for *is-coi-at;* and we shall have even the present orthography of this word, by taking from tran*qu*ille the two letters that are equal to *coi* in meaning. Thus too we see what *cour* (erroneously written *cower*) now literally means; we see that it is for *coi-ir* (that is, coi-*ire*, coi-*être*), the being *coi.* Nor need we doubt that *coi* is equal to *qu*, or that *coi-ir* is the original of *cour* (cower), since the analysis of the single word *square* must satisfy us that in both cases the view taken of these words is a correct one. Thus, when we analyse *square* simply in this manner, *is-quare*, we see that *quare*, the radical part, is equal in sound to *carre* in French, which, with the accent thus, *carré*, is in this language the word for *square;* and the sole difference between *carré* and *square* is, that the former has a word equal in meaning to *is* in

English thrown at the end, and written *ré* instead of *est* or *is*, whereas in the former word (square) this *ré* precedes, and it was written *is* (which is equal in meaning) before the *i* was dropt, and that *s* went over to *q*. From this we may be certain that *coi* is equal to *qua;* and as *car*, the root of *carré*, is equal to *coiir*, that is, to *cour*, we see the word square in its most ancient form, and hence we are led to ask why in the beginning did men name a square in this manner? *Cour*, when analysed, is *ic oi ir*, and this means, "it the great one being," or "it the great round being," or still, "it is man," or "the existence to man." The word *ic* means also *each*, as a knowledge of the *c* will allow us to perceive; and so the above analysis may imply, "each to the great one being," &c. If we here suppose the *sun* to be meant, we may say that by his existence is indicated the *four seasons*, or the *year;* and if the *moon* be referred to, we may suppose that her quarters are indicated. By admitting either of these, we perceive that the radical part of *cour* is *oi ir*, which might as well have been *oi is*, or *oi it*, &c.; but by holding to *oi ir*, we perceive that we shall have the radical part of the English word *four*, which also means, when analysed, "the great one being," as we may thus see, *if-oi-ir;* hence *cour* literally means "four;" and an analysis of the English word year (*ye-oi-ir*, or *he-oi-ir*) gives also *four*. Now as *oi-ir* means "the one great being," that is, the *sun* or the *moon* (for both will serve in this instance just as they have

equally served to name *one*), it follows that the number *one* gave to men in the beginning the idea of *four*, since both ideas are named in precisely the same manner. This is indeed very curious and important information; and it will, I have no doubt, lead to a great deal. I find this truth fully confirmed by an analysis of the words for *year* in both Latin and French, which the reader may perceive, by merely looking at them, (*an*, *annus*,) are equal to *one* (oin), though the same word in English is equal to *four*, or "the great one being," or "double existence," by which is meant "all existence," or "the Divinity;" and this idea is also equal to *one*. Now as the English word *fair* (a market) makes also, in the analysis, *foiir* (in French contracted to *foire*), its name must come from this word, meaning "all life" (in this instance, "all motion," "all people," &c.); or from fairs being first held only once a year, or four times a year; that is, one for each season.

Though the observations that might be still made on all these words are numerous and important, I must, in order to escape endless digressions, avoid them. I cannot, however, omit noticing the French word *faire* (to do), since a knowledge of it must lead to the right understanding of the same word in every other language. We see, since it also means *four* or *one*, when analysed, that the first idea men ever had of *to do* was to put the four parts of a thing together, so as to make them become *one*. Hence *to do a thing* was in the be-

ginning *to one it*, that is, "to make it become one, or entire." Indeed, if the expression could be allowed, I should say that the meaning was to *God it;* then *do*, which makes, in the analysis, *id o*, means, "the one;" and *facere*, which, analysed, is *if-o-ic-ere*, means, "the one thing to be," this *ere* in fac*ere* being the same as *ire* or *être*, that is, *to be* or *to go*. Hence the English word *fair* (handsome) means, "one who is complete," that is, "one in whom there is no visible defect, or any thing wanting." But when this word means *just* or *equitable*, we are to consider *oi ir* as "the great one Being, who is justice itself;" and when *fair* refers to the colour of the hair, we are to understand *oi ir*, though it still means "the high or great one being," as another name for the *sun*. That such is the true meaning of *fair*, when thus employed, there can be no doubt, since this definition is confirmed by an analysis of the same word in French, Greek, and Latin. Thus *blonde* makes *id-ib-il-on*, which means, "the full" or "flowing one." For here *ib-il* is the same as *if-il*, which happens from the *b* being used for the *f*, as has been already observed; and these two words, *ib il*, or *if il*, are ever contracted to *bil* or *bl*, *fil* or *fl*. By *the flowing one* is meant, "the one with the flowing hair," that is, *Apollo*. The Greek word for *fair*, when used in this sense, is Ξανθος, and may be analysed thus, *ic-is-oin-theos*, meaning, "it is the one God;" but the critical analysis is, *os-icis-oin the*, "the all-existing one God." I have here put *ic-is* in one word, as it names but one idea, *all existence*,

literally, *each existence.* The account of a word so important requires still further confirmation, and this I can happily offer, by the analysis of Xanthus or Xanthos, a river sacred to Apollo, and of which the waters were allowed by the poets to have the extraordinary virtue of beautifying the hair; and as this word does not differ in orthography from Ξανθος, it is in analysis and meaning the same.

Flavus (the Latin for *fair*) makes *if-il-oi-iv-us*, of which the primitive order is, *us-if-il-oi-iv*, and it means, "the full one life," that is, *Apollo*, or the *sun.* Here, if we allow the two words *if-il* to be contracted thus, *fl*, and *oi-iv* to coalesce thus, *ouv*, and that we consider the *u* as a *v*, in which case the three letters *ouv* become *ow*, we shall have, by putting *fl* and *ow* together, the English word *flow*, instead of the four words *if-il-oi-iv;* hence the only omission in these several words is the *i* before *f* and *l*. Now when we bear in mind that the *us* in flav*us* is for *os*, and that *os* is for *is o*, the *sun*, we discover that this word literally means, "the flowing sun," that is, "the flowing-haired sun," or, "the god with the flowing hair." It was easy for poets in the beginning of the world to employ such figurative language as they have done, when they thus saw an image in every word. As the present English word *flower* must have first been (*er-flow*) *the flower*, it is evident, since the radical part of *flavus*, that is, *flav*, is the same as the radical part of *flow*er (*flow*), that men in the beginning must have considered *fair hair* as they did a flower, that

is, as a thing in bloom. As *flow* (one full life) is another name for the *sun*, it follows, that as *er* in flow*er* is the same as *être* in French, or as *a thing* or *a being* in English, the exact meaning of flower must be, "a thing or a being to the sun," that is, "belonging to the sun." As to the goddess Flora, since her name is the contraction of *floerea*, that is, "she to the flowers," "belonging to the flowers," it is clear that she is indebted to the flowers for her name, and not the flowers to her for theirs.

I stated (vol. ii. p. 36.), respecting the word *property*, that I should notice it again, as many important discoveries rise out of it.

Property, when analysed according to its meaning, makes *pro-pri-it-e*, which means, for "price (or value) it is." The word *price* is a contraction of *per-is*, so that its radical part is *per*, and this becomes, when analysed, *ip-er*, which literally means, "on it" or "in it," that is, "the one thing on it or in it," meaning by this, "its life," "its being," "its sole worth." *Per* may be also thus analysed, *iv-er*, as we shall see hereafter; and these two words mean *ever* or *life-life*, and consequently the *Divinity*. But *ip er* has also this latter meaning, since *ip* signifies "high" or "above," and *er* is equal to "existence" or "ever," so that *ip er* may be rendered by "high existence" or "existence above." Hence the price of a thing was considered by men in the beginning of the world as its soul, its being, its divine part, &c. Then *property* (*pro-pri-it-e*) means, "*for* value it is," &c.; and hence we may

discover the meaning of multitudes of words in all languages. Thus *beauty*, *modesty*, *facility*, *duty*, &c. are all contracted from *beau-it-e*, *modest-it-e*, *facile-it-e*, *du-it-e*, that is, "beau it is," "modest it is," "facile it is," "due it is," &c. But in the beginning the order of these and all such words was *it-e-beau*, *it-e-modeste*, *it-e-facile*, *it-e-du*, &c., meaning, "it is beau," "it is modest," &c.; after which the *it e* fell behind as usual. Thus we discover at a glance not only all the words in French and English ending as these do, but all those in Latin in *tas;* such as *charitas*, *tenuitas*, &c., which are, when we do not want to trace them up to their very birth, to be analysed thus, *char-ita-is*, *tenu-ita-is*. Here *ita* is for *it ea* (the thing), both these words having become an article, such as we have already seen them in *vita*, which must have first been *ita vi* (the life). The English scholar may be made to understand this Latin ending (*tas*) by being told that it is the same as the two words *that is* when contracted to *that's;* and the German scholar may clearly understand it, by being told that it is equal to *das*, which is composed of *da is* (that is); but as *da* is still a compound word, it being the contraction of *id-ea* (the thing); hence *das* is composed of three words (*id ea is*), just as *itas* is composed of *it ea is*, and *that's* of *the ea it is*, or *theo it is* (the thing it is, the one it is). But as these Latin words in *tas* did not take this ending in three parts, but in two (*ita-is*), we are not, when accounting for them, to analyse them otherwise than above. Of course,

when we do not understand what is meant by the word preceding *itas*, which may happen to be no longer in use, we are to analyse it, in order to discover its meaning. *Char* in *charitas* makes *ic-ea-ir*, or rather *ic-iv-ea-ir*, the former meaning, *it the first thing*, and the latter, *it of the first thing*, either of which is consequently a name for the *Divinity*. And when we remark that *char* is the same as *car* (*ic ea ir*), and that this is the same as *car* in *carus*, (at first, *us car*, "the dear,") we perceive that *charitas* is the same as *ita is carus*, "that is dear," "that which is dear;" in other words, "that it is a dear thing," and is hence synonymous with *the first thing*, and also the *Divinity*. Hence we discover that men must have in the beginning understood by *dear*, when this word was applied to worldly objects, "*that which held a first place* in rank or merit;" and that in its higher signification (as in *charitas*, for instance) it indicated the "Godhead." Then were we to give to *charitas* French and English forms corresponding with its meaning, we should translate it by *chere-it-é* and *dear-it-y*, or *divinité* and *Divinity*. As the radical part of *first* is in *fir*, since the whole word makes *fir-est* or *est fir*, meaning, "it is fir," we may discover that there is no difference between *fir* and *dear* as to meaning, when analysed. Thus *fir* in *first* is pronounced, and very properly, as if written *fur;* and this we know is for *if-ii-ir*, which means, "the one one thing," or "the life, life;" by *one one thing* is meant, "one thing in the extreme," and conse-

quently the "*first* thing;" and by *life life* is meant "life in the extreme," or "all life," and consequently the "Divinity." Now if we change, as we may do, the *f* in *if-ii-ir* for a *d*, we shall have *id-ii-ir*, of which the contracted sound may very well be *dear;* hence *dear* and *first* may, in some languages, be the same word. Then when we pronounce *first*, as if written *furst*, it is because it must have anciently been *fiirst*, and that an *i* has been dropped; but as this is a word in frequent use, its primitive pronunciation has been happily preserved. The *ii* might, however, have very well been pronounced like *ea* in *dear*, in which case both letters would not become one letter, that is, a *u*. In this word, *if-ii-ir*, we discover the French word *fuire*, and in this case we are to translate it by "life, life," or "going, going," that is, "life or motion in the extreme." Here also we discover *fear;* but then the *ii* is not contracted to *u*, for each letter is heard, and both are pronounced like *ee* or *ea* in *dear*. And from thus perceiving that men in the beginning had but one word for *fuire* and *fear* (or for *flight* and *fear*), we discover what their idea of fear was. Here, too, we find the original of *further;* but the *ii* has become *u*, and is made to name a single idea; and hence this word is to be thus analysed, *if-u-ir* (the go, go, the go). *If-u-ir*, which three words have been contracted to *fur*, are equal to *go go;* so that when a person or a thing was distant, men in the beginning said, *he is the-go-go*, thus signifying, by the repetition of *go*,

that it was necessary to go much in order to reach such an object. And to this double *go* was added still another, in order to increase upon it, and make the comparative degree, which was done by the two words *the er* instead of *the go*, *er* being here as a pronoun. Then *further* is literally "the *go*, *go*, and *the go*." The superlative degree *furthest* means, "the go go, THE BEING HEAD," that is, "the being ahead;" for *s* is here for *is* or *be*, as we shall see in the analysis of Βητα; and *t* is for *head* or the *Divinity*, this letter having such a meaning, as I have already shown, but which I am to show still more fully in the alphabet. The *fur* in *further* may also with great propriety be rendered thus, *er fu*, "the go go," or "the flight," yet still the meaning is the same. But as an instance of the same word having very opposite meanings, we may cite *fuire*, which has just been accounted for, and shown to mean "life, life," or "going, going," though such will also serve, as every body can conceive, to mean "all life, or the Divinity."

As *farther* does not differ from *further* but in the first syllable, we need only, in order to explain it, account for *far*. This word is to be thus analysed, *if-o-ir*, and which also means, the "go, go," *o* being here for the *sun* or *motion;* then from the *i* preceding the *f* having been dropped, and from the *foir* falling together, the word *far* has been made. Hence *further* and *furthest*, and *farther* and *farthest*, are equally correct; and this is satisfactory to know, for as the highest authorities were divided

in opinion respecting these words, nobody knew how to use them. But *fo*, it may be remarked, means "an enemy," and consequently *foir*, which must have first been *ir fo* (the *fo*), ought to have a meaning quite different from *go go*, or *far*. This is a very true observation, and it has cost me a great deal of hard thinking; for when I first endeavoured to explain the difficulty connected with it, I had not analysed the letters of the Greek alphabet. This is not the place to account for *fo*, or *foe*, when it means "an enemy;" but I may forget this single question in the many difficulties I have yet to encounter, and my memory has by dint of incessant thinking almost forsaken me. The character *f* has, besides its other meanings, that of *half*, and hence it is separated into two equal parts by a bar in the middle, thus, *f*, and hence also the character by which it is represented in Greek is made thus ϕ, in which we see an *o* divided also in two equal parts. Then *fo* means here half the *o*; that is, "a hook or a bill," with which men fought in ancient times, this arm having the form of half an *o*. Hence it must have been made in the shape of a *c*. As to its handle, which we may represent by attaching the figure 1 to a *c*, thus, ς, it was probably in wood; and hence from its not being really a part of the hook, it was not at all considered when the form of this arm was designed by half an *o*. Then when men said, in ancient times, "that foes were coming, or running," their words literally meant, "the hooks are coming, or the hooks are

running." Even now such language would be highly approved of, and called poetry. And why so? Because we have an image, and a powerful one, brought before us in "the hooks are coming;" whereas from our not knowing what the word *foe* literally means, the mind finds nothing to dwell upon in this hitherto insignificant sound; and we cannot see why those who come to cut our heads off, are called foes any more than friends. Now when we consider that all words were thus at one time as so many striking pictures, how great must appear the calamity that fell upon the world when men first began to lose the meaning of what they said! As it can be easily supposed that a person half deaf or blind must possess still more of the power of hearing and seeing than one who knows not, critically speaking, the meaning of a single word he utters, may be said to have of the faculty of speech, it must follow that this affliction of both mind and voice, by which man has been deprived of by far the nobler part of that gift which has raised him so pre-eminently above all other creatures, is one of the most serious misfortunes by which he has been ever visited.

A reaping-hook is, it may be observed, made like the ancient arm named *fo*, and hence the analysis of this word in Latin, which is *falx*, makes *if-ol-ic is*, and means, "half the moon it is." For *ol* was also a name for the *moon* as well as for the *sun*, from some men having begun to name it thus, *il o*, and from the *il* having fallen behind the *o*, and

lost the *i*. But of course the same people never had at one time the same name for both *sun* and *moon*, as they must, for the sake of distinction, have made different articles to precede the *o*. It is extraordinary to witness how long the primitive pronunciation of words in frequent use remains with a people. The French word for *falx* has been *faulx*, and it is now written *faux;* but both these words were in the beginning *fo*, and just so are they pronounced at the present hour. Thus also we have seen that the English word *womb* was at one time only *wom* (*be wom*), and such still is its pronunciation. This critical knowledge of *foe* will allow us to discover the origin of several important words. The idea of *falsehood*, as we find it named by the Latin, French, and English words, *falsitas*, *falsus*, *fausseté*, *faux*, *false*, &c., was in the beginning *fo*, as the analysis of these different words, which any body may now show, clearly proves. But I wish to draw the reader's attention to *falsitas* and *fausseté*, in which are other instances of the termination *itas* and *ité*, already explained. How easily the mere English scholar can understand *falsitas* when he analyses it thus, *ita is false*, *that is false:* he will perceive little or no difference between it and the English form, since he has only to recollect that *ita* is for *that*. But even the word *falsus*, how much more easily he must understand it from knowing that this common Latin termination, *us*, is equal to *the*, and that it once went before *fals*, thus, *us fals*.

We thus perceive that man borrowed the idea of falsehood* from *foe;* that is — and to the honour of the animal creation be it said — from one of his own species. But the reader, who by this time must be as learned in the art of analysing as myself, may tell me, that the word *fox* makes *fo-ic is*, "false it is;" and this is very true; and *fox* has not only this idea of falsehood *singly* in its meaning, but doubly; for X is equal to *ten* or *double life* (that is, to double V), and this he cannot fail discovering if he looks at it closely; and from this he will learn why this character has been made to represent ten any more than eight or nine, or any other number. And by following up this discovery, he may also find out why a V stands for five. Then as *x* in *fox* qualifies *fo*, so does the *x* in *rex* qualify *re;* for though the latter word literally means, "it is the being," this is signified in a very high degree. Then it may be said that man has borrowed the idea of falsehood from the fox; but in the analysis of this name in Greek, Latin, and French, there is no allusion whatever made to falsehood, but to this animal's swiftness, and to his having his dwelling under ground, which clearly proves that man has named the fox after himself. In Greek this word is *αλωπηξ*, which makes, when analysed, *al-iv-iv-ip-ii-ic is*, the literal meaning of each word being, "all

* I perceive that I ought to have accounted above for this termination *hood:* here it means literally *the whole head*, and it may be analysed thus, *he-oo-id*, or thus, *iv-oo-id:* the repetition of the *o* indicates all; but there is another way, and it is equally correct, as we shall see when accounting for *alpha*, of naming the same idea.

life life" (in), "up one, one, it is." By *all life life* is signified "all life," "all animation," "all lively." By allowing *iv iv* to meet thus, *iviv*, we reduce them to one word, which is equal to *vivus* in Latin, since the latter must have been *us iviv*, the *i* alone in *i*viv having been, as usual, dropt. This word will be also then equal to *vif* or *viv* in French (in English, *lively*). But ω may be very properly rendered by *oo*, of which the meaning will be still the same, that is, "life life," or "lively." By *up one one* (*ip i i*) is meant "feet;" but it might as well be rendered by *iv i i* or *if i i;* and from knowing this, we perceive that by *ip i i* is meant also, "the live one one," that is, "the live ones." If we allow *i i* in *if i i* to meet, we shall have a singular for *if i i*, and this will be *fu* or *flight*, by which we discover that *motion* and *foot* were in the beginning but one word, and that they could be only distinguished by different articles. Thus, too, we discover why *u* has frequently the sound of an *o*. We perceive that this arose from men being desirous to make it signify one thing, which idea was generally named by an *o*. Hence the singular of *feet*, which might be written *fiit*, is truly *fut*, and not *foot*, as it is erroneously written and pronounced by all persons except by those with whom the true English pronunciation still remains; that is, such natives of Great Britain as have lived most remote from an intercourse with foreigners. In like manner, *teeth* might be *tiith*, this word first being *it i i*, which then became *tii*, then *the tii*, and, finally, *tiith*, now

written *teeth;* which is in the singular, unfortunately, *tooth*, instead of *tuth.* Thus, too, we may discover the origin of *sir:* it is the diminutive of *sire*, made by such persons as pronounced this word as it is at present heard in French; that is, as if written *siir* (seer), the *ii* being shortened to *u.* Hence the present pronunciation of *sir* in English is very correct, but its orthography very faulty, since it ought to be written *sur.* From *sire* having been pronounced *siir*, it signified (as this is for *being*, *being*) that the individual so named was one of great dignity. The English word *street* is also for *striit;* but its pronunciation has not been changed except to mean *strut.* It is also the same as the French word *rue*, which must have first been *ir ii* (the *go go*, or the *way way*), and thus was shortened to *ru*, now written *rue.* But while it was yet *rii* it took the article *it* before it, thus, *it rii*, and then *it* fell behind, and both words became *riit*, which have been shortened to *rut*, to signify a wheel track; but its long sound has remained to name *street*, this word being no other than *est riit;* which two words have coalesced, and made *striit*, now written *street.* By this we discover that *rue* and *street*, though very dissimilar in appearance, are radically the same, and this we may see by merely analysing *street* thus, *est-ree-it*, where *ree* is the same as *rii*, and consequently as *ru* or *rue*, so that street means also *it is rue.* In like manner *fir* must have first been *if i ir*, "the go go," that is, "the go go up," this tree being a very high one, and this was shortened to *fur*, now

written *fir*, but pronounced *fur*. Numerous similar observations may be still made respecting *i i*; but for the present I can say no more on this particular point.

Thus we discover that the Greek name for *fox* means, "the feet all alive it is;" that is, "the being or creature with the feet all alive." The Latin word *vulpes* means, literally, "life-above feet," that is, "flying feet." For when analysed, *vulpes* makes *vie-ol-ip-es*, "life up foot foot," in which *life up* qualifies *foot foot*. *Renard* makes, when analysed, *re-en-eard*, "a thing in the earth." As I have already accounted for *earth*, I need here only remark that its form in *renard* does not differ from the English word, but by its having taken, when merely *ear*, the article *id* before it instead of *the*, which fell behind, just as *the* has done. Hence *renard* may be rendered thus, *re-in-earth*, that its meaning may be the more easily seen: the dropping of the *e* before *a*, as in *eard*, is too trivial and frequent to call for an observation in this instance.

We may also now discover, from knowing that *fo* is for *foe*, the original of *war*. I had occasion to remark, the reader may remember, when accounting for the French termination *ois*, that *was* in English and *fois* in French made but one word. This statement is, I still find, very correct, with, however, a slight exception, namely, that the *w* in *was* ought not to be a single letter, but a double one as it is; and the reason is as follows: *was* means, I observed, when accounting for it, not only one

being, but one time also, which double meaning is equal to two lives or two beings; but as it is the *as* in *was* that has this meaning, the *w* goes before it, as an article; and since it is from its being a double character, in apposition to it, an *f* could not with equal propriety be chosen to fill its place. But as the word *fois* means only "one time," and not "one being and one time," the character which precedes *ois* (of which *as* in *was* is the contraction) is, with great propriety, a single one, for it stands in apposition to *ois*, which means, "one time." As every thing new in the application of a science which is only yet in its infancy, should be eagerly laid hold on, as it opens the way to other discoveries, I consider this newly-acquired knowledge as a valuable acquisition. Now there is precisely the same difference (and for the same reason) between *fo ir* and *war* which we perceive between *fois* and *was*. Then in *war* the *w* is only as an article, and in apposition to *ar*, which is the real word for *war*, as we may perceive when we analyse it thus, *oir*, and give to these three letters their ancient pronunciation, which is such as they have still in French. And as the *w* is not now heard in *war*, since the *ar*, when analysed, produces this sound, this proves that *ar* must have long stood by itself; that is, apart from the article *w*, so that we even still have its ancient pronunciation, just as we have that of *womb*, when it was yet only *wom*. Then this remarkable word was thus formed: *fo* meant, as we have seen, "a hook," of which the idea was

taken from the *half-moon;* then when men wanted to signify many *foes*, they doubled the object that signified one *foe*, and so employed the entire O, which was consequently equal to *hook hook*, and made it qualify *ir*, so that the three letters meant, "the hook hook being;" and on this occasion the word *ir* was wisely preferred to any other, as the *r*, on account of its double jarring sound, has been chosen also to name *ire* or *anger*, that is, "double animation." Then this first word for *war* was *oir*, and in meaning it equalled "hooks hooks," but as a collective singular number. It must have been long thus employed, but its literal meaning seems to have been well known when it received the double character *w* before it, since this agrees with *oir*, to which it stands in apposition. Hence, when we account for the *w* apart from *oir*, we are to do so by saying it means "these things," so that both accounted for together will make *these things* (namely), *hooks hooks*. How easy it is now to account for Mars in Greek (Αρης). A child will henceforth know that this word must have first been *es-ar*, and that this is for *es oir* (the war). He will also see why the word *ar* is still used when dogs are set to fight: he will perceive that it is the same as *war*, and consequently means "fight!" He will also discover the origin of *swear*, *sware*, and *swore:* he will see that these three words are for *is war*, which means, "the war," or "it war;" that is, "it (to) the war," "belonging to the war;" thus signifying that swearing belongs to fighting,

and that it has sprung from it. By knowing the nature of this word *war* we also discover the origin of the word *warm*, and consequently the exact difference between it and *hot:* we perceive that the one originated from the heat produced by bodily exercise, literally from double animation, and such as men experienced when at war. Whereas the other, from its signifying, when analysed, *the o above* (*he-o-it*), means such heat as we receive from the *sun*, and consequently from *fire*. Arm is also, we may see, *ar im;* at first being *im ar*, and then meaning "it (to) war," that is, "a thing to the war," in which sense it is still used; and here we may perceive that at this time the word for *war* was *ar*.* In the same way *dart* (*id ar it — that* to *war is*) must have been also made. And *Mars* (the god of war) makes, when analysed, *im ar is — he* (*to*) *the war is;* that is, "belonging to the war," "the god of war." But as *ar* means "great or double-going" (it being for *o ir*), and consequently for a being of double power or greatness, or any thing double, we must take care not to render it always by *war*. Thus *charm*, which is, when analysed, *ic iv-arm*, has not the word *war* in its pre-

* But *arm* means also "the double thing or being;" and this meaning will be found applicable, when we remark that men have two arms. Thus, too, the French word *jambe* (leg) is, when analysed, *is oim-be*, "the double thing." Here *oim* is the same as *womb*, which means any thing double, just as the *u* or *v* does. Hence *uter*, which in Latin refers to two things, means also a *womb;* when analysed, it makes *u-it-er*. Here *it-er* is the same as *être* in French, and means "the thing;" so that *uter* altogether makes *the thing u*, or *v;* that is, "the thing life," since *u* or *v* is for *life* or *being*.

sent analysis, since this means "it it arm," that is, "double arm," "a thing of double power." But is the French word for king (*roi*) to be analysed thus, *ir-oi*, "the *double one*," that is, "the great one?" or are we to consider it as having first been *oi r* (war), and that the *oi* fell afterwards behind, making *roi*, and still meaning "war," that is, "the chief or leader in war?" But as the name king does not in any of the several languages in which I have analysed it signify "war," but greatness, we are to adopt the former of these two meanings. Such a word as *harm* (*vie-ar-im*), "the war to him," can offer no doubt. The French word *char* (car) *ic-iv-o-ir*, means, "double-going," or "war," the *ch* (*ic iv*) being here equal to *w* in the English word *war;* but in the same word in Latin (*currus*) double motion is alone referred to; this does not, however, prove that *cars* were not first destined for war service.

I have, in the course of the preceding investigations, been obliged to omit many important observations, in order to press forward, and avoid the endless digressions to which I foresaw they would inevitably lead. So many of them have, however, found a place one way or another, that I have, I perceive, frequently violated that part of my promise which went to state, that I should not communicate my discoveries, except in the order in which they came to me. But my desire to make known the interesting wonders that have lain for so many ages hidden in words, has been so strong, that I

could not overcome at all times the temptation I felt to break through the engagement I had entered into with the reader; and so far that part of my promise has been kept, which stated that this work should, as to the communication of this discovery, be characteristic of my mind. Hence, were I here to close my long labour, what yet remains to be communicated might be easily discovered from what I have already made known.

THE GREEK ALPHABET.

I HERE enter upon a most difficult, but interesting, part of my discovery. Till now I have been frequently obliged to leave many critical points unexplained, because I saw it was necessary that I should first, in order at those times to be easily understood, bring the reader acquainted with some things still more hidden, but not less evident, when known, than any which I have yet discovered.

I learn, by the application of my system, that is, by the analysing of words, so as to read what they have hidden within them, that men had, in very remote times, a learned knowledge of the alphabet. From this I am led to conclude that one part of the world must have attained a high degree of civilisation, while all the rest of mankind were in so barbarous a state as to have no rational language. I am further induced to suppose, that, from this enlightened part of the world, very learned men must have gone to teach their fellow-creatures the use of

words. I cannot otherwise account for the extraordinary wisdom displayed in the formation of language, and the frequent and happy allusions made to the letters of the alphabet. I am also led to believe, from the knowledge which I have thus gleaned by reading in words, that there was in the times to which I refer, but one language in the whole world, just as it is mentioned in the Bible: "And the whole earth was of one language, and one speech*;" and that Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, as also the modern languages supposed to be derived from them, are but dialects of this ancient language, between which and the Gothic or Teutonic, the difference must not, I should think, have been material. I make this observation from remarking, that Hebrew, Greek, and Latin words appear, when analysed, to belong to northern languages.

But in deciphering words, that is, in telling what they imply, besides showing of what they are composed, I do often meet with serious difficulties; for which, without taking into account my own weakness, it were not difficult to assign several causes—such as the corrupt state of modern orthography and pronunciation—the great difference in form between words when composed of only one or two letters at most, and their present lengthened appearance; and—which is more difficult than any of these—the art of placing one's self by imagination (for this means must be employed when no other will succeed) in the situation of men in the

* Gen. xi. 1.

earliest times of the world, and of reasoning exactly as they must have done. But as I have already made great progress in deciphering words, I could, of course, if assisted with public opinion, make a great deal more. Indeed, I am induced to believe that I might in a short time, with this powerful help, put every body in the way of deciphering with facility the words of all languages. As to the advantages to be derived from such knowledge I need say nothing, for they must rush upon every mind, they are so numerous and so evident. And can any body who has examined minutely the many instances I have already given of the manner in which the hidden meaning of words may be clearly discovered, without naming the many more which I am now about to offer, entertain a doubt as to the truth of my discovery in this respect, or as to the possibility of bringing this part of the science of languages to the greatest perfection? It is as evident as that one and one make two, that every word in every language in the world, carries in itself its own history and definition; for to suppose that men did not in the beginning of time attach to words a meaning as often as they made them, were to suppose them not only greatly inferior in wisdom to all human beings now living, but that they must not have been of the same species; since in our times there is no man, no matter how ignorant, dull, or narrow-minded he may be, that ever thinks of giving a name to a new object without attaching some meaning to that

name. But by supposing men to have been in ancient times of minds similar to our own, we are obliged to believe that their words must have been significant, and that we may consequently, by our knowing how to decipher them, discover a great deal of the primitive state of the world, and how one language has been made to vary so as to appear a vast number of other languages.

As many of the instances of the meaning of words which I am now about to give, are far more difficult than any yet given, I need not entreat the reader to be slow and attentive. For as my great desire is that every body should know as much as I do myself of this part of my discovery, I give, in addition to the meaning of words, the train of thought and reasoning by which I have been guided, to the end that the reader — should he feel so inclined — may, in the pursuit of similar knowledge, adopt the same method, in case he can find none better of his own.

In the opening of this work I have frequently referred to learned authorities to prove that of the science of grammar nothing whatever has been hitherto known; and it was most requisite that I should then do so, as the contrary opinion with regard to our knowledge of this science, has till now prevailed. But as every body must be aware that with words and letters, as I have in the following pages to consider them, the learned have not even affected an acquaintance, there will be no necessity for encroaching upon the short limits

within which I am now obliged to keep, by making numerous references and quotations to prove what nobody denies. Even such persons as know little or nothing of works on language, need not be told that of the origin of words and letters, as at present shown, nothing till now could have been known; or if so, the learned have tried to keep the secret to themselves, since nobody has been the wiser for their wisdom. For those persons must be aware, that as such knowledge is the very elements of language, it could not, had it existed, have escaped finding its way into school books, with which — from their being the first employed to communicate instruction — all are familiar. And as the latter observation will apply to all the preceding parts of this work, it may serve to show such persons as are not intimate with learned disquisitions on grammar, how far we have been hitherto justified in our pretensions to an acquaintance with its science.

As a knowledge of the Greek characters is alone sufficient to enable every body to understand the following account given of them, they are, for the benefit of such readers as have never studied Greek, set down here, with their names and the corresponding letters of the Roman alphabet: —

Α α	Ἄλφα	Alpha	a
Β β	Βῆτα	Beta	b
Γ γ	Γάμμα	Gamma	g
Δ δ	Δέλτα	Delta	d

Ε ε	Ἐψιλὸν	Epsilon	e short
Ζ ζ	Ζῆτα	Zeta	z
Η η	Ἦτα	Eta	e long
Θ ϑ θ	Θῆτα	Theta	th
Ι ι	Ἰῶτα	Iota	i
Κ κ	Κάππα or καππα	Kappa	k c
Λ λ	Λάμβδα	Lambda	l
Μ μ	Μῦ	Mu	m
Ν ν	Νῦ	Nu	n
Ξ ξ	Ξῖ	Xi	x
Ο ο	Ὀμικρὸν	Omicron	o short
Π π ϖ	Πῖ	Pi	p
Ρ ρ	Ῥῶ	Rho	r
Σ σ ς	Σῖγμα	Sigma	s
Τ τ ϊ	Ταῦ	Tau	t
Υ υ	Ὑψιλὸν	Upsilon	u
Φ ϕ	Φῖ	Phi	ph
Χ χ	Χῖ	Chi	ch
Ψ ψ	Ψῖ	Psi	ps
Ω ω	Ὠμέγα	Omega	o long

ΑΛΦΑ.

The first letter of the Greek alphabet is named *Alpha* (in the Greek characters Αλφα), and it bears two forms, *A* and *a*. The learned know very well, from their perceiving it to stand first in the alphabet, that, of the twenty-four letters in the alphabet, it must be certainly the first; but their knowledge of it extends no farther, if we except that they are also aware of its being dissimilar from other letters in form and sound. Thus, why it stands first any more than the last, or why it has

these two forms, and how it came by them, or why it is called *Alpha*, any more than *abba* or *acca*, or any other word in the world beginning with an *a*, or what its two syllables signify, they have not the most distant notion. Yet *Alpha* is, of all learned words, one of the most important and venerable in the world. In order to discover what has been thus unknown of this letter, let us begin by endeavouring to find out what it means. Its first syllable does not, I know very well, belong to the Greek language more than to any other; but no matter to what language it belongs — that is, to what people — since it makes complete sense by itself, it is, for the present, to be considered as one word. If, by this method, we can discover what *Alpha* means, we may afterwards inquire more minutely into its first syllable. As the *ph* in this word has the sound of a single *f*, we are also for the present to consider it as such. If *ea* at the end be not a modern addition — that is, a word added to *Alpha*, only about three thousand years ago — it must have once stood first; and then the analysis of this word ought to be *ea-al-if*, which would mean "the first whole life." If we suppose *Alpha* to be another name for the Divinity, such a meaning as "the first whole life" will be very appropriate. This meaning may be even found by analysing thus, *al-ip-vie-ea* (all high life it), that is, "it all the life above;" or by allowing *ea* to have preceded *Al*, thus, *ea al-ip-vie* (the whole high life), the meaning will be still the same. Nor is this definition of *Alpha*

contrary to the sacred words, "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord."* This view of *Alpha* accounts for its Saxon form Ꞇ, in which we have both A and T in one letter, and this is equal to *at* or *ta*, which words make, when analysed, *oit* and *toi*†, and mean "God," but literally, "the great one head," or "the head great one;" and, what may now appear strange, it also means "eight," literally, "one seven," or "seven one." In this case the T is for *seven*, and *oi* for *one*, and hence the T bears also in Greek the form of a seven (ʔ), it being the seventh in order after the middle letter M, just as S, which is also made like a six (σ), holds the sixth place. Besides, an analysis of επτα (seven), which gives *ep-it-oi*, and means, "over the head one," that is, "before the head one," (namely, before *eight*,) proves that *it oi* or *oit* is for *eight*. An analysis of the first letter of the Hebrew alphabet (Aleph), which makes *al-ep-iv*, and means, "all high life," or "THE MOST HIGH," goes also to prove that *Alpha* is another name for the Divinity.‡

* Apocal. i. 8.

† Thus we perceive that this form of the French pronoun, though it is now employed on familiar occasions, must have once been a very powerful word; and this accounts for its being still used in prayer, poetry, and where great solemnity is required. The same may be said of συ, σου, &c. in Greek, *tu* in Latin and French, and *thou* and *thee* in English, all which words mean "double existence," "all existence," or "the Divinity."

‡ As *al* is the same as *o il*, and as this is the same as *il o* (the sun), the literal meaning of *Aleph* is "the sun," "the one high life;" for *ep* is here equal to *the one above*, or *the high one*, and *h* is for *v* or *vita*.

I do not *in this work* wish to meddle with the Hebrew characters, because I understand that the learned have been meddling with them,

But we are to look for another meaning in *Alpha;* for so much divine wisdom has been displayed in the formation of language, that the same word can, with the greatest propriety, be shown, on numerous occasions, to have many meanings; of this several instances have been already given. Let us now consider *Alpha* as a letter, and see what account it gives of itself, whilst viewed in this light: *al-if-a*, or it may be, *al iv a*, since the *f* and the *v* are used indifferently; but the meaning is in both instances the same; and this is, *all the a*. Now when we pronounce slowly *all if a*, or *all iv a*, do we not catch ourselves saying *all of a?* we do. And why does this happen? This question may be answered by another, and which may be thus put: Why does the French word *etois*, when written and pronounced as it ought to be, take the exact sound of *it was?* Every body who has read with attention the account given in this work of

and that we do not now see them as they have been. It would appear, however, that their ancient names are those which we still have, and this is very fortunate, as it will, I have no doubt, with a little more attention than it is now in my power to bestow on so important a subject, lead almost immediately to the complete discovery of every thing connected with them. How far learned men have been from suspecting that these names carry in them any meaning, may be discovered from the following observation to be found in L'Abbe Latouche's *Etudes Hébraïques*, a work published as late as the year 1836: — "Par respect pour l'antiquité, nous conservons ces noms *insignifians*, Aleph, Beth," &c. For this negative virtue the learned deserve great praise; for now every one of these supposed "insignificant names" will be prized as the most precious things in the world, on account of the light they will throw on the Hebrew language, and consequently on the sacred writings, of which a new translation, from the first to the last word, must inevitably follow.

the French termination *ois* will answer, that this arises from the French word *etois* being no other than *it was:* then for the same reason *all if a* resembles *all of a.* The reader is well aware, for we have had many instances of this circumstance in the analysis of words, that the letters *i* and *o* are, from their both meaning *one*, often used indifferently. Then what difference is there between *all if a* and *all of a?* The sole difference is, that the *f* in the former situation is preceded by an *i*, and that in the latter it is preceded by an *o*, and here, as to meaning, this makes no difference at all. Then the venerable name, ALPHA, is drawn from under the cloud of many ages, and shown the light; and in English it is, *All-of-a*, contracted to Alf*a* or Alph*a;* from which we are to understand that there is in the word Αλφα all that concerns it, both as to sound and form. What explanation of this letter could be more happy, than thus to give, in one short significant word, both its forms and both its sounds? For here we have in reality the long and the short sound of *Alpha*, as well as both its forms; and not only have we these four essential particulars respecting *Alpha*, but the word itself tells us that we have them, since it implies—*this is the whole of a.* The most enlightened orthoepist of our days would think it were to act very wisely, to give in such a case *any word* containing both sounds of *a.* He would be very far from imagining an instance which not only did this, but also explained itself. Let us now look attentively at

All of a, and see if we cannot discover some further proof — if more be necessary — that this is a correct account of *Alpha*. What difference did the ancients make between the long and the short sound of a letter? The long sound was double the length of the short one, or, in other words, the short one was only half the length of the long one. Then if we have in the syllable AL the long sound of A, and in *pha* its short sound, it follows that *ph* and *of* should be equal as to meaning; and not only this, but that both words should mean *half*, and that *All of a*, or *Alpha*, must be equal to *all half a;* that is, *all a* and *half of a*, which implies the long or full sound of A, and the short or half sound of *a*. At first sight it appears impossible that *of* could have ever meant *half*, since if we say, "Eve ate of the apple," we do not understand that she ate *half of it*. But is it not natural to suppose, that the first division ever made of any whole substance was a half? And from men having begun with this division — the most simple of all, as a part of a whole — may it not be allowed that before they had become acquainted with other fractional parts, more difficult to find a name for — such as a *quarter* and *three quarters* — the word for *half* must have long existed, and have not only meant exactly the half, but occasionally something more or less; until later, necessity made another word for *half*, leaving the first word to mean any undetermined part of a whole substance. As a further confirmation of the truth of this reasoning, may we

not remark that fruits and leaves, which must in the beginning of the world have served as both food and bedding for men, are all so made as to be easily divided into halves, since in the middle of them, this division is clearly shown. It may be also remarked that the human form, as well as that of all animals, offers numerous instances of this division. Bernardin de St. Pierre observes, "Tout animal est double, si vous considérez ses deux yeux, ses deux narines, ses deux oreilles, le nombre de ses jambes disposées par paires, vous diriez de deux animaux collés l'un à l'autre est reunis sous la même peau."*

The *half moon* is also a striking object, and it must in the beginning have greatly attracted man's notice, and have contributed to give him an exact idea of a half.

Hence *of an apple*, or *of a nut*, must in the beginning have meant *half an apple*, and *half a nut.* And does not the line which divides the *o* in ϕ into halves, falling down a little below it, appear to be an imitation of the stalk of a fruit, dividing it also into halves? But I have a stronger proof that *of* and *half* were in the beginning the same. An analysis of the word *half* gives these words, *he-al-if* ("the all, half," "the whole, half"). We shall see presently all that *h* means; and then the reader will admit what I am now going to state, namely, that the word *he* is here for *vie*, which is occa-

* Etudes de la Nature, chap. vii.

sionally explained by *the*, *the thing*, or *the life*. The word *if* may in general be accounted for after the same manner; but in *he-al-if* we should, in order to understand this word more clearly, explain *if* by *half*, and it must be made to take its primitive place thus, *if-he-al;* of which the exact literal meaning is, *half the whole*. I may be told that *if*, as I have often stated, ought to mean *one thing*, and consequently not *half a thing*. But I may reply, that *if* does really mean, even in the present instance, *one thing*, and that this *one thing* is named *half* (*i-if*, that is, *a half*). Thus if we analyse the word *a*, here preceding *if*, it will, we know, make *oi*, (*the one*, that is, *the one thing*,) and when joined to the *if* thus, *oi-if*, we also know, from what we have already seen, that this combination will make *wife*, which is also another word for *half*, as *my dear half*, *my better half*. Then *a half* is really *one thing;* so that what Bernardin de St. Pierre says of animals may be very well said of a whole thing, namely, that it is composed of two whole things stuck together. Then the three words, *if-he-al* mean, *one thing the whole*, that is, *one thing* (belonging to) *the whole*, or *one thing* (concerning) *the whole*.

But why, it may be asked, do we not write a single *f* instead of the word *of?* or why do we not put an *i* before it, as the Greeks appear to have done, since the *i* now put after this letter in the alphabet when naming it (as φι) must have first gone before it? As consonants do not make words by themselves, the letter *f* could not be allowed to

stand by itself; and as to its taking an *o* instead of an *i*, there is no mistake, since the word implies *half of the o*, or *of one thing;* nor did the Greeks do wrong to employ an *i* as they have done, since it is by such a figure that the *o* is divided into two. Besides, may we not remark that in our *f*, however we make it, there is a bar in the middle significant of its primitive meaning; and if we make this letter thus, ρ, which is, I believe, a very ancient form, what is it but a contraction of φ? We need only take from the latter the half of the *o* on its left side, and we shall have for its contracted form ρ. But as the word *half* did, I find, enter into the composition of a multitude of words, while bearing its primitive form, I shall have still many occasions in the analysis of words of proving all I have here said about it. But that the reader may not in the interval entertain any doubt respecting the ancient meaning of the word *of*, I beg to give here—though it be not the proper place for doing so—another instance, and I think a curious one, which must, even for the present, decide this question. As the word *de* has in several languages the same meaning which *of* has in English, if it can be accounted for in precisely the same way, this circumstance will, of course, go to prove that the view taken of the word *of* must be correct.

I have said that this word is the same as φ; that is, as the half of a fruit, thus shown by the form of an O; then what is the letter D but the half of an O, as we may thus see, Ⓓ? As to the

e which follows D in D*e*, we shall see, when we know Epsilon, that it is equal to *i* in *if* and *o* in *of*. And what letter do we see in the other half of the O with D? why, the letter C, the one which precedes D in the alphabet, even as it does here ⒹⒸ. Thus we discover the original of C and D, which is very important. But we may discover something still more important in this O. What letter have we between the C and the D (ⒹⒸ)? the letter I; so that we have in the O the word CID; and the reader now knows that before men said *cider* they must have said *er cid*, that is, *the cider*, *er* being here an article. Then what are we to understand from seeing the word *cider* appear in the form of an apple? Why, that "cider is IN an apple;" and no definition could be more true, concise, or ingenious.

But I have said that man's first food must have been also fruits; and hence it is that the Latin word *cibus* (which must, prior to its bearing this form, have been *cib*, the *us* having gone before it, as, *us cib*, "the food,") appears also when written thus, CIB in the form of an apple, as ⒷⒸ; thus implying that food is in an apple. I also find that the first name which the goddess Cybele (who is the same as *terra*) must have had was *cib*, the *ele* at the end of this word being what is called a pronoun, as *ele cib*, that is, "she to food," "belonging to food;" *ele cib* being for *el ea cib*; so that when we consider this name to be the same as the earth, it is also happily found in the above form. And here I beg to correct a mistaken notion with re-

spect to the name Cybele. It is said that this goddess has been so called from the mountain upon which she was exposed as soon as born. But this cannot be true; for, not to consider the definition already given, *cib* means, when analysed, "it is existence" (or) "being," (*ic ib*, "it being,") and food is existence, since without it man cannot exist; and hence the words *food* and *living* have become synonymous; and it is also for the same reason that the Latin word *esse* means "to eat" as well as "to be." Then, instead of Cybele receiving her name from the mountain, it is rather the mountain that has received its name from her.

From the D being thus one half of the O, it has been frequently made, as a qualifying word, to precede this letter; as *id o*, which, when O meant the Divinity, signified *the God*. Hence we may account for the words *God*, *Deus*, *Dieu*, *Odin*, *Odd*, &c. God must have been first O, then *id o*, (*the o*, or "the one," or "the sun,") after which *id* fell behind *o*, and both words became *od*, which had still the same meaning. Then *od* took *ge* before it, which, from its meaning *go* or *life*, was also, as we shall see presently, another name for the Divinity. Then *ge od*, which has been contracted to *God*, meant "the living one," or "the high one," *ge* having also this meaning, as we shall see when accounting for the third letter (*gamma*) of the Greek alphabet. But *ge* must, like all other words, have lost, with time, its primitive meaning, as men could not, for their want of the science of languages, hinder so

great a misfortune from happening; and in this case *ge* could only mean *the*, that is, be as insignificant as *the* appears *now* to be. As *ge* is the same as *go*, hence there is no difference whatever in meaning between *good* and *God*, since they both mean "the one being." * Indeed *bonus* becomes, when analysed, thus, *us-be-on*, "the one being;" and the same word in Greek (ἀγαθος) has not a different meaning, since it literally is, *ea ga theos*, that is, "the going," or "being God." For here *ga* is for *go-i*, and it did at its birth mean, "the one being," or "the one going." I cannot here omit noticing the other Greek word for *good* (χρηστος), since it literally means, when thus analysed, *os-ic-er-is*, "that which ever is;" and this is certainly a very happy definition of the Divinity. Now the name for Christ in Greek (χρίστος) has precisely the same meaning, as we may thus see, *os-ic ir is*, "that which ever is." It is needless to add, that in Latin, English, and French, this name is still the same as to meaning. Thus *Christus* makes *us-ic ever ist*, "that which ever is." And in English and French, Christ makes *ic-ever-ist*, "it ever is." If the reader cannot yet tell from what has been already shown why *h* is here made to stand for *ev* or *iv*, he will see the cause of it a little farther on. Hence we discover that the different ideas, God, goodness, Christ, and eternity, had at one time but

* Nor even in *form*, as we shall see hereafter, is there any difference between *ge* and *go*; but of this I was not aware when the above statement was made.

one name. That *ge* or *go* was the same as *God* can be proved even by the analysis of the word *guess*, which makes either *ig-esse* or *ge-esse*—and it does not matter which we take—and of this the meaning is, "the being God," or "the being (to) God," *esse-ig*, or *esse-ge;* because it is only God, who knows all things, that can truly *guess*. How evident this becomes when we employ *to divine* instead of *to guess*, since we have already seen that *divine* is, when analysed, *in div*, that is, *un dieu* (a god), the *v* being here employed instead of *u*. Even an analysis of *angel*, which must have first been *el ange* (the angel), will leave no doubt that *ge* was for *God*, since *ange* makes *oin-ge*, that is, *one* (to) *God*, or *one* (to) *going*, meaning, "belonging to God," or "to going." How many observations rise still out of these words, which I am here obliged to pass over!

Od, which was once a name for the Divinity, as we have just seen, lost with time its great meaning, and it has only preserved the power of indicating that which is single or distinct from others. Thus an odd number is that which is separate or alone; and hence we use indifferently the words *odd* and *singular*, as "John is an odd man, or a singular man."

Deus must have been made by the juncture of *di* and *os*, which were also two names for *God*, as we have already seen; *di* being for the *day*, and *os* for the *sun*. But when they were used together, the one must have served as a qualifying word to the

other, or as a mere article, so that *os di* would in this case mean simply *the day*. Hence *os* must have fallen behind *di*, and both words have become *dios*, which form still exists in the Spanish language; but it is in Latin — and for which I shall account hereafter — written *Deus*. The French word for the Divinity (*di eu*) must have been formed in a similar manner, that is, from the article *eu* having first preceded *di* (the day), thus, *eu di*, and from its having afterwards fallen behind it, thus, *di-eu*. Of course the reader has not forgotten what I have already remarked respecting *di es* (the present Latin word for *day*), which was that *es* must have first gone before *di*, thus, *es di* (the day), and have afterwards fallen behind it, thus, *dies*, and that it was the different articles made to precede *di* that showed when it meant the Divinity, or merely the day. *Dieu* means also "head life," or "divine life," D being, like T, another name for *God* or *head;* but still the *day* or the *sun* is, in this case, referred to.

Odin differs from the other names given to the Divinity, from its having taken, when it was only *od*, the article *in* before it, thus, *in od;* which two words, if we give to each its primitive meaning, imply *one one*, and this is equal to *the only one*.

Even the word *devil* means, when analysed, *God*, (*il-div*, or *il dieu*); and this is confirmed by an analysis of it in Greek, Latin, and French. Διαβολος makes *dio-ib-olos;* and here *dio-ib* does not in any manner (not even in form as we shall see when we

know what *b* is) differ from *Dios*, already accounted for. As to *olos*, which means *all*, as we have also seen, it is here only a qualifying word belonging to *Dios;* so that both words mean "the whole Divinity." This explanation will serve for the Latin name for *devil*, as it bears the same form as in Greek. As to the French (diable), it is simply *le diab*, the article having fallen behind; hence it is also explained in the Greek name. Even *Satan* literally means, when thus analysed, *is ea it oin*, "is the head one." But *devil* may, when thus analysed, *id-evil*, mean, "head evil," "first evil."

I have now to account for the double form of *Alpha*, that is, for *A* and *a;* show why this letter holds the place it does in the alphabet, and what is the exact meaning of its first syllable *al*. I shall take the last point into consideration first.

All means the whole of a thing. But how must men in the beginning have named this idea? If we analyse the word *all* itself, it will give us *ea il*, which two words, from their being well-known articles, do not appear to have in them the name of any object; so that, without being well acquainted with the manner of tracing *words* in other *words*, such a one as the present, from its being so short, offers serious difficulties. The method I have hitherto observed, when thus anxious to find out what a word like this means, has been to put myself in such a situation as the men who have composed the word in question must have been in at the time of their doing so.

Their knowledge was derived from the natural objects around them, the sun and the moon, apples, nuts, leaves, &c. Then we are, in order to discover what has given the idea of the whole of an object, to look amongst such things as those for the one which appears the most entire; and then to place it, as a qualifying word, before the name of the object which we desire to qualify.

If we examine a great many natural objects, we shall find that the full moon appears to the naked eye the most completely entire, at the same time that it is the most striking. I have already shown that the first name she ever had was O! In the word *all*, which we know should be *al*, there is no *o;* but we have already several times seen, that letters really are where they do not appear to be; thus, in *iv* we have seen an N, in *ii* a *u*, in *is* a *j*, and in an O both a C and a D; hence a child ten years old, from remarking how I have made these discoveries, ought at a single glance to perceive an *o* in *al*, and thus learn how the first letter in the alphabet has been made. Men first said *o il*, "moon it;" meaning by this, "all it," because nothing appears more whole or entire than the full moon; and from these two words falling together thus, *oil*, and then a little more, thus, *al*, the letter *a* and the word *all* were made. The sun, from its being the greatest object in nature, must have also given men, in the beginning of the world, the idea of totality, just as it has, in common with the moon, given them the idea of unity or singleness, which

has been already sufficiently shown. I have on the present occasion chosen the *moon*, as it is more easily contemplated on account of its mild lustre, when entire, than the sun. But the word *all* might as well have been *ol;* as the *i*, instead of joining with the *o*, might have been lost, which has happened in Greek, where *all* is *olos* (ὅλος), which must have first been *ol*, and then *os ol* (the whole), and at last *olos* (all). The reader has not, of course, forgotten what I have already observed respecting this word *os*, namely, that though made to serve as an article, it was in the beginning another name for the *sun;* which happened from men having put *is* before *o*, thus, *is o*, "the sun," and then from the *is* having fallen behind *o*, and having made with this word *os* instead of *ois*. Here this truth is confirmed by an analysis of the word *lustre*, which makes *il os être*, "the sun to be," which has been shortened to *lostre*, now written *lustre*. When we take from *lustre* its final syllable (*re*), we may also discover the true meaning and etymology of the word that remains (*il-os-it*), which has been contracted in the usual manner, and hence it implies "the sun it," that is, "it is to the sun," "belonging to the sun," "it is burning," "it is ardent." In like manner, the word *it*, which has a meaning similar to *il*, has been qualified by *o*. The Latin word *totus*, the French word *tout* or *tous*, and the English word *out*, as well as the French word *haut*, have been all formed in this way. Thus *totus* must have first been *o it*, which has been shortened to *ot*. The word *it* was again

made, like an article, to precede *ot*, thus, *it ot*, and these two words became shortened to *tot*, which, from having taken *us* (the) before it, and from this *us* having afterwards fallen behind, became *totus*. The first form of *tout*, or *tous*, must have been *ou*, made from the juncture of *oi-i* (great one one), and then before *ou* went *it*, thus, *it ou*, shortened to *tou;* and from *it* or *is* having gone before *tou*, and then having fallen behind it, *tout* and *tous* have been made. The English word *out* must have been also in the beginning *ou*, which became *out* from its having been preceded and then followed by *it*, in the usual way. But this, I shall be told, goes to prove that *out*, and *tous* or *tout*, or, in other words, *out* and *all*, named in the beginning the same idea. And so they did; and even at the present hour we often use *out* in the sense of *all;* thus the word *throughout* is the same as *through all;* for "throughout the town," or "throughout the country," does not differ from "through all the town," "through all the country." What great minds men must have had in the beginning of the world, to express themselves so; and how natural and just it is that *out* should be synonymous with *all*, since to be *out*, that is, abroad with nature, is to be in the midst of *all* things. The French word *haut* is composed of *vie-oi-it;* and as *vie* is here the same as *the*, the literal meaning of the whole is, "the great one life," or "the whole," by which may be meant the *sun* or the *Divinity*. And here, too, we have *out*, for the two words *oi it* take this form when we allow them

to approach thus, *oiit;* and hence it is that the English of *haut* (tall) makes, when analysed, *it all*, in which case *all* is to be considered as another name for the *sun;* from which we learn that it was this great object which first gave the idea of height. Hence, too, it is that the Latin of high, *altus*, means, when analysed, "all that is," or "that is all," as we may thus see, *al-it-us*, which first was *us-al-it*, literally, "the whole it," or "the whole is." But the Greek word for height is, though bearing another form, still more clear; thus ὑψος makes, when analysed, *up is os*, which literally means, "up is that," or "up is it," which, when put in its primitive order thus, *it up is*, makes "the high being." Indeed, the English word height has precisely the same meaning, since it makes "the high life" (*he ig vit*).

Just as the first sound of A in *Alpha* has been formed, so has the second. *Oi*, besides its other meanings, had also that of *one thing*—each letter being the definition of the other—and when both letters fell together, and took the form of *a*, this compound character meant also "one thing," and such is the meaning it has even still in English; for when we say *a book*, these two words imply *one thing* (named) *book*. Hence before *oi* had become *a*, *phoi* (or φοι) must have meant "half of one thing," just as *pha* did afterwards. In order to signify these two sounds of A the *i* has been taken from each *a*, and joined together thus, Ä, and this accounts for the two dots which are sometimes to be seen over this letter. An analysis of the word

phases (the appearances of the moon) goes to prove that by *pha* is meant half of *a*, or of one thing. For this word *phases* is no other than the plural of *face*, and hence in the singular it ought to be *phase*, which is the contraction of *pha-is*, primitively *is pha*, that is, "the *half one;*" for the face of a thing is but one half, as to appearance, of a whole thing.

From thus knowing that *a* is composed of *o* and *i*, the orthoepist can now account for its broad sound, such as it has in the English word *all*. For when we give to these two letters the sound they have in the English word *oil*, we perceive that it is almost the same we give them when they unite, and make this word become *al*. Hence it is that foreigners can perceive no difference in sound between *al* and *ol*, and that they often pronounce *all* as if written *ol*. Now, too, we may discover how far we have deviated from the primitive pronunciation of words. Thus our present pronunciation of *name* is very remote from *noim*, which was its first form. *Nom* in French, and *nomen* (that is *en nom*) in Latin are much nearer the ancient sound of this word, since the *i* alone in both these languages has been dropt. When *a* precedes *n* in French, as in *tranquille* for instance—where *an* is for *oin* — it has much more of its primitive sound than it has in English when in a similar situation. *Fair* (a market), which we now know must have been once *foiir*, is also much farther from the original sound than the same word in French, which is *foire*, the latter having dropt an *i*. The

same may be said of *pear*, of which the orthography is very faulty, as it ought to be *pare*, since it was originally *poire*, as it is even still in French. But the *a* or *oi* is in all languages often very different from its primitive sound. Thus the syllable *ap* in *Apollo* is not in this respect as it must have been when written *oipollo*.* But every word thus

* In the analysis of this word already given, the *o* has been allowed to keep its place at the end; but if made to go first, it will serve to qualify the other three words, thus, *o-oi-ip-ol*, "the high God in the sun." Here *ol*, as we have already seen, is for *il o*, the *sun*, and it might as well be *al* (all). From an analysis of the English word *appal*, which makes *oi ip o il*, and means, "the great one in all," or "the great one in the *sun*," it would appear that the *sun* must have been, when this word was made, regarded as a supreme being. An analysis of words naming the same idea in Greek, Latin, and French, does not prove that *Apollo* was the god signified when these words were made, though it might have been the *sun*. Thus τρομος, which may be analysed thus, *os-être-ou*, means, "the being all," that is, "all existence;" but if we take the μ of this word for an *n*, which we are also entitled to do, the meaning will be, "the one being;" and *terror*, which may be analysed thus, *it-er-o-ir*, means, "the ever one being," that is, "the eternal being." *It-er* is also the same as *être*, and consequently *être* means not only a *being* but *ever;* hence τρομος, just explained, means also, "the eternal one;" but between this meaning and "all existence," or "the one being," there is no difference. *Effroi*, does not name a different idea, since it makes *ef-er-oi*, which means, "the ever great one." It would even seem from *appal*, that *Apollo* was regarded as the god of the *thunder*. But an analysis of this word in the above four languages does not indicate that this god was so considered; yet the idea named by *appal*, and the corresponding words in the other three languages, does not differ from that named by *thunder*, as we may thus see: βροντη, *ib-ir-on-te*, or, *iv-er-on-ite*, which means, when these words receive their primitive order, thus, *it-ever-on*, "the ever one," that is, "the eternal one." *Tonitrus* makes, when analysed (and that the words are put in their primitive order), *us it on er*, "the god one ever," that is, "the ever one god." *Tonnerre* is not different from either of these two, since it makes *it on er* (the one being); and *thunder* is literally *the un id er* (the one god ever). The analysis of *Jupiter*, who is allowed by the poets to be the god of the *thunder*, makes *id is u ip it-er*, and means, "that is life in eternity,"

noticed gives rise to so many observations, that I must, in order to get on, forbear remarking any more of them.

We may now tell why A is the first letter of the alphabet. We know that when made thus, A, it is composed of an I and an I placed one against the other; and that it is, consequently, equal to *one one*, which is for one in the extreme, or the first. If, in like manner, we consider each O from which I has been thus taken, we shall be also obliged to admit that this part of each A, that is, of the long and the short one, is still equal to *the first*, since O, like I, is also for one, and double O must, for this reason, be the same as double I, that is, for *one one*.

It were enough to lead one to suppose that the Jews have named their eleventh month A B, from A being in one of its forms equal to *one* and *one* connected, which stands for *eleven*. In this case A B should be analysed thus, *ib* A (that is, *ib* II), *the eleven;* but a critical knowledge of Βητα will serve to show the real etymology of A B, and also of *eleven* in French (*onze*); both of which, on account

the two words *it-er* being here the same as *is er* (is ever). Even this word *ever* is another name for the Divinity, since it literally means *life e'er* (*iv-er*). The French word *jamais* has, when analysed, a very powerful meaning, which is, "I am the great one being *Je-am-oi-is*." It may be analysed several other ways, but its meaning will be ever the same. Hence this word is not a negative, for it really means *ever;* so that when we see it used negatively, without its being preceded by *ne*, it must have this word understood. *Thor*, who was the god of the *thunder* among the Saxons and Teutonics, makes also, when analysed, *the-o-ir*, and it means, "the one being;" or it may be analysed thus, *it vie oer* (the life above).

of our hitherto limited knowledge of language, lie far beyond the reach of human penetration.

The English word *eleven* must have first been *el ii*, or, which is the same, *el u*, or *el v;* and when *el ii* or *el u* went together, and made *elu* or *elv*, it took *an* before it thus, *an elv*, and then *an* fell behind, and *elevan*, or *eleven* as it is now written, was formed. Hence, in some language with which I am not acquainted, *eli* may name *ten*, since by the addition of I it means "eleven." Thus *ten* in English makes, when analysed, *it ev*, or, which is equally correct, *it iv*, meaning, "the head life," that is, "the Divinity;" or it may be analysed thus, *it-in*, and this means, "the head one," which is still the same as "the Divinity." A knowledge of *Beta* will also lead us to discover that *ten* means three and seven. *Ten* in French (*dix*) is, when analysed, *dio;* and were it written *dis* it would be still *dio*, and this is another name for the Divinity; and though I may not yet show how *dis* makes otherwise *ten*, I can do so for *dix*, by begging the reader to observe that when the X is thus made (ɔc), we have, in the two parts of which it is composed, an O, as we may plainly see by placing each part opposite the other, thus, cɔ, and allowing them to meet. Hence, when we analyse *dio* itself, we have *id io*, or *id* 10, which literally means, "the ten." But if we take each half of the X when made thus (X), we shall still have a name for the Divinity, since it will give us V V (*life life*, or *all life*), as we may perceive by placing these two

characters thus, V/Λ, since when allowed to meet they make X. Then *dix* means *id* X (*the* X), or *id* VV (*the* VV, or *the five five*). *Ten* in Greek and Latin is also a name for the Divinity, or double life, as we may thus see: δεκα makes, in the analysis, *id-e-ka* (*it is k*), and K, we may perceive, is also composed of V and V, when we allow them to meet thus, V/Λ, since these by their juncture give K. But though K has this meaning, we shall see hereafter that this letter was not in the beginning made by the addition of one V to another. We may also remark that δεκα, when analysed thus, *id-e-ik-oi*, will mean, "it is the double round one," that is, "the great high one," "the one of double life," "of life past and to come;" which meaning applies also to the Divinity. *Decem* (the Latin word for *ten*) makes, when analysed, *id ek* M, (*it the* M, but, more correctly, *the great* or *double* M); or it may be analysed thus, *id is* M (*it is* M). Hence in *decem* allusion is made to the capital M, since it is, we may perceive, also composed of double V, arranged thus, ΛΛ, and allowed to meet; or allusion may be made to the small *m*, (in Greek made thus, μ,) which is the same as a *u*, and consequently as a *v*; so that, allowing *ek*, in the analysis *id ek m*, to indicate what is double, these three words will mean, "it the double *m* (μ)," that is, μ and μ, which are equal to V and V, or *five* and *five*.

Even the word *alone* may in some languages mean

ten, since it is also equal to the name of the sun (*o-il-one*), just as *solus* is. The same may be said of the French word *loin*, which is for *el-oin*, or *al-oin*, and is equal to "life life," or "the great one." *El* is here the same as *elle* in French (*she*), as we shall see in the explanation to be given of the Greek Λ (lambda), and consequently it is like the V, a letter implying *double* or *great existence*. I cannot say how the learned explain ELOHIM, one of the names of God in Hebrew, but it literally means, "the great one double life," and is to be thus analysed, *el-oi-ii-v*. Here *ii-v* is equal to *uv* or *vv*, that is, "life, life," "double life," or "eternal life." Hence *Eloi*, which I find explained by *my God*, literally means, "the great one," or rather, "great God;" but when we recollect that *el* is another name for life, *eloi* may also mean, "life life."

Αλφα can be also analysed so as to mean *all in a;* and Alpha, so as to mean *all in the a*, both of which meanings imply that all the letters in the alphabet are to be found in *A*. As it would be necessary, in order to see how far such an account of Alpha is correct, to explain all the other letters of the alphabet, I can *here* say no more of it than to beg the reader to keep it in mind during the following inquiry.

This short account of Alpha, on which volumes might be written full of the most interesting discoveries, will, I trust, for the present suffice. The prevailing temptation connected with this inquiry, that of reading in words the history of man's

thoughts while the world was yet in its infancy, has led me, as usual, far beyond the limits within which I had hoped to keep; and this will oblige me to pass over more hastily than should be done, several of the other characters of the Greek alphabet.

I have till now forgotten to account for the small Roman *a*, made thus, a. The Greek α is, we have just seen, composed of *i* and *o;* the *o* being put before the *i* — thus, *o i*, and allowed to join with it thus, *oi*. Now the sole difference between the manner of forming *a* and a is in the placing of the *o*, since if we put it on the other side of *i*, thus *io*, and allow both letters to meet thus, ė, we shall have a, as the reader will discover by turning up the book in his hand, and looking at the bottom of the words instead of the top, just as children, before they know their letters, often do. Hence both characters (*a* and a) are composed of precisely the same materials, an *i* and an *o;* and though the art employed to conceal their formation—that is, if divine cunning (in order to confound men's words), and not accident, is here to be considered — does not appear very deep, yet long ages have proved that it was sufficient for baffling all penetration.

I have now to account for the second letter of the Greek alphabet, and endeavour to derive some instruction from its hidden meaning.

Βητα, when analysed, ought to stand thus, *ib-ηt-ea*. Here *ib* is for *be;* *ηt* is the well-known pronoun or verb *to be* or *to go* (for it is all three), of which we have already spoken when considering

other pronouns; and *ea* is also belonging to the same class. Now as every pronoun, as well as the verb *to be* and *to go*, implies "existence," it follows that the three words, *be-it-ea* imply "existence, existence, existence." At first sight this appears impossible, as such language offers no meaning; yet if we examine the three words, *it is you*, or *it is that*, we shall find that they also imply "existence, existence, existence." Then if we do understand *it is that*, and do not understand *be it ea*, this arises from one or more of the latter words not being now used as it formerly was. We have already remarked that the word *it* was anciently employed as we do now employ *is*. Then let us profit by this knowledge, and put this *is* in the place of *it* in the three words, *be it ea*, and we shall have *be is ea;* which three words clearly imply that the word *be* is the same as the word *ea;* that is, the thing named *be* is named also *ea*, which is, in other words, to say, that *ea* is for "existence." Thus *be* and *ea* being in apposition to each other, and *is* not different from either of them, and as the three words make but one, it follows that they altogether imply "existence." Thus if we could comprise in one, the three words, *it is you*, or *it is that*, such a compound word would also mean "existence." Hence *be-it-ea* or Βητα is another word for "being." As the three words of which *Beta* is composed are thus three names for the one thing, it follows that not only each one of them is equal to either of the other two when separately considered, but that it

is also equal to the other two united. Thus *be* in *be it ea* is not only equal to the word *it* or the word *ea* individually compared, but it is equal to both connected. Thus if a man has three different names, such as John, James, and Thomas, we may say that John is equal to James or to Thomas, or that it is equal to both James and Thomas. Then as *b* in *Beta* implies "being," it follows, since it is equal to *eta* in meaning, that the latter word must mean "being" also; and as H*τα* is the name of one of the letters of the Greek alphabet, hence we learn what it means. But we learn something more with regard to *Beta* and *Hta*, which is, that not only these three names, but the characters that they represent are equal. Now, if this be true, it follows that whatever letter is equal to *Beta* must be equal to H*τα* also, and the same may be said of H*τα* with regard to *Beta*, since no two things equal to one another can have any thing equal to either of them without that thing being equal to both of them. Let us therefore take a letter which is frequently used for B, and see if that letter be equal to H also. *Habeo* (I have) is, we now know, no other than *eo hab*, which is literally, "I have." Hence between this *b* in *hab* and the *v* in *have*, there is not the least difference. Also *liber* is the same as *livre*, and *wife* in English the same as *weib* in German (the *f* and the *v* being also used indifferently). Then if V be the same as *Beta*, it follows that it must be also the same as *Hta*, and that it must mean "existence." Now

when I analyse the Latin word *vita* (life), I find that the *ita* of this word is nothing more than one of those words called articles or pronouns which first went before *v* or *vi*, and then fell behind it. Hence *v* did in the beginning mean "life," and *ita v* or *v-ita* is nothing more than "the life," or "life it is;" and hence we are to bear in mind that the familiar little word *the*, as well as the two words *it is*, must have been anciently employed to signify "all existence," in other words, "the Divinity;" and the word *vita* or *life* has at present a similar powerful meaning. But what are we to infer from what we have just seen prior to this observation on the words *the* and *it is*, or, which is the same, *ita* or *eta?* Why nothing but this, that the three words *Beta*, *Hta*, and *vita*, are one and the same word; and that consequently the three letters, *B*, *H*, and *V*, are one and the same letter; and that each of these three letters was in the beginning a word for "life," "being," or "existence." Then the name of the Greek letter Η*τα* might be written thus, *v ta*, which makes, when we sound the *v* as we do in the English alphabet, *vi-ta;* but when we put before *t* an *i*, which, in analysing this word, should go before it, we have *v-ita*, that is, *vita*. In like manner when we take the B from Β*ητα*, and put a V in its place, what have we still but *Vηta?* which is precisely the same as *vita;* for as the *i* in the latter word is long, that is, as it is in sound double as long as when short, if we put another *i* to the *i* in *vita*, we shall have *viita*. And what is H? It is nothing more

than a double I, which may be contracted in form to a single I, by our making this single *i* long in sound, which, we know from prosody, is to give it double the value it has when short. But I I, it may be remarked, though very like H, does not bear so close a resemblance to η, the other character for Hτα. But since η is for H, just as *a* is for A, its not being so like double I as H is, can be of no consequence whatever. We shall, however, see, a little farther on, that η is equal in form to *n*, which is composed of I and I.

Then

Βετα
Hτα } is *vita.*
Viita

As the *v* is no other than *u*, and as the *u* is no other than *ii*, it can be easily conceived why the one letter should be taken for the other, since they are both composed of two ones; but as the B does not appear to be composed of two ones, it may seem strange that it should be equal to either H or *v*. Then let us look again over the Greek alphabet, and see if there be any other letter in it which is still said to be the same as Βητα; to the end that we may learn, if possible, how B has been formed, and so account for the apparent singularity here alluded to.

The sixth letter of the Greek alphabet is named *Zeta;* and this word, when analysed, makes *is eta*, for we have already seen, in another part of this work, that the letter Z is for *is*. Then as this means that the word *is* equals *eta* in meaning, it

must, since *eta* is equal in this respect to B, H, *u* and V, be equal to them also; that is, it must be composed of two ones, or of two characters of similar value. But the *s* in *is* does not here appear, no more than it does any where else, to mean *one* by itself. Hence this rather increases than lessens the difficulty to be explained, namely, how the character B is equal to *H*, *u*, or *v*; because it must be now shown how it is also equal to *is*.

When I look again over the Greek alphabet, I perceive another letter of which the name ends also with *eta;* and as this final part is preceded by a single character (Θ), we are, of course, to infer, that the latter must also mean "vita," or "life." This character is in other languages represented by *th*, so that the entire name of the letter in question is *Theta*.

I have already accounted for H, and have proved it to be the same as the letter *v*, which I have also proved to mean "life." Hence *th*, when analysed, stands thus, *it-H* or *it V;* by which we see that *th* or Θ is equal to *the life*, the *it* being here as an article before the *H* or *v*, which is the same as *vita*. Now as I have already shown that the three last letters of *Theta* (see what has been said of the character *Hta*) are precisely the same as *vita*, or *ita v*, it follows, that when it is said in the Greek alphabet that *th* is equal to *eta*, nothing can be more correct, since this is, in other words, to say, *vita* is *vita*, or *life* is *life*.

But I still appear to be evading the question, and increasing its difficulty; for I have now to

show that B H Z and Θ are all alike. I beg, however, to add one more to the number, and then to account for them altogether.

The ninth letter of the Greek alphabet is named *Iota* (ἰῶτα), and its form is I, or ι. When analysed, it is, *io-ita*, that is, *io* is *vita*, *io* is *life;* which is very correct, inasmuch as *io* is the same as the verb *to go*, *to be*, or a *pronoun*, which classes of words do, we know, ever imply existence. But *iota* may, with equal propriety, be analysed thus, *i-o-ita;* that is, *i-o-is*, meaning that the *i* is the same as the *o*, since both imply one. However, as the above characters, which are said to be equal to *iota*, are all double, I adopt the former of these definitions, which I believe to be equally correct.

When accounting for the origin of the names given to the sun and to the moon, I had occasion to show, as I have also had frequently since, that a single O stood for one, as did also a single I. Then if, instead of *io*, we write *ii*, we have still *io* under another form; and we have also the two parts of an H, and of a *u* or a *v*; hence it is not without reason that *io* is said to be the same as *ita*, which we have seen is equal to H and V. But by adding IO to the preceding characters, and thus showing that B, IS, and IO, must not only be equal to them, but to one another also, the difficulty in question appears to increase still more and more. But the confidence to solve it must, however, become greater by so frequent a reference to the same definition. It is, besides, difficult to find any difference, as to

meaning, between *io* and *is*, when we examine these two words as we find them in aud*io* and aud*is*. It is evident that they are here radically the same, and that they differ only in form, in order to distinguish one person from another. And in English, what other difference can we discover between *is* and *be* in such an instance as "if he *is*" and "if he *be?*"

Hence we must be led to look minutely at the B, and consequently to discover that it is composed of these two parts, I ʒ, of which the latter is still composed of these two ʒ, which, when thus placed, ʒʒ, make, by being allowed to join, the letter S; so that when we put an I before it, we have IS, by which we see that B and IS make but one word. If, in like manner, we take these parts of the S (ʒ) and place them thus, O, or thus, O, so as to allow them to meet, we shall have, by doing so, an O, and consequently IO, B, and IS, make but one word, that is, they may all three be, *io*, *io*, *io*, or *b*, *b*, *b*, or *is*, *is*, *is*. Now as *io*, like *u*, *h*, and *v*, is composed of two characters, each meaning one, so are *b* and *is*, since they are equal to *io*, composed of two characters, each meaning one. Then *Beta*, *Eta*, *Zeta*, *Theta*, and *Iota*, have been justly defined by the wisdom of ancient times; and now we can see why such words as *io*, *be*, and *is*, are in meaning all alike, though different in form.

I consider it still necessary to repeat, in a few words, how the *Beta*, *Eta*, *Zeta*, *Theta*, and *Iota*, agree with one another, and the definitions given of them.

Βητα. The definition of this word implies that Βητα is the same as Ητα, which is true, since the former is equal to *be vita* (the being or the thing life), and the latter to *vita*, that is, *v ita*, "the life," or "life it is." The character B is also equal to the character H, from its being equal to *io*, and from *io* being equal to *i i*, and from *i i* being equal to *H*.

Βητα is equal to Ζητα in meaning, from the latter being for *is* ητα, that is, *is vita* (the life), which is also the meaning assigned to Βητα. The character B is the same as the character Z, from the latter being a contraction of IS, and from *is* being equal to B.

Βητα is equal to Θ (theta) in meaning, from *theta* being equal to *the vita*, or "the life." The character B is equal to the H in *theta*, to which H reference is made in the analysis thus, *it-H-ita*, that is, "it the H is;" and how B is equal to H has been just shown.

Βητα is equal to *io* in meaning, from *io*, like Βητα, implying "existence." The character B is equal to *io*, from *io* being equal to *is*, and from *is* being equal to B.

Thus Βητα both as to meaning and form has been accounted for. The next to be considered is Ητα.

Ητα means "existence," from its being composed of *v-ita;* that is, "life it is," or "the life." The character H is equal to the character B, for the reason that the character B is equal to the cha-

racter H, as has been shown. The character H is equal to Z, from Z being equal to *is*, and from *is* being equal to *io*, and from *io* being equal to *ii*, and from *ii* being equal to H. These equalities exist also as to meaning, since each word means "existence." The character H is equal to the character referred to in Θ (theta) in the definition of this word thus given, *it-H-ita*, that is, "the H it is," since both characters are alike in form. Hτα and Θ are also alike as to meaning, since *theta* is the same as *the vita*, "the life," "the existence," just as Hτα is for *v-ita* or *ita-v*, "the life," or "it is life."

H is equal to *io* in meaning, from the latter being a pronoun, as also the verbs *to be* and *to go*, all of which words ever imply "existence." And H is equal to *io* as a character, from *io* being equal to *ii*, and from *ii* being equal to H. Thus B and H have been accounted for. Zητα is next to be considered.

Zητα means "existence," from its being composed of *is-eta*, that is, "the life;" and hence it is in this respect equal to Bητα, Hτα, &c., as has been sufficiently shown. As a character, Z is equal to B and also to H, for the reason that both these characters, as we have just seen, are equal in this respect to Z. This character is also equal to the H referred to in Θ, or *theta*, for the same reason that this H does not differ from the one to which it has been already proved to be equal.

Z is equal to the character *io*, for the reason that *io* is equal to *is*, and that *is* is equal to Z.

Θ (theta): as it is only the H in the name of this letter that is referred to in the definition already given of it several times, it is unnecessary to show over again how it is equal to B and Z, and how correctly it agrees with its own definition. Thus we have accounted for B, H, Z, and Θ, so that *io* alone remains to be noticed; but from these four characters having been found equal to *io*, it follows that *io* must be equal to them.

If we now look over the above characters and compare them with alpha (A and α), we may perceive that they are all in the latter, and that thus far the analysis of this letter, which means, "all in *a*" — that is, all the letters of the alphabet are to be found in A—is correct. B, since it is composed of IO, is the A itself, in which we have also IO. And H, since it is composed of I and I, connected by another I in the middle, thus I–I is the same as A, which is also composed of I and I connected by another I, thus H. But how does H resemble α? By its being also made thus, Ɔ-C, in which we have the two parts of O connected by I in the middle, thus Ɔ-C. And Z? It is the contraction of *is*, as has been shown; and *is*, as it is the same as B or *io*, as has been shown, is, like these letters, the same as A. If we even divide Z in two equal parts, by a bar in the middle, thus Ƶ, we shall see that each part is equal to V, so that both parts are equal to W; and if we divide an O in two equal

parts, thus, C C, and then put them thus, ω, we shall have this part of B (3), which we have seen is equal to S, or to an O, and also, when placed thus, ω, to a W; hence Z itself is to be found in A, since O is a part of A. As to this character Θ it is an O and an I, and is the same as A. But it is not like A? As H is equal to Ɔ-C, and as the former is equal to A, it follows that the latter, that is, Ɔ-C, must be equal to A also; hence when we divide the O of Θ in two parts thus CƆ, they are equal to I I; and, were they to be joined thus, (-), they would be equal to I I when joined thus, A. As to *io* in *io*ta, it is the A itself; and when we consider the I alone, we see also that it is in alpha, whether we make the latter thus A, or thus *α*. The O is also in the A, since it is equal to C C, which two characters are equal to I I in H, or in Ɔ-C, or in A, as has just been shown; and as it is the second part of *a* (which is composed of *o* and *i*), it is to be also found in this character. Then A is a compound letter, it being composed of O and I; and as O is equal to these two parts C C, no matter how we place them; and as each of these two parts is equal to I, it follows that alpha is equal to I I I; that is, to *three*, and yet it is only *one*. Great attention should be paid to the remark made respecting these two characters H, Ɔ-C, which, from their being equal, is sufficient proof that these two characters I and C, or I and Ɔ, are also equal. Hence it is that I and I when joined thus, V, or thus, Λ, or thus ¦, ought to be equal to C and C when joined thus, ω or m,

or thus S, or in any other way. We should also remark well, that I means *one*, and that O has a similar meaning, and that these two characters stand in apposition to each other. This latter circumstance cannot be too seriously considered; for important discoveries, not only in the science of grammar, but in all other sciences, can, by following it up, be made from it, especially when we consider the form of these two characters; that is, when we remark that the one is a straight line and the other a circle. But these two figures differ widely? So do an S and an O, and yet they are one and the same figure.

As my knowledge of this science increases hourly, I now discover that a more minute analysis of the above characters (*Beta*, *Eta*, *Zeta*, *Theta*, and *Iota*) can be given. *Beta* may be analysed thus:—

B-e-et-a (B is E and A).
And *Eta* thus, E-it-A (E is A).
And *Zeta* thus, Z-E-et A (Z is E and A).
And *Theta* thus, T-H et A (T is H and A).
And *Iota* thus, I-O-et A (I is O and A).

It must in this place appear very ridiculous to assert that the character I is both an O and an A, yet that it is the one and the other, nothing can be more true and evident; and of this statement I shall remind the reader in the proper place: and no matter how strongly he may be opposed to it now, he will then admit, I have no doubt, that it is very correct, and can be easily conceived by all

who have the power of divesting their minds of erroneous ideas long imbibed.

On looking again over the Greek alphabet, I perceive that *m* and *n* are said to be equal to *u;* for their names *mu* and *nu* (μυ and νυ) make, when analysed, *m-u*, *n-u*, and mean *m* (is) *u*, and *n* (is) *u*. Then these two characters must be often used for those connected with *beta* explained above, since they are also equal to them; and hence it is that the two forms of *eta* (H and η) are, like μ and ν, each composed of *one one*, and that in modern languages μ and ν might be taken for the Roman character *u*. There is, we may remark, one half of this character η longer than the other, so that if we take a slight portion of what this long half has too much, and add it to the end of the short half, we shall have both halves equal, and consequently an *n*, which turned up becomes *u*. We may also remark, that this character μ has attached to the end of its first half a considerable part of an *i*, which has been taken from its second part, so that if we restore this part of an *i* to its primitive place, this character μ must become ω. Hence, too, it is, that the capital Greek M, which does not differ from the Roman one, is, when turned up, a W, and, consequently, means *ten*, since V and V, of which it is composed, are equal to *ten*. Thus, too, it is, that the word IO as its two letters (I and O) are equal to the two figures 1 and 0, stand for *ten;* and that the two parts of B, namely, Ꝑ, give, when placed thus, ω, that is, with the I between υυ, another form of the

W, and that they are consequently equal to 10. And the same may be said of IS, when we allow the two parts of the S (ʕ) to meet thus, CƆ. Then we discover that the single character I, is for man, or the male kind, and that ᴗᴗ, ʕ, or ʒ, is for woman, or the female kind, and that both connected constitute a Being. Let us now take μ, or rather its primitive form ω, and put it opposite the I, thus, ꓭ, and is it not easy to perceive that by allowing them to meet we shall have B? And if we take the ν and place it in a like manner against I (I^), shall we not also have, by allowing them to meet, the Saxon Ɯ, made thus ꝑ? The English v placed in like manner against I (I>), must also give by their juncture, the same letter (ꝑ). Now, too, we know why the B is frequently used for the V and the W. If we write the word *war* thus, ɯar, nobody will take it for *Bar*, for they will see that this letter ɯ must be an ancient form of the W; yet it is no other than B laid upon its back, as the reader may perceive by looking at it sideways. And if we write the word Mars thus, ɯars, nobody will mistake it for Bars, for the first character (ɯ) will be considered another form of the M; yet it is still the B, but now in a position opposite to that which it holds when laid upon its back; so that if we turn it up again thus, ɯ, we shall have ɯars. Hence between the three words, Bars, Mars, and ɯars, there is not as to either meaning or form the least difference, and this must confirm all that I have said farther back of Baron,

War, and Mars. There is something in all this extremely curious and mysterious, yet it is nothing compared to what we shall see farther on.

We may now tell why the Jews named their eleventh month AB. *A*, when analysed, makes *oi*, and *B*, when analysed, makes *io*, so that when we put the analysis of each together, thus, OIIO, we have eleven (11). Now also we may show the etymology of the same number in French (*onze*). As *z* is for *is*, as we have seen, hence *onze* is for *onise;* then, as *on* is for *one*, and as IS is the same as IO or 10, it follows, that when we add both together we have *eleven*. But the *e* at the end of *ise?* This *e* in the beginning went first, thus, *eis*, and this word was written thus, εις, which in Greek means *one;* but when we make ε and ς become *o o*, which we may do by putting the two parts of each sign together thus, CƆ CƆ, and allowing them to meet, we shall have, instead of εις, OIO, and here we have *ten*.

Here, too, we discover what Epsilon is; we see it belongs to the class of letters already explained. When we put it thus, ⁿ, it is an *m*; when thus, ⁿ, it is a *w*, or a double *u*; and if we take it asunder, we shall have ς or S. In its larger form, which is equal to the Roman E, we have still the two parts of Ɛ, they being placed against I thus, Iᶜ, which I stands in apposition to them, just as in I O *it* stands in apposition to O. We shall see further on, that *epsilon* is a diminutive of *upsilon*, and consequently of *eta*, which is the same as *upsilon*. But with regard to εις making, when analysed, *oio*,

or *ten*, I may be told that it should make only *one*, since these three characters (*oio*) are εις under another form, and this word in Greek means only *one*. Then I answer that in *oio* we have only one (1). But I have just said, it will be again remarked, that in *oio* we have 10? and I say so still. Then how is this mystery to be explained? We shall see that in the proper place; but in the interval, in order to give the reader something to think of, I beg to remind him of what I have stated farther back, and proved to be correct, namely, that the Divinity is named ONE and TEN also; which, if true, must go to prove that *one* is *ten*, and *ten* are *one;* and if this be not proved, my words have no meaning.

With regard to the M, I find in the analysis of words frequent allusion made to it. This circumstance I attribute to the remarkable place it holds in the alphabet, that of the middle, which necessarily implies sameness or equality.

But it should be observed, that by M the Divinity is also meant, He being ever *equal*, ever the same; and M is not only often employed for W, U, V, H, B, and N, but also for *in* and *iu* and *iv*, and this accounts for its three *ones* (m), since in each of these words *in*, *iu*, and *iv*, we have three *ones*.

The Greek word μεσον (middle) must have first been only *m*, which is equal to *iv;* for εσον, by which it is followed, and which may be analysed thus, *is on* (equal to *be-on* or *being*) is only a repetition of *iv*, since this also means *being* or the 1 *life*, just as *be-on*,

that is, *be-one*, or *one be*, or *one vie*, does. Then we are to translate μεσον by, M *being*; that is, "being the M" or "the thing M." The same word in Latin, *medium*, is composed of *id-em* (the same), and *iv-in* (even). It is *med* (im-ed) that gives *id-em*, but it might as well be written *mid*, just as it is in English; yet *med* is very correct, as a further knowledge of epsilon will show us. Then *med* or *mid* and *idem* make but one word, and this we shall find very exact when we remark that the middle implies equality. The *u* in *ium* is for *v*, and *m* is for *in* or *en*, both being equal. Then we are to render *medium* by *the m, even*. It may be also analysed thus, *in-ed-iv-iv* — *one God, life, life* — and a great many other ways, but the meaning will be ever the same. The English word *amid* is to be analysed thus, *ea m* (the *m*); and from this must have come *am*, and this word must have meant middle, and have taken *id* before it as an article (the), so that from the latter having fallen behind, *amid* has been formed. As to the word *middle*, it does not differ from *mid*, which I have just shown to be equal to *idem*, but by its having the article *le* at the end, which must have first gone before *mid*, thus, *le mid*, and have afterwards fallen behind. But *amidst?* it is only *amid-est* (amid is it), this common termination *est* being equal to the French word *être* (being), and it is also equal to *er*. Thus *harp*ER, or *harp*IST, means "a being (a person) to the harp." And were tobacco*nist* written tobacco*ner* or *to*bacco*netre*, it would be very correct. But *am*, when it was used for

same, took also *is* before it, thus, *is am* (the same), and from both words falling together, thus, *isam*, and from the *i* being dropt as usual, *sam* was formed, and Spenser writes it so. But *same* or *sam* might have been formed thus, *is-ea-m* (is the *m*), for these three words, when contracted, become also *sam*. The word *item* (also), is still the same as *id em*, and is to be analysed thus, *it m*, but when it means an article in an account, it is to be analysed thus, *it-in* (the *one*), where *in* is for *m*. Here I ought to remark that ONE is also employed to signify what is equal or *even*. Indeed this word *even* is literally *one one*, as it may be thus analysed, *in in;* a name which I often find given to the Divinity. Thus the French word for *even* is also (since it is *uni*, that is, *un-i*,) literally *one one*. The French word *même* is still *m-m*, or *in-in* (one one); nor does the ancient spelling of this word (*mesme*) make here the least difference. But we have in *mesme* three words added together, *em-es-em*, and they may be analysed thus, *in-eo-in*, meaning "one, the one, one." Then the word *mesme* must have been formed thus: it was first *in* (one); this became *m*, from the *i* and *n* having fallen together, and it still meant *one*, or what was *even;* then came *eo* (*es*), which also meant *the one;* and afterwards both *es* and *m* must have been used together, thus, *esm* or *esem* (one-one); and from the first word (*in* or *m*) being not at this time forgotten, it was employed conjointly with *esm;* but at first separ-

ately from it, as, *in esm*, and then thus, *inesm* or *mesm*, now written *même*.* It will be found in all languages that this idea was in the beginning *one* or the *Divinity*. And what does this great name literally mean? *Of one one the being;* that is, "the being of one one," "the existence belonging to the great one," or "eternal one;" for *one one* has this meaning. *Divinity* is to be analysed thus, *id-in-in-it-e — of* ONE ONE *it is*. Here *id* may be also rendered by *head*, but this will cause no change in the meaning; for *head* and *of* differ only in form, and hence *of* indicates the *Divinity* as well as it does *one thing*, though it also means *half*, as I have already shown. As the two words *it is* do not differ in meaning from *être*, hence we see that the above analysis literally means, *of* ONE ONE *the being*, that is, "the being of ONE ONE," "the being or existence belonging to God." When we put *head* in place of the word *of*, and make *it e* take its primitive place, thus, *it-e-id-in-in*, the literal meaning will be, "being head ONE ONE;" that is, "the existence chief (concerning) ONE ONE." Here, too, we may see what I stated above, namely, that *even* is another name for the *Divinity*, since the latter word may be also analysed thus, *id-iv in-it-e* (*of* EVEN *the being*). This leads me to think of the word *heaven*, which I find means *God's dwelling*, *vie-à-iven* or *be-à-iven*. Here *be* and

* No trace of *em* for *même* is, I believe, now to be found in French, but *esme* is, unless my memory greatly deceives me, still to be met with in old writers.

vie may be used indifferently. The reader will please to remember the account I have given of the first names man ever had for his dwelling: we there saw that *Be* or *bi* (for it does not matter which we take) was one of those names. To show how necessary it will be to pay great attention in the analysing of words, I need only cite this word *in*, so frequently used for the *Divinity*, since it is also to be found in *sin*, where it still means *one*. Then it may be supposed that *s* is not here for *is*, which is equal to *io* or *Be;* but this conjecture is wrong, for *sin* literally means *beon*, or *beone*, or *being*, which names are equal to the *Divinity;* and this is so true that, in some languages with which I am not acquainted, the word *sin* may be for *God*. Then how are we to explain it? In this way: the word *in* means *one*, just as *o* means *one*, as we have often seen. Now supposing that there was in a language but a single word, it can be easily conceived that the people speaking such a language could not have both an affirmative and a negative without making their one word serve for both. The word IN*tact* has a negative meaning, and the word IN*come* an affirmative one, yet the word *in* has in both instances the same power, and it is for *one;* but in the former instance it is *one* negatively, and in the latter, one affirmatively. Just as *o* in *zero* (*is-er-o* —" it is the *o*") is *one*, being negatively considered, and in *anno* (*an-o* — " one thing to the year") it is *one* in a contrary sense. From seeing the same word thus employed, as in

IN-*tact* and IN-*come*, and as in *zero* and *anno*, it is evident that an affirmation means *one thing*, and that a negation has precisely the same meaning. Hence, in some languages, the word which is used affirmatively, may be taken in a negative sense in other languages. Thus IN is an affirmative in the English word IN*habitant;* but to Frenchmen, who use the word *habitant*, it appears a negative. It were yet too soon to tell why in all the languages in the world an affirmative and a negative have, when radically considered, the same meaning. Of course every body believes a language to have more than one word, yet this remains to be proved. Lest it should be supposed that *in* is not, when having a negative signification, the same word that means *one*, I wish to show something similar to what I have just shown, which must on this matter remove all doubt. The word IN*tact* means UN-*touched:* — what is this word *un?* It is the French and Latin word *un*. I call it a Latin word, because I know it must have existed ages before *unus*. But this negative, it will be observed, seems to be rendered in a very different way; thus the first syllable in the Latin, French, and English words, *impotens*, *impotent*, appears neither *in* nor *un*. However it is both, for when analysed it becomes *iv*, and this is equal to *in*, or *one thing*. But how is it *un?* There is no necessity for analysing it in order to show how this happens, we need only look closely at it. The word *un* is composed of four *ones*, and *im* is composed of precisely the same

number, so that *impotens* or *impotent* might with equal propriety be written *unpotens* and *unpotent*, and in some languages they must be so written. And as a proof of this, which admits of no doubt, I may cite such Latin and French words as *impolitus*, *impoli*, *impunitus*, and *impuni*, of which the *im* is in English rendered by *un*, as *un*polite, *un*punished; and the former of these two words is frequently written *im*polite, which also proves that *im* and *un* are equal, and consequently that the two first ones in *im* make a *u*. Then such negatives as *ni*, *ne*, and *no*, are *in*, *en*, and *on*, and in some languages they may be affirmatives, for they all mean *one*, *one*, *one*. Thus the ancient Latins must have used *no* affirmatively when it meant WE; for that this was the form which *nos* once had, I have clearly proved in the account (given farther back) of this word. Thus if we were now to make *un* change its place in such a word as *un*happy, by putting it at the end thus, *happy* UN, it would mean *happy one;* it is, however, the same word.

I have often had occasion to wonder at the many things, in the discoveries I have made, that have lain on the surface: to perceive that *in* and *im* are equal to *one* does not appear very difficult, but what can be more visible than *un* in *unhappy*, *unfortunate*, &c., this being the French word for *one*. But this observation is only a repetition of what has been often said, namely, that the most simple things are the most difficult to find.

I have in another part of this work accounted

for N, and have there shown that it is composed of *one* (I) and a *v*, which makes it equal to I and V (IV); and as the word for *one* was anciently *in* and *en* as well as *on*, it has given its name to this letter (N), which might consequently be named *on u*, *in u*, and *en u*, and such a name signifies *one* (and) *u*, that is, the *middle* (μ) and *one*.

If we put *a* before N, instead of *i*, *e*, or *o*, the meaning will be still the same, for the reason that *a* is for *oi*, in which we have two letters in apposition to each other, so that what one means the other means also; besides I have already shown that *a* is for *one*, there being no difference as to meaning between it and *an*, which is *oin*, where we have *o* in apposition to *in*. But in this word we have really three letters defining one another, *o-i-n*, as each means *one*, and yet all three mean but *one;* so here are *three in one*. This latter observation I beg the reader to bear well in mind; I shall draw a great deal from it hereafter.

We must also remember that the Roman character *f* is frequently used instead of *u*, *v*, *b*, &c., and consequently for *n*. Thus if we want to explain the English word *if*, we know that it may in some languages be written *iv*, *ib*, *in*, &c., or which is the same, *ov*, *ob*, *on*, &c., or still, *av*, *ab*, *an*, &c. In Greek we find it, αν, εαν, ην, and from our being well aware that *an* is the same as *one*, we thus plainly see that *if* in English means *one*, and in all the languages on earth the same idea must have a similar meaning. But the etymologist

will tell me, that *if* was anciently in English the same as *give* (in Saxon ȝiþ), and that, consequently, it cannot mean *one*. But if the etymologist knew the meaning of *give*, he would tell me I was very right, for he would know that *give* was another name for God, as I have already shown; and that *God* and *one* were precisely the same, as I have also shown many times in this work. The Latin and French word for *if*, which is *si*, makes also, when analysed, *is i*, that is, the *thing one*, *is one*. But I have forgotten to notice the other two Greek words given above, namely, εαν and ην. The former of these two becomes, when analysed, ε-*oin*, and here ε is in apposition to *oin*, and consequently it is equal to *one*, and this, as we shall see presently by the analysis of epsilon, is very true. But here I may, with great propriety, say that ε is equal to *the*, or *is* in English, for these words (*the* and *is*) are also equal to *one*, as we shall see. Hence εαν means *the one*. The other Greek word ην is literally *un* (one), for the reason that *u* and *n* are one and the same letter; and *un*, when analysed, makes *u-n*, that is, "*u* is *n*;" and as *n* is equal to *one*, as we have frequently seen, it follows that *u* is equal to *one* also.

The German word for *if* is *ob*, that is, *o-be*, *one being*, *one thing*, for *being*, we shall also see, is equal to *one*. Let us now, by an instance, show how *if* can mean *one thing*: "If you do wrong you shall be punished;" that is, "*one thing*, you, namely, *do wrong*, and you shall be punished;"

which means, "*to you the one thing* named *do wrong*, and you shall be punished."

The fourth letter of the Greek alphabet is Delta (Δ δ), of which the analysed form is *id-el-ita*. We have here three words in apposition to one another, so that to know any one of them is to know the other two. *Ita* is a word we have already frequently seen, and we know that it is for *being* or *existence;* hence the other two have a similar meaning; and as Δ is for God, it will of course correspond with existence, as He is existence itself. El is merely the letter L (λ), and thus we discover that this character is for existence also. It is composed of three parts when thus made, λ; for if we take off the top, and put it underneath, thus, △, we shall, by allowing these to meet, have Δ. It will be also necessary to remark, that there are in Δ three parts (△), and that if we put them thus, IV, we shall have another name for existence or the Divinity, and male and female. This, too, we should bear in mind; as also that Δ, though composed of these three parts or *three ones* (1 1 1), makes after all but *one*. These observations may appear now very trivial; but before the reader comes to the end of this book, they will often make him pause and think: for, when followed up, they lead to very strange things, to very important discoveries, and than which there is nothing in Euclid more evident.

Delta is to be also analysed thus, *d-e-l-et-e-a*

(*d* the λ and the *A*), that is, Δ is the λ and the *A*; meaning that it is equal to these two letters, both of which are, I find, frequently employed as names for the Divinity. Let us now see how far this definition is exact. If we take from *A* the bar in the middle, and put it at the bottom, thus, Δ, and allow it to join with the part above it, we shall have Δ. Even when delta is made thus, δ, we have still all that composes the other form of alpha (α), namely, an *o* and an *i*, as we may perceive by arranging them thus, *oi*, and allowing them to join, since this connection must give δ. Hence this definition given of delta (*id-e-l et-e-a*) is very exact. Delta also means *Head life it is*, because Λ is another name for *life* or *woman*, since it becomes a V when turned up. Delta also means *God* (*to*) *hell he is*, because λ is another name for *life*, and the English word *hell* simply means *the life*, or which is the same, "life life," and this is equal to eternity.

I may be told that, in other languages, *hell* does not appear to have such a meaning. Thus the Latin word *infernus* signifies what is low down; but so does the word *hell*, and here is the reason why: *ell* (or rather *el*) means *life* or *woman*, and the womb, or place of generation in woman, is low. Thus *infamis*, *infame*, and *infamous*, mean all what is very low, yet we have here the radical part of *fœmina* and *femme*. Hence it is that *well* (in good health) has literally the same meaning as *hell*, the *h* being equal to the *w*, and it critically signifies *life life*,

(*vie-el*). But what does *well*, a spring, mean? It is precisely the same. Nor has this word in Latin and French (*puteus* and *puits*) a different meaning, since the former, when analysed, makes, *us-ip-vi-it-e*, "the thing in life it is;" and the latter is *ip-vi-it-is*, which literally means, "in life it is." The English word *life* is, we may remark, when analysed, *el-if*, which means, "life life," or even, "God, God," *el*, as we have just seen, being another name for the *Divinity;* yet when we put these words in a situation which they must have once held, that is, *if* before *el*, we shall have *fel* instead of *life;* and hence it is that in Saxon the word for *well* (in good health) is pell, which proves, in the most evident manner, that *life* and *well* make but one word, and thus it must be in all the languages in the world.

But what does the Latin word *infernus* mean? It is to be analysed thus, *in-if-er-in-us*, or thus, *us-in-if-er-in*, of which the meaning is, "the being ever in one life," but each is literally, *in life ever one being*, and, "the being in life ever one." The French word *enfers* makes *en-if-er-is*, which means, *in life ever being*, and this is synonymous with *eternity*. But what is the literal meaning of this great word? Its analysed form is, *it er in-it-e*, "it ever one God is," or "being one God it is;" for *it er* is the same as the French *être*, or as the English word *ever*, and *being* and *ever* are synonymous. But I should have already remarked, that *er* is equal to *vr*, for the reason that *e* is here equal to H or *v;* and these two letters *vr*, when each

takes a vowel, become *iv ir* or *ever*, for here *i* and *e* are equal, as we shall see presently. But the English scholar can understand that *it er* is for *it ever*, as it is similar to *it e'er;* or, as the latter word ought to be written, *ere;* or simply *er*, for, critically speaking, there is no such word as *e'er*, the real word being *er*, and this is both past and future.

It will be now easy to account for *Dis* (Pluto): we know that *D* itself is for *God*, and that consequently *is* stands in apposition to it, and has just such a powerful meaning, and that when we give to one of these two letters (*s*) another form which it may take, namely, *o*, the word *Dis* becomes *Dio*, that is, *id-io*, *the head one*, or *ten* (10), this number being also for a *divinity*. Pluto, when analysed, makes, *ip-el-i-it-o* (in hell the head one).* Here it may not be amiss to notice the common prefix *dis*, as in *dis*please, *dis*like, &c. The reader will please to remember the explanation I have given of the different prefixes, *in*, *un*, and *im*, for *dis* is to be accounted for in precisely the same way. This word is equal to *one one*, and one of them is, whilst having still this meaning, used negatively, just as *in*, *un*, and *im*, are used in the instances already given in explanation of these words. But as *bis* (twice) is equal to *one one* (*be-be* or *io*-10), it can be easily conceived that *dis* (*id*-10, or *id be*, or *id*

* The word *ut* is, as we shall see further on, literally *the;* so that Pluto means also *in hell the one*. We have above not only this meaning, but also the meaning of *the*.

vi,) should have a similar meaning. Then such a word as disable is to be analysed thus, *id-un-able*, instead of *id-io-able*, not that there is any difference as to meaning between *io* and *un* (for both mean *one*), but because *un* happens to be used negatively in English. In other languages a different form of the word *one* is to be chosen; that is, the form to which a negative signification is generally assigned. Thus in French the word *un* is never employed negatively, for *unpoli* (*un poli*), if such a word were now to be introduced into this language, would mean *one polite;* yet *im* and *un* are, however, one and the same word, so that *impoli* is still *un poli* (*quelqu'un poli*) but in the wrong way, that is, in a bad sense.

I have already, in a great measure, accounted for the Greek L, (Λ λ, lambda,) the analysis of which offers several satisfactory meanings. It may be λ-*oim-ib*-Δ A, which means λ, *double being* (or *thing*) Δ A; that is, *l* is the double thing Δ and A; thus signifying, that it has in itself both a Δ and an A, delta and alpha.

In this analysis, the word *oim* is literally *womb*, which also means any thing double, as well as it does *womb*. Thus the French word *jambe* (leg) makes, when analysed (as has been observed farther back), *is-oim-be* (the double thing), because men have two legs; and it is for this reason, as has been also observed, that *uter* (making, in the analysis, *u-it-er*, the thing *u* or *v*,) refers to any two things, but also means a *womb*. This word in

Greek (υσερα), which, analysed, makes *ea-u-is-er*, has still the same meaning, since it literally is, *the u being;* that is, "the being or thing *u*." Thus, too, the Latin word *ambo* (both) makes *oim-beo*, *double being*, or *the womb being*, that is, "the thing double." The number *two* in Greek, Latin, French, and English, will be found to have a similar meaning: thus δυο and *duo* make *id-u-o* (the double *o*, the double *one*); and *deux* is for *id-e-u-o* (it the double *o*). Here the *x* is in place of *o;* and hence it makes an *o* when its two parts are put thus, cɔ, and allowed to meet. The English word *two* is still the same, since it is, when analysed, *it-w-o*, the double *o*, that is, the double *one*. These observations must lead to many others, which, from the way being thus opened, any body may now make.

When we examine the Greek L (λ), it is easy to perceive that it has all the parts to be found in Λ and A, and consequently the meaning given to the analysis of lambda can in this instance be applied. But this word may be also analysed thus, *L-oim-ϖid-oi*, meaning L (is) the womb with *the one;* that is, L is Λ or V, with *the one;* thus alluding to the 1 placed over the Λ (Λ̇). I have here explained *oi* by *the one*, so that I consider the *o* as an article, and which might be written thus, ε, or thus, ω, in which case *oi* becomes ει or ωι, which literally means, "life one."

Here I am sure man alone is meant, he being indicated by the sign I, just as Eve or woman is indicated by V or ᶜ̥, no matter how we place these

signs, which are always equal. Now as by these two signs for man and woman, when put together thus (IV), a human being is signified, and also the Deity—that is, man, woman, and their Creator, as we shall see clearly hereafter—I cannot believe but that when they are also placed thus (Λ), we have still the same characters. When made to take such a position as we see here (IΛ), they produce the well-known masculine pronoun *il* (he), which is another name for man, but literally, *man-woman;* for in man's name that of Eve's is always to be seen, and in Eve's that of man's, and both connected do ever compose a name for their Creator. Hence it is that we see so plainly in alpha (A), delta (Δ), and lambda (Λ), three parts in each character, (1, 1, 1,) that is, *one, one, one,* although each character makes, after all, but one. Then here we may be said to have three, and yet only *one!* This will, I foresee, lead to a great deal.

From knowing this much of lambda (but a great deal more might be said of it), it will not be difficult to account for the two Roman characters, L and l. If we take the two parts of Λ, that is, 1 and 1, and put them over one another thus, ⁞, we shall, by allowing them to meet, have the small l; hence this character is equal to *v* or *u*, from its being composed of similar parts. If, in like manner, we take the three parts to be seen in λ, and put them together thus, ⁞_, we shall have the capital L. And if to ⁞_, we add another 1, or *one*, thus, ⁞_ı, we shall have four *ones*, or the figure 4. Even

when this sign is made thus, 4, we may see that it is still composed of four *ones;* for when to this much Δ, which is equal to three *ones*, we add another 1, thus, Δ/1, and allow all four to meet, we shall have 4.

From A, Δ and λ, being thus equal among themselves, and also equal to one of the other characters found equal to *beta*, it follows that they must be equal to all the characters found equal to beta, so that up to the present we have seen only one character in all we have examined. When we perceive how lambda can become one of the characters equal to beta, we may easily discover how it can become the others. Thus to see it when bearing this form Λ become V, we may easily allow its other form λ to be equal to H, since this letter is also composed of 1 1 1, or three *ones*. Surely every body can now see how alpha, when formed thus, A, is the same as B, since, when we take this part of B (3), and make it become an *o*, thus, ( ); and then, when we add to this *o* the other part of B, namely, I, thus, *oi*, we see that A is B. As to alpha, when made thus, A, it is equal to these three parts, ⊖; and in some language with which I am not acquainted, A may be so made, with this difference, that there is perhaps no opening above; and that the three parts may join thus, Θ, or even thus, Θ. In this latter character we have *theta*, one of the letters equal to beta, and which is consequently equal to alpha. When we reflect that A is also made thus,

Ꭿ, what difference shall we find between it and *theta*, when we consider A as equal to Θ? Does not the head of the T placed over A, thus, Ꭿ, make it very evident that Θ (theta) and Ꭿ, are equal? That *iota*, that is, IO — for such is the radical part of iota — is also equal to alpha, must appear, after what has been shown, very evident to every close observer. We need only put the I on the other side of *o*, thus *oi*, to produce *a*; and when we put the *o* and *i* thus, Ⓘ, we have still the same letter, and do, by this means, see its three parts, since it is equal to Ⓘ, and, consequently, to Ⓘ or ɯ, by turning up which we have an ancient form of the *m*, namely ᴍ. These indications will, for the present, suffice to lead to the perfect discovery of whatever I leave unnoticed connected with these characters.

In this analysis, *l-oim-ɯid-oi*, of lambda, there is a difficulty to which I have not in the explanation referred, because I foresaw it would lead too far. But now as lambda has been sufficiently accounted for, I may notice this difficulty, and even allow myself a few digressions; for, unless my sight greatly deceives me, I can here perceive, as it were in the distance, two or three important discoveries rising out of this inquiry.

The ɯid, in the above analysis, is only Bid, as the B becomes ɯ when laid on its back; but were we to put the B thus, ɯ, and so have ᴍid, that is, *mid*, it would be equally correct; and were I writing principally for the German nation, B should

be placed so, since this would show Bd to be the same as *mit*, the German word for *with*.

Now were we to analyse BΔ (bd) thus, *by*, instead of making it *wid*, the analysis would be very correct. And why so? because the three parts which compose Δ compose Y also. But the difference in meaning between *with one* and *by one?* There is none, and hence we may say indifferently, "he is *with me*," or "he is *by me*," and also, "he was killed *with* the sword," and "he was killed *by* the sword;" and when we say, "eight feet *by* four," the meaning is, "eight feet *with* four." But we might have analysed BΔ in lambda by the English word *with* itself, for the reason that B is equal to ϖ, and that Δ is equal to Θ (theta), which is *th;* so that when the *th* takes before it *i*, to which it is entitled, we have, instead of BΔ, ϖith. Δ and Θ are composed of the samè parts, each having three; for as evidently as Δ is equal to 1 1 1 (three *ones*), even so is Θ, since this character is equal to Θ, which is the same as *w*, *m*, &c., as we have seen. Besides, when delta is analysed thus, Δ-λ-*eta*, which is very exact, the meaning is, "*d* (is) *l*," "*d* (is) *eta;*" and as *theta* (that is, Θ or *th*) is equal to eta, since it is to be analysed thus, Θ-*eta*, (meaning, Θ *is eta*), it follows, that Δ and Θ, from their being equal to the same thing, must be equal to one another.

Now when we analyse the BΔ in lambda, thus, *ib-id*, it means, "the being God." When we analyse it under this form ϖid, it makes *iv-id* — "first life

God;" when thus, *by*, it is equal to *ib-iv* (*being the first life*), because Y is another name for the Deity, and is composed of the two letters to be found in IV, the I having been put under the V thus Ṿ, and made to join with it. If we analyse BΔ whilst under this form *with*, it will make *iv-it-iv* — "the head life." From knowing this much, we may be sure that the idea *with* is, in all languages, another name for the Deity. This, on first consideration, must appear impossible, but I shall soon make it evident.

Men, in the beginning of the world, must have been wonderful beings compared to what they are now, or to what we learn of them from the most ancient records come down to our times. To say that their ideas of the Divinity were greatly superior to ours, were to give a very imperfect notion of their religious feelings. I have discovered from the analysis of multitudes of words, that in all their expressions the Deity was referred to. Thus I find every action, be it good or bad, is a name for God. From this I infer that men took the idea of *doing* or *acting* from HIM whom they believed to be the great *doer* or *actor*, the Creator of all things. Hence with them to *do* a thing was, if I may be allowed the expression, "to *God* it," "to *divine* it." We shall see farther on how men could not do otherwise than make use of such powerful language as that to which I now allude, for I have yet one or two important truths to divulge, to which I desire to lead the reader gradually. Now when

we say, "John *walked* with James," we name in the word *walked* the Divinity, for this word literally means, *life all double above* (*iv*-al-ik-ed). Here *iv* is no other than the double *u*, the *i* having joined with the *v*, thus, *iv*, and this is equal to *v v*, since *i* means *life* or the *Divinity*, just as we see it in the imperative of *ire* in Latin, where it is equal to *go* in English, which literally means, "the high, great, or first *one*" (*ig o*). *Al*, I have often shown, to have been in the beginning *il o* (the *o*), literally, "God *o*," for *il* is a name for the Divinity. *Ik* means *each double* or the *first*, and it might as well be written *ic* or *iq:* it has been already partly explained, but it is to be noticed again. The syllable *ed* means literally *head*, "above," or "over." The reader may remind me that when accounting for *had*, I explained it by *then;* but to this objection I can reply by observing, that *above* and *over* are other words for *then*, or *a time past*, though when analysed they are, like *then*, names for the Divinity. Thus *above* makes *ea-be-on*, "the first being." When we give to B its analysed form of IS, *'bove* will make *isone*, which from the dropping of the *i* becomes *son*, and this is equal to *Sun*, or the Divinity. And when we do not consider *v* as an *n*, but allow it to remain *v*, *isove* becomes by contraction *zove*, the *is* being equal to *z*, as has been already clearly shown; and this again becomes *Jove*, from the *z* and J being the same letter, as I have also shown. *Over* makes *on-er* (one being), or "being being;"

but, like *above*, it can be analysed variously, and yet all its forms correspond. Thus when we make *o* become ε, it is *ever*, a word by which the Deity is frequently named. And why so? because this is equal to *iv-er* (*life life*, or *the being life*): *over* is also equal to *one ever*, that is, the *eternal one;* because *e* in *er* is equal to *Hta* or *v*, so that these two letters become *vr*, which, when each takes a vowel before it, will make *iver* or *ever*. The word *then*, when analysed, becomes *it ven;* and as *ven* is the German word for *when*, *it ven* is equal to *it when;* but as *ven* is for *iven* or *even* (for both are equally correct), it proves that *then* is another name for the Divinity, since *even* is also thus employed, as we have seen in the account given of the Greek M. Thus we see the powerful meaning of this apparently insignificant termination *ed*. But since *time* is meant by it, and since this great word must mean, in all the languages in the world, *God*, (in Greek, Latin, French, and English, I find it so,) though signified in various ways, we are forced to admit that a past *time* could not be named otherwise than by the Divinity, since it is still a part of time, of the Being who is all time. When we give to *e* in *ed* its form of *o*, which we may do since it is only ε, this word will become *od*, and this accounts for *ed* being anciently written so. It will also account for its other form of *ad*, since this is only a contraction of *o id*, the *o* having gone over to the *i*. Here, too, we have an additional proof that *ed* was another name for the Divinity,

since in *od* we have the original of *God*, as the explanation of this word already given will show.

When I accounted for the word *had*, I was not aware of its being a name for the Divinity; but it was very correct to explain it, as I have done, by the word *then*. Thus the reader may see that I give my discoveries as they come to me, that is, in their rude and finished forms. But the word *walked* may, I now discover, be explained more briefly, though not more correctly, thus: *Iv-al*, the analysis of *wal*, can be taken altogether as a name for the Divinity, since it also literally means, *first life all*, that is, *all the first life;* and *ik-ed*, the analysis of *ked*, has also a similar meaning, since it can be rendered by *the first life above*, for the reason that *ik* is, as we shall see hereafter, the same as the personal pronoun *I*. Then *ik-ed* is but an explanation of *iv-al*, to which it stands in apposition. Yet both words make only one, and this is a name for the *Divinity*.

I have been led into this account of the word *walked* from having stated that all actions were in the beginning expressed by various names given to the Creator, which implies that men believed all things to be done by his will. And this statement I have been led to make in order to prepare the reader for the explanation of the word *with*, which I am now about to give. When we say, "John *walked* with James," the meaning, according to the account just given of *walked*, must be, "John *God over* with James." This singular language we may

render more intelligible by employing the word *go* instead of *walk*, and by giving to this word the regular form of a past time; that is, by the addition of *ed*, which, we have just seen, is equal to *od*. The word *go* will then, instead of *went*, become *go-od*, in which we have two names for the Divinity, the one meaning the *high* or *first one*, (*ig-o*), and the other the *head one* (*o-id*). This word *go-od* is in English more intelligible than *walked*, for the reason that the present name for the Deity in English is but a contraction of it, so that John *Go-od*, or *Go-ed*, can be clearly understood by the English scholar to have the meaning I wish here to assign it.

As it can be easily conceived that life and motion may be names for the Divinity, He being the source of all life and motion, it can surely be as easily conceived that every action — such being still life or motion — must be also a name for the Divinity; and by following up this idea, are we not led to discover that whatever is achieved by life or motion must be still the Divinity, since it may be said to have not only emanated *from* Him, but to be *of him*, and consequently equal to a part of life or motion under another form, that is, when finished or at rest? Hence it would appear that when language was first made — and then this earth, if it be not eternal, as its name implies, must have been in its infancy — men had the strong belief that the Divinity was all in all, and that without him there was nothing, and that nothing without him could

possibly be. This belief we can easily conceive, when we reflect that He was believed to be the life out of which all things have grown, and of which all things were but as so many parts. Hence there is not a word nor a letter to be found that does not mean life; and it is difficult to conceive how so short-sighted a being as a materialist could have existed in the times to which I refer, since every word he uttered, from its being a name for the Divinity, or life, would have risen up as an argument brought against him, and have served as a check and a warning.

Hence all bad actions, as well as all good ones, have in them names for the Divinity, from which we are to infer that men did not in those remote times believe that any thing could be done, however contrary to his Divine law, but by his permission, since it is evident, from his name being in every thing, that he must have been taken for every thing. Now, as there is in a language but one part of speech, which is *the name*, and as this one part names all things, and as all things, from their being *of* LIFE or the Divinity, are called after him, just as a book or any other labour is called after its author, it follows that every word in the world must be reduced to ONE, and that this ONE must be even named ONE, or God!

Here I wish the reader to think a little for himself, whilst I consider the idea named *with;* there is in what I have just stated enough to fill and occupy the mind for a certain space of time; a little farther

on I shall have occasion to make another important statement, and I can safely add, an important discovery also, but to which I consider it necessary to take the reader gradually. We may see more clearly hereafter than we do now, why even words having a bad meaning were in the beginning other names for the Divinity.

The word *with* might be very well written *wit*, for both words have, when analysed, the same meaning. The latter is literally *life head*, or "*the* head;" and its analysed form is *iv-it*, in which *iv* is for *the* or *life*, and *it* for *head;* but both name the Divinity. *Iv-it*, as it is equal to *in it*, means also *in head*, *in God*, or *above;* or it means *one head*, that is, *one a-head*, or *above*, *one to the head*. *Wid* is exactly the same. *With* does not differ from either, but by its having a letter more, and it may be variously analysed without this occasioning any difference in the sense. When done thus, *iv-it-iv*, we may say it means *the head life*, or *thing*, or *in head life*, or *thing*. This word *in* is ever expressed or understood in all those words called prepositions, its use being to show that the *one thing* referred to is only partly considered, and hence *in* is equal to *of*, or *half*. Here, by *head life* or *thing*, is meant "one thing over," or in addition; and *iv-it-iv* may also, with equal propriety, be rendered by *one and one*, since *v* is equal to *n*; and this means *one over*, since it is "one besides one," or "one added to one." From this meaning the conjunction *and* does not differ in the least, since it makes, when analysed,

oin-id — *one over*, or *one* (*a*)-*head;* and since *id* is, from its being a name for the Divinity, equal to *one*, the word *and* is consequently equal to *one one*, that is, *one* and *one* besides.

From these words *and* and *with* being thus shown to be equal in meaning, we can account for their being often used indifferently; as when we say, "John did that *with* James," instead of "John *and* James did that;" or, as when we say, "Give me this *with* that," instead of "Give me this *and* that." In these different instances the reader may remark that every word employed is a name for the Divinity, and so must it be with all the words in the world. But how must the idea *with* be expressed in other languages? Just as it is in English. Thus the Greek word for *with*, συν, makes, when analysed, *is-un*, and these two words make *Be one* or *Be-on*, where we have two names for the Divinity; and they mean, when collectively considered, *being*, but literally *one being*, or *being being*, or *one one*, that is *one over;* for *is* is also equal to *io*, and is consequently equal to *one*, just as *un* is. We may also remark, that *on* is used in English to signify one thing over something else; for when we say, "My book is *on the table*," the meaning is, that it is over the table, though touching it. Thus the English word *sun* (*is on*) means *one above;* but it might as well mean *one un*der, as *un* has really such a meaning in this word *under;* and this singularity is the same already explained in the account given of *in*, *un*, *im*, and *dis*.

There is another word in Greek for *with*, which is *ξυν*, *ic is un*, and this word does not differ from *συν* but by its having the article *ic* (double), which serves to explain *is un;* for the three words not only mean *the one one*, but *the double one one*, this word *ic* having the power of signifying *each* or *double*, as has been already explained. The Latin word *cum* (with) does not, in the meaning of its analysis, differ from *ξυν*, since it makes *ic-ω-ιν*, and if we were to analyse *ξυν* very critically, it ought also to be rendered thus, *ic-is-ω-ιν*; for the original of the Latin and French word *un* (it is as much Latin as French) is as follows: it was first the two words *o* and *in* put together, the one being a definition of the other, and this union made *oin;* but the *o* was also written thus *ε*, that is, as the Greek epsilon, so that *oin* must have often been *ειν* (ein); and here, when the *i* was dropt, this word became *εν*: but when epsilon was placed thus, *ω*, *εν* was changed to *ων*. Thus between *oin*, *on*, *ειν*, *εν*, and *ων*, or *un*, there is not a shade of difference, since *ω* is *u* or *o*, and *ν* is *n*. The present English word *one* is, as I have already shown, the contraction of *oin*, and the ancient pronunciation (wan) is still preserved; *an* is *oin* itself. In these words we are supposed to have Greek, Latin, French, Saxon, English, &c., but we have as many languages in them as there are in the whole world, namely, one.

Now when the analysed form of *cum* (which is *ic-ω-ιν*, and means the *one one*) fell together thus, *icωιν*, it was equal to *cum*, because the first letter *i*

was soon dropped, and *iv* became equal to *w*, which was the same as *m*, from its being composed of the same parts; and hence it is this letter itself when turned down, as has been shown in the account of the Greek M. The repetition of *one* in these different words just analysed is equal to *one* in the extreme, and consequently to *all one* or *alone;* and this accounts for the Latin word *unicus*, or rather for its radical part (unic); for whilst *cum* was yet *ic-ω-ιν*, the *ic* fell behind *ω-ιν*, thus, *ωινic*, and this by the dropping of a single letter was shortened to *ωνic* (unic). Such, too, is the original of *unique* in French, as this word might as well be written *unic*, just as the French word for *with* is now written *avec* instead of *aveque;* the latter being supposed, but erroneously, to be the more ancient form. The radical part of the same word in Greek, *ενικ* (from *ενικος*), as it is the same as *ονικ*, the contraction of *οινικ*, was, as this can be accounted for exactly as *unic*, made also by the repetition of *one;* and this is confirmed by *μον*, the radical part of *μονος*, which has a similar meaning, since analysed it is *ιν-ον*, that is, *one*, *one*.

Who could have ever suspected that in *cum* there is such a word as *unic*. But do Englishmen suspect that in *crow*, the name of a bird, they have the word *rook*, another name for the same bird? Yet it is so, and this has happened from the same *ic* we see in *unic* having fallen behind, since *crow*, when analysed, makes *ic-e-roo;* but were we to analyse it *ic erow*, it would be very correct, for here

the *w* signifies that the *o* is ***double;*** and hence this word is in Greek written κορω*, this Greek character ω being a long or double *o*. O in κορω is the *e* given above in the analysis of *crow*, as we may perceive by giving it its other form (ε), of which the two parts (ↄ) make *o*. Hence the Greek and English word for *crow* is, letter for letter, the same word. As to the *c* and *k*, by which they appear to differ, this makes no difference at all, these two letters being equal.

It will be readily admitted, that when the *ic* of the analysed form of *crow* (*ic-e-roo*, or which is the same, *ic-e-row*) fell last thus, *é-roo-ic*, the first letter *e* could not have long kept its place, so that *e-roo-ic* must have become *rooic;* and this again from the *i* and *c* having coalesced thus, ic must have made *rook*. Here we have been led to a very important discovery, the origin of the letter *k*, which we may see is composed of an *i* and a *c*. And now we can tell why in the ancient English or Saxon tongue such words as *king* and *ken* were written with a *c* instead of a *k;* as, *cynge*, *cen*. We see this arose from these words having been first written thus, ic*ynge*, ic*en;* so that from the *i* which precedes the *c* having sometimes been dropped, they became on those occasions *cynge* and *cen*. The radical part of the word *crow* is *row*, so that *ic e row* means, " it

* It is, when we consider the article νη at the end, written κορωνη; but as this νη is equal to *un* (*a*, *an*, or *one*), it having in the beginning gone before κορω, it is unnecessary to notice it, as it makes no part of the radical word.

is *row*," and hence this bird has been called after its note. Thus, too, the word *roost*, a place where fowls rest, must have been first named *est roo*, meaning, "it is *roo*;" because fowls do, whilst roosting, allow frequently such a note to be heard as the letters *roo* produce when sounded.

After these remarks, every body may tell me that it is not necessary to notice the French word *avec*, since it is visibly the Latin word *cum*, it having first been *ic-oin*, which, from *ic* having fallen behind, became *oinic*, and this, from the *o* and *i* in *oi* having joined, made *anic*; and then, from the *n* becoming *u* or *v*, *auic* and *avic* were formed, the latter being now written *avec*, and which is very correct, since *e* is here equal to ε, which is also equal to *o* or *i* in meaning.

In order to see plainly how *avec* and *cum* make but one word, we need only recollect that the *o* in the analysed form of *avec* (*ic-o-in*) is the same as ε (epsilon), and that this character, by being placed thus, ω, is made equal to *u*; after this we are to remark that *in*, from its being composed of all that makes an *m*, has led to the formation of this letter, and is consequently equal to *m*. Hence *ic-o-in* first became *ic-ω-in*, and then from these three words having fallen together, *icum* was made, after which the first letter (*i*) was dropt, so that *cum* alone remained. How widely this word and *avec* differ from each in appearance! yet they are one and the same word, there being no difference whatever between them, not even so much as the third

part of a letter. We have seen how the radical part of *unicus* (*unic*) has been formed from *cum;* and even so is it formed from *avec*, since in *oinic* (the second analysed form of this word) we have this sign (ε) by making *o* become epsilon, so that in this case *oinic* is made to be *ωinic*, since in the first letter of this word we have still ε, but laid upon its back. Then *unic* and *ωinic* make but one word, since the sole difference between them is that the first *i* has been dropt in the latter.

Like the other words for *with* already accounted for, *avec* in its primitive state, that is, when *ic-o-in*, meant *the one one;* which is the same as, "one and one," or *one* added. Even the German word for the same idea (*mit*) makes, when analysed, *im-it;* and this, we may perceive, is equal to *un-it* (*one one*, or, which is the same, *one above*, or added). To what a number of observations the allusion made to ϖid in the analysis of lambda has led! and yet how many I have been obliged to suppress!

Again I have been led into numerous digressions! And so must it ever be while words speak about themselves as they do, and that I desire so ardently to hear what they have to say. But let me for the future turn from them when they fall in my way, or suppress altogether the ideas to which they give birth, with the exception, however, of such as will be absolutely necessary for explaining the letters yet to be accounted for. When I shall by this means have reached the end of the

alphabet — and, by holding to this resolution, it will not, I should think, be difficult to do so — I may indulge myself, and I hope the philosophical reader too, with a few digressions leading into discoveries far more important than any I have yet made.

The seventeenth letter of the Greek alphabet is made thus, P, ρ, ϱ, and its name is ῥῶ, written in the Roman characters "rho." This little sign ʽ, which the reader may perceive over the ῥ in ῥῶ, is called by grammarians a note of aspiration; and from their remarking that, in other languages, it is replaced by a *h*, they conclude that it must surely represent the *h*, but this is all they know about it, as they cannot tell why it bears this form more than any other. When we divide an *o* in two, thus, ↄ, and place these two parts thus, ϰ, and connect them thus, ϰ, we shall have another form of the H. But before I say any more of this, I wish here to remind the reader of what I have already proved in another part of this work*, namely, that *out* means *all*, which we may see by putting the *t* in its primitive place, that is, before *ou*, since this will give *tou*, which is the same as *tout* or *tous* in French. Hence also it is, as I stated when accounting for *out*, that we say indifferently *through*OUT *the house*, and *through* ALL *the house*.† But the word *out*

* See Vol. II. p. 105.

† If *out* means *all*, how are we to explain *without* when it has a negative signification, as *without* friends, *without* money, &c. I have already shown that an *affirmation* and *negation* make, when analysed, the same word. Thus *in* and *un*, for instance, mean *one* or *not one*;

means also what is *double*, because this idea, as well as that of totality, was signified by the same words

in the English word *unkind* it is a negative, and in the French word *quelq'un*, an affirmative. When I first made this discovery, I could not tell why men had not in the beginning negative words, but having since then discovered the religion they had when language was first made, I have been able to account for their having no negatives. It arose from the sublime idea they had of the Creator of all things; for having believed him to be all in creation, they were necessarily obliged, in order to be consistent with themselves, to believe all in creation to be him; for if I say, "John is my brother," it must follow that my brother is John, and so if we really believe the Divinity to be all things in the creation, we are obliged to believe all things in the creation to be the Divinity. But by *all things* was meant not only all material substances, but even all things immaterial; in short, there was nothing omitted, not even sin, nor word, nor thought, the most hidden. By following up this idea to the extreme, we see that men in the beginning were obliged to believe, that if the Creator of all things could possibly cease to exist for the space of one second, at the same instant all living beings, as well as all substances the most solid and bulky, would so completely suffer annihilation, that not the least vestige, not even the smallest particle imagination can conceive, could possibly remain of them; they must have been even obliged to believe, that without the Creator empty space itself could not exist. When we enter into the spirit of this mighty idea of the Divinity, we can easily conceive how men in the beginning of the world could have had no negative; for since they believed the sounds of their voices to be him, all their words being for this reason named after him, and that they knew he was ever *equal*, ever *one*, they could not possibly have a word contrary to an affirmative. Hence *out* in through*out* means *all*, and in the word with*out* it is still the same word; and is, like it, in the extreme, since it means *none*, which analysed is *in oin*, that is, *one one*, or *all*, or the Divinity. Who in the world could suspect that this English word *none* and the Greek word *παν* (all) are, when analysed, letter for letter, the same word, since the analysis of the latter is also *in oin*, of which the reader will be convinced presently from a knowledge of the P? Or who could suppose that the French word *pas* (not) is also, when analysed, letter for letter the same word, since it also makes *in-oin*? But every body who has paid the least attention to the art of analysing words, as shown in this work, must know that the French negative *ni* becomes, when analysed, *in-i*, and that this means *one one*,

that indicated life or the Divinity. Now the note of aspiration over the ῥ in ῥῶ, is the H, made thus, ϰ, its first half being suppressed, so that when this letter is brought down to its place, ῥῶ becomes ρϰω. And what does the ϰ here signify? that the ρ has a double power. The whole word is to be thus analysed, ρ-ϰο, meaning, "*r*, the double one."

And why has ϰ this power? Because it is double; it being composed, as I have just shown, of ϽC and C joined together. But what proof can be given that this double character was an ancient form of the H? The analysis of its name. In English it is called *aitch*, and this word analysed makes, *out-c-H*, which means, "double C (is) H," that is, the double C (alluding to ϽC and C) composes the letter H. I have just shown that *out* means "all" or "double." The analysis of the French name of this letter shows also that ϰ is indicated as its ancient form; thus *Hache* makes *Hoi-c-h*. Here *hoi* means *high*, which idea is the same as *out*, as I have also shown in the account given of the latter word.

which is equal to *all*. A knowledge of lambda also shows us, that the Latin negative *nil* is *in in*, since this form of lambda (ʌ) is equal to *n*, just as the other form (λ) is equal to *in* or *m* or *w*, &c. But the English scholar may remind me that the analysis of the English word *no*, which is *in-o*, and consequently means *one one* or *all*, is sufficient proof of the truth of what I state. But, in the same language, do we not see the same word used in both ways? thus the Greek word ἐν means *not*. Yet *one* is rendered by ἕν also, for both words are the same, and make, when analysed, *on*, which becomes *oin* (*one*). But the English scholar will again remind me that the instance already given of *out*, which means *all* and *none*, is fully as evident as this *one* in Greek.

There is, besides, no difference whatever between *out* and *Hoi*, as the reader must perceive, if he looks closely at both words; and this, too, will account for their naming the same idea. But there is no *t* in *Hoi?* Not when we look at it slightly, but there is one, however; and when we see two words naming thus the same idea, we should consider them very minutely, as there is great probability of their being — notwithstanding the apparent difference between them — letter for letter, the same word. In this word *Hoi*, the letter *H* is an entire word, and is precisely the same as *iv*, it being composed of *i* and *ii*, just as *iv* is. The latter word we have already often seen, and we know that it means the *first life*, that is, the *Divinity*. Now as *oi* in *hoi* names also the first life — it being equal to *a*, and also to *H* or ϰ, since when we divide the *o* of the *a* thus, ϰ, and connect these two by the *I*, thus, ϰ, we have a *H* — it follows that it stands in apposition to *H*, and that it might as well precede as follow this letter. Hence when we allow *H* in *Hoi* to fall behind *oi*, thus, *oiH*, and the the bar in the middle of it to be placed on the top of its second *I*, thus, T, we shall have instead of *oiH*, the word *out*. Here we have, by the analysing of this word, made a very happy discovery, the original of the letter *T*. But why did men put the bar above, any more than below? Because they wished by this to signify the *head*, or any thing high up. Hence the *L*, which has a bar below, is frequently employed to signify what is low. I shall, when account-

ing for Π (*P*), have occasion to allude to this letter. Thus we see that *T* has, in this instance, grown out of the *H*, which is another form of *A*; and that this arose from the *H* and the *i* coming together thus, *Hi*. Hence the English word *He* (which might as well be *Hi*) and the word *it*, make but one word, and the three letters *A*, *H*, and *T* make but one letter, so that thus far we have not seen two letters in the alphabet. But the *I*? It makes but one letter with the *A*, since it is a part of *A*. But the *O*? It makes but one letter with the *A* (*oi*), since it is a part of it. There is, however, a great difference between one (1) and a circle? There is none whatever; for though the *o* is composed of an infinite number of ones, still they all make but one, that is, an *o*. This observation will lead to a great deal, and the reader will, I hope, lend it a serious thought. Thus from *ait*, in *aitch* and *ha* in *ha*che being equal, it must follow that the entire words, *aitch* and *hache* are equal; for as to the *e* with which the latter word ends, the former should end with it also, but as it means *is*, and ought to be apart from *h*, it can be very well understood. Then *Hache*, when its last letter is accounted for, is to be analysed thus, *out-c-h-e*, and this means *double c h is*, that is, double *c* is *H*.

The Roman form of the Greek P, when made thus, R, has no *c* placed over it; the reason is, that the tail attached to it is equal to this *c*, so that if we were to round it, *R* would become *B*. And, in like manner, if we were to attach the note of

aspiration seen over the Greek P to its lower part, thus, Ꝑ, we should have a *B*. Hence it is that in the analysis of words, *Be* and *re* are frequently used indifferently, since both are made to signify *a thing*. But the principal use of *R* is to signify what is double or repeated; thus the common prefix *re*, as in *re*call, *re*lapse, *re*turn, &c., signifies not only a thing, but *a thing again*, or *twice*. I shall, in the account of the following letter, have many opportunities of strengthening, by examples, this use of the Greek P.

The sixteenth letter of the Greek alphabet is Π, π, or ϖ, and is named *pi*. The reader who has understood the account just given of the origin of T in the analysis of the French word *Hache*, will at once discover the origin of Π. He will see that it is another form of *iv*, when we write these two characters thus, *iii*, and such was the first form they ever had. Hence as *iv* means *life*, the three letters *iii*, which are equal to *iu*, and consequently to *iv*, since *u* is equal to *v*, have a similar meaning. Then Π does not differ from *iii* or *iv*, but by the first *i* being placed above the other two, thus, ¯, and allowed to join with them, thus, π; and this has been done to indicate what is high; that is not only life, but life above. Hence the meaning of the name *pi* is, when thus analysed, *ip-i*, the *up i;* that is, "the *i*," or "the *one* above." But the English name of this letter is also *pi*, and it has no *i*, or *one* above? It is a mistake to think so; for the ɔ or o placed against I, thus, Ꝑ, is *one* above, and it does not

matter whether we form it thus (–·), thus (I), thus (o), or thus (ɔ), for it is ever one.

But is there any resemblance as to form between *iv* and *ip?* If we allow the *iv* to become one character thus, *iv*, it is a double *u* (*w*); and if we allow the double *i* in *π* to coalesce thus, ü, have we not a double *u* (*w*), when it is headed by the other *i* thus, ϖ? And is not this character the third one of these three, Π, *π*, ϖ, given in the alphabet as the different forms of Π? And when we make this ϖ stand on one end thus, B, what have we but the second letter of the alphabet, a B? And this accounts for P and B being frequently confounded, and that between P and this form (ƀ) of B, there is no difference but in the situation of the ɔ placed against the I, it being in the one high up, in order to signify what is up or above, and in the other low down, in order to signify, like the *v*, what is at the *b*ase or *b*ottom. But I have, it will be remembered, frequently explained *ip* in the analysis of words, by *in* instead of *up*. And it was very fit that I should do so; for since *ip* is the same as *iv*, and as *iv* is the same as *in*, it follows that *ip* should be equal to *in*. Besides, when we take the *i* off *π*, and place it against the inferior part of the second *i* in *π*, thus, *iν*, have we not the Greek *ν* or the Roman v? And here, too, there is great wisdom displayed in the placing of this *i* against the other *i* (*ν*), in this way; for since it is meant to indicate the inside or interior, and not the top,

it is placed below, and left open, to allow us, as it were, to look in.

Π is the sixteenth letter of the Greek alphabet, and it is for this reason that it makes sixteen (16), when we take the ı from above, and place it in its round form — such as we see it in the Roman P — at the bottom of the second *i* in Π, thus, 16. But do not all the Greek letters from mu to omega count as they do from alpha downwards, that is, by beginning with one? I have discovered that they do, and hence it is that the three parts of Π, namely, *iii* are equal to *iu* or *iv*, which two characters stand for four, Π being the fourth letter after mu. But since *iv* is also for the first life or the Divinity, should it not stand for *one?* And so it does; for *iv* means "one life," or "one thing." And have we not just seen that *iv* is the same as *in;* and do we not know that *in* is for *one*, since we have frequently rendered it by *one* in the analysis of words?

But the Divinity is also named by three? And Π is also three, since it is composed of *iii* or III. But how can three be one? An analysis of the name Trinity, and to which we are now hastening, will explain this mystery, and the mystery of the Trinity itself, at the same time.

From our remarking that *ip* is equal to *iv*, we see that the radical part of *ripa* (the sea-shore, or the bank of a river), which is *rip*, is the same as the radical part of the same word in French, which is *riv* (from *rive*), and that, consequently, these two

words make but one. From this we discover the original of the idea *rival*, since the latter word is, when analysed, *à-le-rive* (*à la rive*); that is, opposite or opposed, just as the one side of a river is to the other.

But why did men name the sides of a river by the word *rive?* Men named the sides of a river so, because there are two of them, for the word *rive*, which is to be analysed thus, *ir-iv*, means "the double thing," and here *ir* and *iv* agree, as each signifies what is double; and thus we see the nature of the *r* already explained. Hence, too, a *rib* is named as it is, it having also its two sides, just as a river has. The word *rue* (street), which I have already explained, may be also analysed thus, *ir-iv*, since the *u* is equal to a *v;* from which we perceive that between it and *rive* there is no difference. The explanation already given of *rue* (then analysed thus, *ir-ii* — *the go go*, or *the way way*,) is very correct, because there are two ways or sides to a street; yet I did not understand it as I do now, and this proves how true the system of analysing by which I am guided is, since it may be correctly made, even though we do not understand the explanation it gives. Thus, too, the English word *rip* (a tear) is named so from its two openings; and *ribbon* (*riv-on* — the double one,) is the same as *rib* or *rive*, already explained. *Rivet* is for *it rive*, "the both sides;" because it is an iron pin fastened on both sides. If we examine other words than those in *ri*, such as *robber*, *roi*,

run, &c., we shall have further confirmation of the truth of the above explanations. Thus *robber* is for *rover*, the *b* being equal to *v*, and when thus analysed, *er-ir-o-b*, "the double one being;" that is, one who is doubly as great as ordinary men. But why not analyse the word *rover* instead of *robber?* It will make no difference, as we may thus see, *er-ir-o-v*, which means, "the double one life or being;" for *v* is as much for life as *B* is. But *v* is also for *n*? It is, and hence if we allow it to be this letter in *rover*, we shall have *ro-ner*, and this is no other than *runner*, because a *rover* is a runner.* And how is *ro-i* to be analysed? Thus, *ir-oi*, "the double one;" for here *o* and *i* are in apposition to each other, and do but explain each other, so that they mean *one;* and if *roi* was written *ro*, it would be equally correct. When it was written *re*, this was equal to *ro*, as the rounding of *e* or *ε* produces *o*. Hence, as *rob* in *robber*, or *rov* in *rover*, is equal to *roi* — for *b* and *v* mean, "being or life" — it follows, that *robbers* or *rovers* were, in the beginning of the world, all kings. Hence the two English words, *rogue* and *knave*, have very honest meanings, as they both indicate royalty. The former is to be analysed thus, *ig-vie-ro*, "the high or great life king;" that is, the high or great person named king. The latter gives *oin-ic-in*. Here *oin-ic* is,

* Hence it is that *voleur* (a robber) may be said to mean a *flyer*, since *voler* means "to fly or rob;" and that the Greek word φωρ, and the Latin word *fur* (both meaning a robber), become, when the *i* understood before *r* in these words is expressed, equal to *fuir*, the French word for *flee* or *fly*.

the same as *unic* or *unique* (explained farther back in the account given of *avec*); and as the *in* by which *oinic* is followed means *one*, it is evident that *knave* means the "only one," or the "sole one," kings being so called from there being but one of them at a time. But this was also a name for the Divinity? It was; and this arose from rovers, robbers, knaves, rogues, or kings, being in the beginning of the world great conquerors, who, on account of their power and the dread they inspired, were also considered as gods. Hence the name of the celebrated outlaw, Robin Hood, means king in the wood, or *robber in the wood* (rov-in-wood); and *Robin des Bois* must be the same individual, as the one name is a translation of the other. Hood is the same as wood, for the reason that H is equal to *iv* or *w*.

I have also remarked already, that *roi*, when the *r* or *ir* is allowed to fall behind, becomes *oir*, which is equal to war, but it literally means, "double being;" and here it is not taken in a bad sense, since it is, as we have already seen, the same as αρ, the radical part of Αρες, the god of war. The analysis of the word *star*, which makes *est-ar*, and means, "it is the double being," by which a divinity or divine thing is evidently signified, is also sufficient proof that kings, even while plunderers and rovers, were looked up to with veneration. Here I beg to call the reader's notice to a circumstance worthy of remark. We see by the analysis of αρες and *star*, that they are radically the same word. Now when we seek for the radical part of the Latin word

bellum, we shall find it is *el*, since the analysis of this word is *ib-el-um* (that is, *um-ib-el* — the being double); and if we analyse the Latin word for *star*, which is *stella*, we shall have *est-el-ea*, that is, *ea est el*, "it is the double being;" for the reader will please to remember that *l* is equal to *v* or *iv*, as I have shown in the account of lambda.

Thus we see that as the radical part of *war*, or of αρες (*ar*), and the radical part of *star* (*ar*), are equal in English, so are they equal in Latin also, since both are *el;* yet there is no resemblance as to form between *ar* and *el;* they have, however, the same meaning, and indicate any thing double, and hence they may stand for the Divinity, for life, or for woman, just as well as they do for war. Men must have named a star so, from their having believed it was a divinity, or another sun. Thus *aster* makes *it-er-ois*, "the being sun;" for, *as* is the same as *os* (the sun), the *i* in the latter having been lost. The Greek word αστηρ, as it is to be thus analysed, *ever-ois*, that is, "being a sun," is still the same: ηρ is analysed by *ever*, because these two letters are equal to *vr*, which, with vowels before them, become *ever* or *ivir;* and *ever* is the same as *iter* or *être*, or being.

The similarity found farther back between *ripa* and *rive* is also to be seen between *ripula* and *rivulet.* As the final syllables of these two words are the two articles *ea* and *it*, their radical parts are *repul* and *revul*, which, as we know the meaning of *rip* and *riv*, are to be analysed thus, *ul rip*, *ul riv;* and as *ul* is here the same as *ol* or *al*, that is,

all, the meaning of both words is *all bank*. It is probably so named from its being so narrow a stream, and that both banks appear at a short distance to make but one. Hence the idea seems to be, *all bank, and little or no stream*. It may not be amiss to give one or two instances more of the *p* and *v* being used indifferently: when we remark that *lev* in the French word *lèvre* (lip) might as well be written *lop* or *lip*, since *e* from its being originally ε, is equal to *o* or *i*, we see that *lip* in English, and *lev* in French, make but one word. And what gave the idea of *lip?* The same word that gave the idea of *life*. Then *lip* means *life?* It does. And *lèvre?* It is for *re lev*, and means, "the thing life;" but literally, "the double thing life." And the Latin word *labium?* Its radical part is *labi;* and as we know that *b* is for *v*, we have, instead of *labi*, *la vi*, that is, *el à vi*, "the thing to life."

We may now also see that *dip* and *dive* were originally the same word. But *dive*, the reader may remind me, I have already explained by *Dieu?* And I do so still; and this observation leads to a very important discovery, namely, that men believed God to be in the head; for when we recollect that *v* is equal to *n*, and that *d* is for the head, and that consequently *dive* may be analysed thus, *id in* (head in), which means, "in the head," as well as "the head in," it is clear that the Persian *Dives* received their name from its being supposed that they were all mind or spirit. As to the meaning of *head in*, for the English word *dive*, it must, I should think, be found very accurate, since to dive

is really to put the head foremost in water. This is only one instance out of hundreds that I have met with in the course of analysing, by which we may see how the same word can, with great propriety, have very opposite meanings. The English word *shop* must be also *shov*, and it confirms what has been already shown, namely, that *p* is also for *w*, which is very just, since the *v* and *w* are frequently confounded. Hence *shov* must be for *show*, which, when thus analysed, *she-o-vi*, means, "the open life," or "life open," that is, open or public business. But *shop* itself, when thus analysed, *is-vi-op*, gives a similar meaning, since this makes "the life open."

The third letter of the Greek alphabet is Gamma. It is equal to the Roman G, and it is made thus, Γ, γ. It is easy to perceive that this is the same as lambda (Λ, λ), already explained. This form Γ is the Roman L, put in a contrary position, the part which is down in the latter character being raised up in the former. As to the other form (γ), it is, when its superior part is turned down, wholly lambda (λ). Now what are we to infer from this similarity? Why that both characters make only one; but that life is signified as being low in the one (in lambda), and high in the other (in gamma). Then it follows that as the *womb* is meant by lambda as the place of life, the *head* must be meant by gamma. And what are we to infer from this, when we recollect that the Divinity is indicated by the word "head?" Why, that gamma is another name for the Divinity. Let

us now see how far an examination of this name will support the view here taken of it.

It may be variously analysed, but its meaning never changes: *G-am-moi:* this literally is, G (is) *am* (and G is) *moi.* Now as *am* and *moi* are both in the first person, the one being the English word answering to *sum* in Latin, and the other the French pronoun answering to *mihi*, it follows that G is in the first person, since it is the same as either of these words, and that it is consequently equal to the English pronoun I. When we put, as we ought to do, an *i* or an *e* before *g* — thus, *ig* or *eg*—we must have the ancient form of *ego;* for the *o* at the end of this word is another form of *e* or ε; but as this *o* becomes ω in Greek, that is, long or double *oo*, *ego* must be a contraction of *eogoo*, or, which is the same, of *eigoo;* and as this word *eigoo* or *eogoo* is to be analysed thus, *eo-g-oo*, it follows, since we have here three words in apposition to one another, and that one of them is *oo*, each of the other two must be equal to *oo;* so that the whole word is, in its most simple form, composed of these six characters, *oo-oo-oo.* Then the analysis of gamma (*G-am-moi*) is, with the *i* or *e* added to *G*, *Ig-am-moi*, which means that *Ig* is *am* and *moi* also; so that it is as if we were to say, "I am myself;" that is, "I have no equal," "I am alone." These three words, also, are to be thus analysed, *Ig-o-im-moi;* which means, "I who am myself;" or it may be done thus, *Ig-o-un-moi*, "I the one myself;" that is, "I am the one named

myself." *Moi* is, when analysed, *im-oi*, which means, "him I," or "him the first," but literally, "him one one" (which is still "him the first"). And when we analyse this *im* in *im-oi*, it is equal to *iw* (first life): if we analyse it in the Greek characters ιμ, this, as it is equal to *iu* or *iv*, will cause no difference. The *im* in *moi* may be also analysed thus, *un*, that is, *one;* and if we adopt the Greek characters ιμ, (as this word is equal to *in*, which means also *one*,) there will be still no difference. Hence, in consequence of these different accounts of *moi*, the analysis *ig-am-moi* may be explained thus variously as to form, but invariably as to meaning, "I am him I;" that is, "I am him named I," or, "I am him the first;" that is, "I am him named the first," or, "I am him the first life I;" that is, "I am the first life named I, named myself:" and when *im* is considered as being equal to *un*, the above analyses will still mean, "I am one I," that is, "I am the one I;" which may really mean "I am the one eye*;" and when we consider that

* When we remark that the word which here means *eye* is in apposition to *ig*, and that *ig* might as well be written *eg*, and that in Greek this would make εγ, it is easy to see that the present English word for *eye* and this Greek word make but one. Hence this Greek letter gamma (γ) is really the same as the Roman y, and both are equal to IV, or "the first life" or "the Divinity." Hence *eye* literally means "the first double one," because we have two eyes. Thus when we analyse *oculus*, as, *us-oc-ul*, it means "the double all," "the double sun," or "the double life." The French word *œil*, which must have first been *il-oe*, and this is equal to *il-oo*, means also "the double one." But these words have no G? But in Saxon the G is to be seen, since in this language the word for *eye* is eaȝ, and this analysed becomes *oo-ig* or *oo-eg:* here *oo* and *eg* stand in apposition, and are of equal import,

I is here in apposition to *one*, and that it consequently means *one*, the meaning of the above will be, "I am one one;" that is, "I am wholly one," or, which is the same, "I am the sole one," and this means, "I am all," or "I am all one," that is, "I am al-one."

Thus we have seen that *Gam* in *Gamma* may be correctly rendered by *Ig am* (I am); but it is also to be thus analysed, *I-go-un;* that is, "I live one," "I move one;" thus signifying that there is no other. If we translate *ig* by *great* or *high*, which meaning it also has, and *am* by *the first life* (*ea-v*), which is also very exact, and continue to consider *ma* as *moi*, the meaning of gamma will be "the great first life *moi*," that is, "the great first life *à moi*," in other words, "I am the great first life," or "the great first life is belonging to me." Gamma may be still analysed thus, *ig-oi-im-moi*, meaning, "I who am myself." Here *oi* is rendered by *who*,

so that the one word qualifies the other; and it is, as if we were to say, "the double one." Thus *sight* makes, when analysed, *is-ig-vit*, which is equal to *is-eg-vit;* and when we bear in mind that *eg* is for ἐγ or *eye*, the meaning of this analysis will be, *the eye life*, "the eye being," "the eye existence," that is, "the life to the eye." From this knowledge of the word *sight* we may be sure that *eg*, *ig*, or *og* (for here *e*, *i*, and *o* are equal), was at one time the word in English for *eye*, just as it was in Saxon. The *oc* in *oculus* is still of equal value with *eg*, *ig*, or *og*. The French word for *sight* is also in this instance very clear and conclusive: it is *vu*, and this, analysed, makes *iv ii*, "the life (to) the double one," or "the double life," that is, "the two eyes." The radical part of *visus*, that is, *vis*, which is to be thus analysed, *iv-is* or *iv-io*, or still *iv iv*, is precisely the same, that is, "life life," or "double life." If we accept the analysis *iv-io*, we have in *io* the number *ten* (10), which is equal to *vv* (five five) or "double life."

but it means *the one*, literally, *the one one*, or *the double one*, because life is double. Such, too, is the exact meaning of *who*, as we may thus see; *iv-iv-o*, that is, "the double *o*," or "life *o*," and this is equal to *the one*. *Qui*, in Latin and French, is precisely the same, since it gives *iq*, *iv*, *i*, and here *iq* is equal to *ic* or *ik;* so that the meaning is still "the double one," or "the life," or "the one." Nor is there the least difference between *who*, *qui*, and the same word in Greek, since the latter is ὅς, which, analysed, becomes *ho-is*, because the *c* placed here over the *o* is equal to *h:* and as this H is still equal to *iv* or *w*, *ho is* is itself, when analysed, *w-o-is*, "the double *o* is," that is, "the life is," or "the one is."

Gamma may be also analysed so as to mean, "I am the life in man and woman," or "I am life in a being:" it is then to be thus accounted for, *Ig-oim-in-oi*. Here *oim* is for "womb" or "life," and *oi* for "a being." Since the *o* is the female sign, and may become υυ, and *I* is for man or the male kind, making with υυ, when put between both signs, thus, υιυ, a *w* or υυ, that is, *life life*, or "double life."

Gamma may be also analysed thus, *ig-iv-i-in-iv-i*, "I the first life in the first life;" because *a* or *oi* is equal to *ui* or *vi*, for the reason that O is equal to these two parts ☾☽, and that these two parts are equal to *w*, or *u* or *v*. In Hebrew this letter is named Gimel, and this word, when analysed, is equal in meaning to the last analysis given, since it makes *ig-ivi-in-o-iv;* or it may be done thus, *ig-ivi-in-ol;* or, in place of *o-iv* or *ol*, we may put *on*, but

the meaning will be ever the same, and this will be, "I life in the first life," or, "I life in the one life."

It is said that the word gamma, or gamut (the scale of musical notes), has been so named because Gui Aretin happened, whilst composing this new scale, to place the Greek character Γ (gamma) over the old notes for the sake of distinction; but this etymology I cannot believe correct, because gamut is found, when examined, to be composed of two principal words, the one being a definition of the other. Thus *gam* means "the first thing"—*ig ea-iv*—and *ut*, which, analysed, makes *iv-it*, has not a different meaning, since it also is "first thing," literally, "first life it;" that is, "it first life," or "the first thing." Gamma may be also analysed so as to have exactly the same meaning, as we may thus see; *ig-ea-iv-iv-ea:* the three first are as above, and *iv ea* is literally "first life-thing;" that is, "the first thing." Hence *gam* (the first thing) must have existed before gamma or gamut; and since a gamut is the first thing with which music is studied, the name is too appropriate to have come by chance.

The *ut* in gam*ut* has precisely the same meaning as the English word *that;* the sole difference between both words is, that in the latter the word *ut* is twice repeated, it being, though the same word, under different forms, so that the one explains the other, and is an article to it. In order to find *ut* twice in *that*, we are to analyse the latter thus,

th-oit: here *th* is, when analysed, *it-iv*, of which the meaning is, "head life," or "the Divinity," and when the word *it* falls behind, these two words become *iv-it*, "first life above," and when these are contracted to one word, they make *vit*, which, from the *v* being the same as *u*, becomes *ut*, the *i* being dropped. Hence the Latin word *ut* and the English word *the* make but one word. The other part of the above analysis is *oit*, which, from the *o* being the same as *i*, is equal to *ut;* so that the English word *that* is really composed of *ut*, *ut*, or of *the*, *the*.

But what difference is there between the words *that* and *who?* There is none; for *who* is also a name for the Divinity, since it literally means, "double life," that which *was* and *is;* in other words, "that which has ever been," or "the Eternal One;" but though such be the literal meaning of *who* and *that*, we should understand them, in the analysis of words, as being simply for *the one*, or *the being*, in both of which forms we have still the same meaning, but in fewer words; and by this means we can analyse more easily.

Hence Horne Tooke, when he asserted that the Latin word *ut* and the English word *that* were equal in meaning, was not mistaken, though he never suspected that *ut* could be found in the word *that*. Thus each part of *that* means, "the head life," or "the Divinity;" and as the one stands as an article to the other, this word may be analysed thus, *the-oit* (the-one above). But why, it may be asked, should men employ so powerful a word on trivial

occasions, for there are few words in more frequent use than the one in question? Because they wanted to signify what was *certain* or *definite*, and it was God alone, since of his existence they could not doubt, that gave them this idea. Hence if we analyse the words *certain* and *definite*, and all such words, we shall find that they are different names for the Divinity. *Certain* is composed of two principal parts just like the word *that*. *Ain* means, "the one one," that is, "the first;" and it once stood before *cert* thus, *ain-cert*, serving as an article to this word, which is to be thus analysed, *it-is-er* (God is ever), that is "eternal." But we shall see further on, when I inquire into what first gave man the idea of *truth*, that *ever* and *truth*, that is, "eternity" and "truth," must be in all languages the same, and that they make but one word: this I remark, in order to show that *cert* means also "the true God," or "IT is true," that is, "God is true," because the word IT has this powerful meaning.

This word *cer* and the German word *sehr* (very) do not differ from one another, and both mean *truth* and *eternity*, as also a *human being* and the *Divinity*, as we shall see hereafter.

The word *definite* is composed of three names for the Divinity, but in ordinary language these mean, "the head end" (*it-id-fin*); the word *fin* (end) is for *iv-en*, and these two words mean "even," a name frequently given to the Divinity; and they also mean, "in God" (*in-on*), signifying by this

that He is the end of all things, that all things end in Him. The English word *end* (en-ed or en-id) means also, "in God;" and if it were written *eden*, it would be still the same.

Eden (Paradise) means, in Hebrew, we are told, "pleasure;" and this appears to be very true, since this idea in Greek, Latin, French, and English, is synonymous with "the being in God." As these four words, ἡδονή, *voluptas*, *plaisir*, and *pleasure*, are very easy to analyse, I leave them for the reader to amuse himself with, and so verify what I here state. The idea named by καλῶς, *bené*, *bien*, and *well*, are also synonymous with "Eden" and "pleasure." Here we see confirmed what has been just stated with regard to the word *even* being a common name for the Divinity, since the Latin word *bené*, when thus analysed, *iv-en-e* or *ev-en-e*, means, "even it;" that is, "it is even;" and it also means, "God in it;" that is, "it is in God;" since *iv* means, "the first life." It is needless to add that it also means, "in life it;" that is, "it is in life;" since *life* is another name for the Divinity. But what difference is there between this word *Divinity* and *definite?* If we sound the *e* at the end of the latter word, there will be none; since it will be then *definité*, between which and the French word *divinité* there is no difference, since *f* is equal to *v*. Then how is *divinité* to be explained? By *Dieu-in-it-e*, "God in it is;" and these four words mean, "the being in God;" because the two words *it is* are equal to *being* or *être*.

The English character corresponding with the Greek gamma is G, and it is named *djee*, which is equal to *djī;* and the latter, when analysed, becomes *id-is-ī*, and means, "God is one;" but when we recollect that the word *is* is equal to *io*, the above three words, *id-is-i*, are found to be the same as *id-io-i*, which, by falling together, make *dio-i*, that is, "God I," or "God one," meaning by this, "the one God." But as this word *dji* is composed of three words, *id-is-i*, we are led to ask for its radical part, and by this we discover that it is a single *i;* for *id is* means, in ordinary language, "it is;" so that *id-is-i* must mean, "it is I," which is equal to *Ig am moi*, "I am I," or, "I am me;" that is, "I am myself;" in other words, *God is God*, or *I* (God) *am God;* for *moi* is, we must not forget, equal to *iv-oi* (the first life I). But supposing we were to say that *id is i* might as well be written *is-i*, would this be correct? It would; and have precisely the same meaning as *id-is-i*, since it would make *Io I* (the first life I); that is, "I am the first life." Then if in the Greek language this was said, what would be the consequence? The two words *Is i* would by contraction become *si* (see), and this would be equal to the letter C; so that the Greek gamma would become this letter. Then what difference is there between C and G? Radically considered there is none; and hence it is that in the Saxon tongue the letter C is made thus, Ꞓ, and the letter G thus, Ꞡ, which two letters are evidently one and the same letter. But in the

analysed form of the name of C (*is-ī*) what difference is there between its two parts *is* and *i?* The one stands in apposition to the other; and hence what the one means the other means also. But we may say that in *is-i* we have three words in apposition to one another, that is, *i-o-i;* for *s* is equal to *o* (ς ο). And when we recollect that *o* or υυ is for "life," the three words *i-o-i* evidently mean, "I am I," or "I go I," or "I life I;" that is, "the first life I," or "I life the first." Hence the *o* between *I* and *I* is equal to both these words; and it is, as if we were to say, "I life, I life." Hence when we reduce the word *life* to a single letter, namely *f*, or, which is the same, *v*, we shall have for the above, *I-v*, *I-v* (I life, I life). And when we say that in *io-ī* the one part is in apposition to the other, we are to understand that the second part (*ī*), from its being long, is equal to *ii*, or *u*, or *v*. Hence when we analyse *io-i* thus, *i-o-i*, and supply what is understood, we shall have *ii-o-ii*, because now each *i* in *i-o-i* is equal to double *ii*. As the *o* is here in apposition to either *ii*, it follows that it is also equal to *ii*, and it should, that this may be seen, take its form of ω, which is equal to *u* or *v*. Then *i-o-i* is the same as *v-v-v*, or as 11-11-11; and when we say that *io* is in apposition to *i*, though the former is equal to *ten* and the latter to *one*, as this *one* is as much entitled to the *o* as the first *one* is, it follows that we are to consider the single *i* in *io-i* as followed by *o*, and that the meaning is, "*io-io*, ten ten; that is, "ten are ten," or "I am I;"

that is, "I double I," or "I life I;" and this is equal to "1 *is* 1" (one is one). And as in this proposition *one is one*, the *is* stands in apposition to *one* and *one* placed on either side of it, though it be equal to *ten* (10), it follows that each *one* must be equal to *ten* also, or this *ten* in the middle must be only *one*. Let us write *one* as it was anciently written, and so account for it in the above proposition, that we may see how it corresponds with *io* or *ten*. We have already frequently seen it analysed, and know that it is for *o-in*, and we also know that *n* is equal to ɔ or a single *o;* so that when we make an *o* take its place in *oin*, we have *oio* instead of *oin;* and hence the proposition, "one is one," becomes *io*, *is*, *io;* so that all three make *io*, *io*, *io* (ten, ten, ten). But *oin* was also written *in?* It was; but this cannot alter the sense of the last proposition. Thus when, instead of *io*, *is*, *io*, we write *in*, *is*, *in*, and bear in mind that *s* as well as *o* is equal to *n*, the three words, *in*, *is*, *in*, become *io*, *io*, *io*, or *in*, *in*, *in;* that is, "ten, ten, ten," or "one, one, one." But *one* was also *un?* It was; but still this will make no difference, as we may easily see. The *u* is, we know, equal to *v;* hence when we put this letter before *n*, thus, *vn*, we see that a vowel is understood before each of these two consonants, which will make them become *iv in*, or *ev en*, or *ov on;* in which three instances we have the single word *un* under three different forms, and we see that each form is composed of two parts, each part standing in apposition to the

other, and serving as a definition of it. Thus in the first form *iv-in*, the *iv* is equal to *in*, because *v* and *n* make but one letter; and both words together are composed of six letters, each one having three to itself, so that in this respect also they are equal; and hence they not only mean "one," (literally, *one one*, that is, "the first one,") but also "equality" or "evenness;" and hence it is that this word *iv-in* does not, when the power of each letter is considered, differ in the least from the English word *even*. The French word *mesme* (même) makes also, (when analysed thus, *in-es-in*,) "one is one," for we now know that *m* is equal to *in*. But *one* is an *odd* or *uneven* number, and it cannot possibly mean *even*, as this would go to prove that the two words *odd* and *uneven* signify "what is *even*," and this were too absurd to be asserted by anybody in his senses? Not more absurd than to assert that *one* is *ten;* yet this have I done; and it will not appear absurd when we are no longer ignorant of the real meaning of our words. Farther on, I shall enter most minutely into this inquiry.

But in this instance just given, *iv* and *in* are not equal to *ten?* We shall find that they are, when we recollect that the two halves of an *o* are equal to a *v;* since when we put this *o*, instead of its two halves with the *i* in *iv*, we shall have *io*. As to the other two instances given above, *ev-en* and *ov-on*, they are still the same, since this *e* is here equal to *o*, from its being the same as ε, and since *o* is equal to 1, or *one*.

In the English word *ring*, is the character *g* or the *Divinity* referred to? It is to be analysed thus, *ir-in-ig*, and this means, "the double one G," which may indicate this form (g) of the G, in which we see the likeness of a ring; or it may allude to the Saxon *G*, made thus, ȝ. But as by *ir in*, or *er-in*, eternity is also signified, since these two words are, literally, "the ever one," we are to believe that the *Divinity*, HE being endless, is referred to. In this case the word *ring* is to be considered as another name for God, and that its three parts (*er-in-ig*) mean, "the eternal one," "the first." *Ig*, which means also *I*, is here rendered by *the first;* but between *I* and *the first* there is no difference.

But *finger*, in which we have also a *g?* This word is also another name for the Divinity, because it is ONE. Thus *fin* is the same as *iv in*, which means "the first one," and also "even;" and *ig-er* is in apposition to *iv in*, and means, "the first being." Then are we to believe that the words *ring* and *finger* may in some languages be equal? We are; or that the difference between them must be very slight; and this is as easy to conceive as that *o* and *I* should be represented by the same signs, since each means *one;* for the similarity between a ring and a finger is in form precisely equal to that which we see between *o* and *I*. And as *o* and *I* have been used as figures in counting, so must the words finger and ring have been used for a like purpose by some people, as they, too, mean *I* and *o*. We are also to believe, that as *I* and *o* are often ex-

pressed by the same word, namely, by *one*, that finger and ring have been also named by the same word. Hence the English word *debt* makes, when analysed, *dois-it;* the *e* being ε, and this being *o* (cɔ), and the *B* being, as we now know, *is* (Iʕ). But the *it* in this word? It means *the*, and in the beginning it went first, so that debt literally was, *it dois*. And this meant the finger; but when analysed thus, *id-o-is*, it means, "the *o* being," that is, "the thing *o*." By this we discover that the radical word for debt is a single *o*, and such is at the present hour the pronunciation of the English word *owe*, which word must have first been *iv-o;* the *iv* having become, when it fell behind, a *w*, from the *i* and the *v* having coalesced thus, *iw*. Then what difference is there as to meaning between *iv* and *d?* There is none; and hence it is that in delta (Δ) we have IV (as we perceive by looking at it closely), and that both these letters name the *Divinity*. The English D is also equal to IV, or, which is the same, to IU, since when we separate it thus, IↃ, and place these two parts thus, IU, we have IU, which is, we know, equal to IV. And as IV is, we also know, equal to IV or *in*, that is, to *one* (another name for the *Divinity*), both D and Δ must be also the same as ιν or *in*. These observations lead to a great many others, which cannot here find room. This form (*dois*) for *debt* exists in French, as does also *doive*, in which we have *s* converted into *v* by means of its two parts ʕ, which are equal to *w*, and consequently to *u* or *v*. The French word *dette* (in

English *debt*) is, when analysed, *dot*, that is, *id-o-it* (*the* o *it*), in which we have still a single *o*. This word *dot* is to be found in English, in which it means a very small (°), that is, a point, such as is placed over the letter *i;* and by this remark we discover the origin of this point; and see that it is put in apposition to the *i*, signifying that this letter is equal to *o*, that is, that it stands for *one*. This discovery, though it appears one of very little importance, will, we shall find, lead to a great deal when followed up. For the present I wish only to remark, lest I forget to do so hereafter, that we are not to forget what has been just stated, namely, that the dot over the *i* arose from the *o* being suppressed in *Io*, just as the note of aspiration over the Greek letter ῥ signifies that κ is suppressed.

The Latin word *debitum* is, when analysed, the same as *debt* or *dette*, since it makes *um-id-o-is-it*, of which the radical part is still a single *o*. Here *um* is for *iu-in*, that is, *iv-in*, which, as we have already seen, is equal to *even*, and means "the *one*" (literally, *the head one*, or *one one* *). Indeed, the five words, *um*, *id*, *o*, *is*, *it*, are all in exact apposition to one another, and, when analysed, they give these six words, *in in in o in in;* and as the *o* is also equal to a *v* or an *n*, and as this *v* or *n* takes an *i* (though it might as well take an *e* or an *o*) before it, thus, *in*, it follows that the

* The Spanish title Don, which is to be thus analysed, *id-on*, means also *the head one.*

above six words are equal to *in* six times repeated. In the Greek word for *debt* we have also the *o*, since it is χρεος, and that this, when analysed, makes *os-x-ir-o;* that is, "the *x*," "the double *one;*" by which we see that *x* was also considered as an *o*, which arose from its two parts when made thus,)(, composing an *o* when put thus, ( ), and allowed to meet. But this is made very clear by the other Greek word for debt, εεος, which, analysed, is, ος-εε or ος-ω, that is, the great *O* (the omega).

As the radical part of the Latin word *debere* is DEB, since *ere* is the same as *être* (the thing), we see that it is equal to *dois*, the French word already explained. Thus, an examination of these several words for *debt* in Greek, Latin, French, and English, leads us to discover, that men in the beginning kept accounts with these three characters only, *I*, *O*, *X;* and even still do we not sometimes see the village shopkeeper, and persons of no education whatever, settle their affairs by the use of such signs? Then "I owe" literally means, *I O;* that is, *I an O;* in other words, "I a *one*," or "I a *finger*." I have said that *ring* and *finger*, from their bearing the same relation to each other which *o* bears to *I*, must, in some languages, be the same word, and this opinion is verified from an examination of the two Greek words, δακτυλιος (ring), and δακτυλος (finger), between which words there is no difference, for they are equal in meaning, and the *i* which the one has more than the other might as well be omitted. Here, too, the reader may per-

ceive that the four first letters (δακτ) of each word are equal to the French word *doigt* (finger), which, when *o* and *i* fall together, becomes *dagt;* and as we know from what has been already clearly shown, that *G* is radically the same as *C*, and *C* the same as *K* (IC), it follows that δακτ in Greek is *doigt* in French, and that both words are, when analysed, a single *o*, which is equal to *I*. This analysis is to be thus made, *it-dak* and *it doig*, both of which have the same meaning, and this is the *ring* or the *finger*. When we afterwards analyse *dak* and *doig*, we shall have *id-o-ik* and *id-o-ig;* here *ik* and *ig* are equal to the pronoun *I*, which means, "the first *one*," or "the great *one*," and is, as we have already seen, another name for the *Divinity*. Then *ik* and *ig* are here equal to *o*, and it is as if we were to say, *the o is I*. But the French word for *ring* (*bague*)? It is to be analysed thus, *iv-bag*, "the *ring;*" and *bag* is then to be analysed thus, *ib-o-ig*, which still means *the o* (is) *I*. And when we recollect that *iv* or *iii* is the same as *iτ* or *iτ;* and that *b* is *d* otherwise placed, both being composed of an *o* and *I*, we discover that *bague* is letter for letter the same as *doigt;* for the *e* which it has after the *u* is equal to an *o* or an *i*, and is to be considered as the third part of *iii*, the letters that compose *iτ* in the above analysis.

I have forgotten to account for the υλιος and υλος in δακτυλιος and δακτυλος. *Ul* in both places is equal to *ol*, and this we know is equal to *il o*, "the *o*," or "the sun," or "the Divinity." The *os*

stands as an article or pronoun in apposition to this *ol* or *il o;* so that when we give to *ol* a substantive meaning, *os* is to be rendered by *the*, and *os ol* by "the Divinity," or "the whole one," or "entire thing." Hence it does not differ in meaning from *dakt;* but it is the same word under another form, and it serves to show what *dakt* means. But here I have explained υλος and not υλιος. The latter does not differ from the former, except by its having expressed what the other has understood. Thus ος-υλ means, "the whole (one)," the last word being understood; and ος-υλ-ι has the same meaning with all the words expressed. Here we discover the original of the English word *holy;* we see it is for *iv-ol-i*, "the whole one;" but in this case we are to understand *ol* as meaning "the Divinity," and that the three words mean, "the one to God." But in what does *wholly* differ from *holy?* They do not differ; for though the former has a *w* more than the latter, this letter is only a repetition of the *h*, and serves to explain it, and both letters are equal to these two words *iv*, *iv*, just as *it*, another form of *iv*, is in apposition to *h* in the English word *the*, which is also equal to *iv*, *iv*.

The letter S is the eighteenth of the Greek alphabet. It bears these three forms, Σ, σ, and ς, and its name is Sigma, which, analysed, is, *is-ig-im-a*. Here the three words *ig-im-a* mean, "I am the first;" so that the word *is* stands in apposition to them all, and has consequently the same meaning;

and this account is, we perceive, very exact, since when we give *is* its other form of *Io*, we have "first existence," or the first person of *to be* or *to go*. We may also, by giving to *S* in *is* its form of *u* or *v*, say that this word (*is*) equals *Iv*, which still means, "the first life." From the minute account given of gamma we know that *ig* is for *I*, the first person, and that the *m* by which it is followed is, from its being the same as *iv*, another word in apposition to *ig;* so that *Ig im* is for "I am." As to the *a* at the end, it is equal to any or all of the words by which it is preceded, since it also means, "the first." It may be that in the beginning it went before the *m*, and that *sigam* existed instead of *sigma*, of which the analysis is, *is ig am*, or *Io ig am*, meaning, "is I am," or "*Io*, I am;" that is, "the first I am," or "God I am," or "life I am." And *sigam* may in its turn have stood thus, *is-am-ig*, that is, *Io-am-ig*, "I am the first," or, which is still the same, "the first am I." It can be easily conceived that this word *sigma* should take these different forms, when we remark that the several words of which it is composed stood apart from one another in the beginning, as we see them now in the analysis. This opinion is confirmed by the name this letter bears in Hebrew, which is *samek*. Here, as *ek* or *ik* is the same as *ig*, this word does not, except in the position of its parts, differ in any way from *sigma*. Hence before it was *samek* it was most probably *sekam* (*is-ek-am*). But as the several words of which *sigma*

and *samek* are composed are in exact apposition to one another, it does not matter how we place them, the meaning will be ever the same.

When *sigma* is made thus, Σ, we have another form of the M or W, that is, "life, life;" and when it bears this form, ς, we have a variation of the Roman s, and consequently an *o*, a *u*, &c. But when it is made thus, σ, we have alpha (α), since the *o* and the *i* added together thus, ὁ, produce, when allowed to meet, the character σ. Hence, when we analyse *sigma* thus, *s-ig-m-a*, the meaning will be, "*s* equals *ig*, *m*, and *a*." Now *ig* is in Greek ιγ, that is, four ones (1 1 1 1), as we may perceive by separating this word thus, ΙΥ, which parts when put together thus, Σ, and allowed to coalesce, give the character Σ. How *sigma* is also an M and an *a* we have just seen.

This critical knowledge of *gamma* and *sigma* will, since they are different forms of the pronoun *I* and the verb *to be*, allow the learned to understand what is meant by the sacred words, "I AM THAT I AM," to be found in the following passage:—

"And Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel, and shall say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me, What is his name? What shall I say unto them? And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you."*

* Exodus, iii. 13, 14.

As the word *am* means, when analysed, "the first life," (*ea-iv*, or *oi-in*, the latter being literally the *one one*,) the two words I AM are equal to "I the first life;" and as the word *that*, which has been already explained, means, "the being," or "the one;" the whole passage, "I AM THAT I AM," is equal to "I THE FIRST LIFE, THE BEING THE FIRST LIFE. Hence had the Almighty made use of these words, "Thou shalt say unto the children of Israel, THE FIRST LIFE hath sent me unto you," instead of "I AM hath sent me unto you," the sense had not been different.

From the use made of *am* in the above passage, it is natural to suppose that its primitive meaning was not, at the time it was so employed, yet lost. But had this word as late as Homer's time been so used, it could not have been understood. Commentators must have said a great deal about it in the above passage, but of its literal meaning they can have known nothing. The word *am* will be found, I am sure, to have in all languages the same meaning it has in English. In Greek it is *εἰμί*, and this, when analysed, becomes *oi-iv-i*, and means, "I the first life." The same word in Latin (*sum*) makes *is-iv-in*, or *Io-iv-iv*, "is the first one," or "I the first life," or "I am the first." The French word *suis* makes *is iv is*, that is, "the first life is;" or it may be analysed thus, *Io iv Io*, "I the first life I," in other words, "I am I." The German word *bin* is for *ib-in*, which is the same as *eb-en;* and as the letter *b* is here equal to a *v*, *eb-en* does

not differ from the English word *even*, the name for the Divinity so frequently to be met with in the analysis of words, and which, in its primitive state, means "ONE," since the French word *un* (which, analysed, is *iu-in*, that is, *iv-in*,) is equal to *ev en*. But as the *in* in *iv in* is still equal to *one*, both words mean "the first one," which meaning can be also found by analysing thus, *in in*, or, which is the same, *en en;* since this form means, "the one one," that is, "one in the extreme," or "the first." When time is referred to, *in in*, or *iv iv*, means, "ever," or "the double one," that is, "the past and the present."

The Hebrew text of "I AM THAT I AM," is, I am informed, in Roman characters, AHYEH ASHER AHYEH, in which we have three words; but the three first letters alone (*ahy*) of the first word (*ahyeh*) are precisely equal to I AM. They may be analysed thus, *ea-iv-ey* (the first life I). Here each word is in exact apposition to either of the other two; that is, to each one of them when singly considered, or it is in apposition to both of them taken together. Thus the first word *ea* does not, as to meaning, differ in the least from either *iv* or *ey*, since each one means, "the first;" nor does it differ from both together, that is, from *iv ey*, since these two mean also "the first." Hence these three words might, without causing the least change in the sense, stand thus, *ey-ea iv*. Here, as IV is, from its being composed of *i* and *u*, or of *three ones*, equal to the letter *m*, it will become by the addition

of the *ea* which precedes it, *eam;* and this word, when its first letter (*e*) is dropped, is equal to the English word *am*. Hence *ey-ea-iv* is the same as *ey-am;* and as this first word *ey* is the same as the English word *eye* (the organ of sight), and which does not, when analysed, differ in the least from the pronoun *I*, it follows that *ey am* is, literally, "I am;" so that the three first letters of *ahyeh* are as much English as they are Hebrew. Were we to consider *ey* as *eg*, it would be very correct, for *y*, besides that it is frequently used instead of double *i*, or of *Io*, is also used instead of gamma in Greek (γ), from which it does not differ even in form. And as *eg* is equal to *ig* or *og*, the word *ey* might also be made *og*, or even *ol* or *oc*. Hence the several words, *ey*, *eg*, *ig*, *og*, *ol*, and *oc*, will, if the inquiry be made, be found to be now, or to have been once, names for the Divinity, the *sun*, the *eye*, the pronoun *I*, and *one*, and that they all make but one and the same word. The ancient plural of *eye* was *eyne*, which, analysed, becomes *ey-in*, in which we have a word meaning *one*, namely, *in* added to *ey*, which also means "one," so that *ey ne* literally means, "one one," or "I I," which two words are also equal to "one one" (I I). But the present plural of *eye?* It is very correct; for the *es* in ey*es* means also "one," as it is another form of *os*, since *e* is here for ε, and since this character is equal to ϽO or to *o*. We may also observe that *es* is the contraction of εις, the Greek word for *one*, the *i* alone being dropped. But this

ις is still the same as *ois*, and of this *ois*, the word *os* is the contraction.

As the three first letters of *ahyeh* mean, "I am," why are there still added to them the two other letters, *eh?* As the three letters, and I may say the three words, which precede *eh*, do already fully and clearly explain one another, this addition to them cannot have been made for doing the same thing over again. Hence, though these two letters may be so analysed as to mean, "the first life" (*iv*)—and, no matter how we consider them, they must after all have this meaning—still we are, in order to bring them within the reach of our comprehension, to analyse them so as to make them appear to have—what, in reality, they cannot have—a meaning different from any or all of the words by which they are preceded. The two letters *eh* are equal to ε-*iv*, as ε is the same as ω; and as this is still the same as *iω*, *iu*, or *iv*, it follows that in *eh* we have two words in exact apposition to each other, and that these may, in the Roman characters, appear under the form of *eu eu* or of *ev ev*. Now though either two of these four words mean, "the life life," and, consequently, the Divinity, they are, I have frequently remarked, also the words which name both the PAST and EVER, both of which words do also signify the Divinity, or "the first life." Then what difference is there in meaning between the three first letters and the two last letters of *ahyeh?* Critically speaking, there is none whatever; and yet there is *apparently* a very great dif-

ference, for this word *ahy* means, "the first life," in the present time, since it is equal to "I am," which is a present time; and *eh* means also "the first life," but in the past. Hence the critical meaning of AHYEH is this, "THE FIRST LIFE NOW," "THE FIRST LIFE EVER;" in other words, "I (WHO) AM I (WHO) WAS;" and as the present time is no other than the future, AHYEH does also critically mean, "I who am," "I who shall be," "I who was," in which we have really three times, and yet only one! And this I know from remarking that every word in AHYEH is a name for the Divinity, and he is only ONE. But he is also *three?* He is, as we shall clearly see hereafter, especially when we come to the analysis of the word *Trinity*, which word must have never been understood since that distant time when language became so confused that men knew no longer what they said.

It may serve to render more intelligible what has been just stated with regard to *three* times being only *one*, if we remark that *Time* is the Divinity. This word in Greek is χρονος, which analysed is, *os-ic-iv-er-on*, and literally means, "God the eternal one." In Latin it is *tempus*, which analysed is, *os-it-iv-ip*, or *os-it-un-ip*, meaning "the head life," or "one above." The French word *temps* is the same. The English word *time* (*it iv* or *it un*) is "the head one," or "ten."

AHYEH might be still analysed in various other ways, but its meaning cannot be rendered more visible.

We have already seen that a relative pronoun means, in ordinary language, "the one," or "the one being," but it is also a great name for the Divinity; and this arises from its being synonymous with what is *definite* or *certain*, both of which words have been already critically explained. The second word of the three words, *ahyeh asher ahyeh*, means, when analysed thus, *as-iv-er*, "the being one," or "one ever;" but *ever*, as it is the same as *it er* or *être*, is, as I have already shown, synonymous with *being*. The word *as* is, when analysed, *o-is;* and these two words become, from *s* being equal to *o*, the three characters *oio;* that is, "one one one," which repetition of *one* is equal to *three*. But in *oio* there is also the number *ten* (10)? Then these three signs are equal to *ten*. But they should be equal to *one?* And so they are, since we see in them only one *I*. It is easy to perceive that this *as* is the same as the English word *ace*, in French written *as*, and that it is also the same as the Latin word *as*, and the *as* in the Greek and Latin word *mon*AS, since all these words mean "one." In *monas*, when thus analysed, *im-on-as*, which is still equal to *un-on-as*, we have the word *one* thrice repeated, though the three words mean only *one;* but when we analyse thus, *iv-on-as*, which is still equal to *iv-en-as*, or *even as;* and as *even* is another name for the Divinity, and is in this respect precisely the same as *being*, we see that *monas* literally means "the thing one," or "the being one." All this, when added to what has been shown farther

back, proves in the most evident manner that a relative pronoun means "the one," that is, "the certain one," for it is a name for the Divinity. As the word *as* in *asher* means "one," and that the remainder of this word (*her*) is equal to *ever*, it follows that the entire word literally means "one ever," (otherwise "one being," or "one thing,") in other words, *one ever* is *the eternal one*. It may appear very extraordinary to find in *asher* the whole English word *ever*, since this goes to prove that the English language is only Hebrew disguised; but I can make this appear still more extraordinary, by showing that the two words which compose this word *asher* are the two English words *was ever*. This *as* is, when analysed, *ois;* and here, when we sound every letter, and give to *oi* its primitive pronunciation (such as it has still in French), so that these three letters may produce the same sound they have in the French word OIS*eau* (a bird), *asher* will make exactly "was ever." Hence it is as evident as any thing else I have shown, that we have still in English the ancient pronunciation of *was*, so that the *w* is not at all heard in this word. But when it was made to precede *as*, the meaning of words could not have been yet lost, since the agreement between it and this word is perfect. Thus *w* is equal to *double life*, or to double V, which is equal to *ten*, as V and V make *ten;* and as the word *as* becomes, when analysed, *ois*, and that this becomes *o*I*o* or 10, we see that *w* and *as* define each other.

From this inquiry into the meaning of the sacred words, "I AM THAT I AM," it is evident that when first spoken they had in Hebrew this meaning: "The first life now, and to come, and that was—the eternal one being—the first life now, and to come, and that was."

Now the words "I AM hath sent me unto you," have not hitherto been intelligible, if we except the time when languages were in their infancy; for nobody can with truth say that he saw in this word AM the meaning which it really has, "THE FIRST LIFE." Nor can anybody have a clear notion of the following passage, which corresponds with the one just given, because nobody knows the meaning of the word "WORD."

"In the beginning was the WÔRD, and the WORD was with God, and THE WORD WAS GOD."*

But the analysis of *word* renders all intelligible; it is done thus: *iv-o-ir-id*, or thus, *iv-oer-id*, or thus, *id-iv-oer*. The literal meaning of each analysis is, "the double one being, God," "life over head," "God above." The third analysis gives, when we allow the two first words to meet, *diu-oer*, which is the same as *dieu-oer*, "God above," or "head life above." From this we learn that the word WORD is another name for *divine* or *eternal life*. Hence, if we read the above passage, whilst substituting *life* for *word*, we shall have, "In the beginning was the *life*, and the *life* was with God,

* St. John, i. 1.

and the *life* was God;" and this every body can understand without the assistance of learned commentaries.

The analysis of the word *verbum* will suffice to put every body in the way of analysing the corresponding words of other languages; all of which will, I have no doubt, be found to have a similar meaning: — *iv-er-bi-un;* that is, "the eternal being," or "eternal life;" but literally it is, "ever being," or, which is still more literal, "ever life one;" that is, "the ever one life." In order to understand the latter analysis, we have only to remember that *b* is frequently used instead of *v*.

The fourteenth letter of the Greek alphabet is Ξ ξ, and it is named Xi, and is equal to *cs* or *gs*. In order to understand this character, it will be necessary to remark that there was a letter anciently in use named Ic (it was no other than the Roman C), of which the meaning was, *each* or *both;* that is, each half of the O (*cc*), or both halves; for it is to this letter that allusion must have been first made, when *ic* was formed. The truth of this observation is fully confirmed by the analysis of the word *like*, anciently *lic*, since this makes *il-ic*, that is, "the *c*," or "the *ic*," meaning by this the half of the O, for no two things can bear a closer likeness to each other than the two halves of an O or a circle do. Hence, when we say that one person is like another, our words imply that the persons compared are to one another as the one half of the O is to the other half. It has been

always believed that the English termination *ly* is a corruption of *lic;* but *ly* means *il e* (it is); thus *sweetly*, *charmingly*, &c. are for *sweet il e*, *charming il e;* that is, "it is to sweet," "it is to charming;" meaning that it belongs to what is sweet, to what is charming. The French termination corresponding with *ly* is *ment*, and this, when analysed, is *iv-en-it*, and means "being it," or "it being." This arises from *iv-en* being a name for the Divinity, and consequently for *being*. Hence the French word *doucement* means "it being mild." This is confirmed by the analysis of the corresponding termination in Latin; thus *leniter* is for *len-it-er* (*lenetre*), "the being mild." The reader must now know that *len* is more ancient than *lenis;* hence when *leniter* was formed, *len* alone, and not *lenis*, had existed. It is difficult to pass by such a word as "mildness," without asking what first gave man this idea. *Len* is for *el-en*, and this is the same as *even*, as the account already given of the *l* proves; and *even* is, we know, a name for the Divinity. Hence *leniter* means "the being to God," that is, "the life or being belonging to Him." But we shall have the same meaning by analysing *len;* thus, *el-iv*, "the life," which is also another name for the Divinity; or still, by analysing it thus, *el-in*, or *el-on*, "THE ONE;" which is still the same. The reader will find, if he wishes to take the trouble of making the inquiry, that an analysis of the corresponding words of other languages will prove this idea to have had with all people the same origin

As the C and G are radically equal, there is no difference between *ic* and *ig;* and hence it is that *ic* must, in some language with which I am not acquainted, mean *I*, since *ig* has also the power of doing so.

The principal use of X, which is the Roman character corresponding with Ξ or ξ, is to indicate what is double; thus *rex* (*re-x*) means "the thing double," "the one of double power;" and when we remark that this character is composed of V and V put together, we may say that it literally means "double life" (W); and though, when thus considered, it is equal to "ten," as V and V stand for this number, yet, when we consider it as composed of I and I, we may say that it stands for "two" only; and this may account for its being the second letter in the Greek alphabet after M. As it means "double life," it is synonymous with "all," and such words as are equal to the latter. Hence, when it is used negatively, we are to render it by the reverse of "all"—that is, by "none." But we are not to forget, what has been already shown, namely, that there are no negatives in a language, the words so called being affirmatives used in a bad sense.

The analysis of the name ξι (Xi) is to be thus made, *ic-is-i*. When we give here to the *c* and *s* their full form, we shall have *o* and *o*, so that *ic* and *is* become *io-io*, which two words are equal to *I, I;* and when to these two we add the last word of the analysis, *ic is i*, we have *I, I, I;* by which we see that ξι is equal to three ones,

and this clearly accounts for its other form, in which we have also three ones; as we may thus see, Ξ. Hence *ic is i* really means, "each is I;" that is, "each one is an I." But when, instead of *I I I*, we write literally the analysis *Io Io I*, we have still only three ones. From looking at the words *ic is i*, we also discover of what ξι is composed—we see that it must contain a *c*, an *s*, and an *i*. Then the *c* or ancient *ic* is placed over the *s*, thus, ς̄, and the *i* is made to follow both, thus, ς̄*i*, by which means the name ξι is composed.

X, or χ, is the twenty-second letter of the Greek alphabet. It has been just explained in the account given of ξι. Its name is Chi, and this is equal to *ic-iv*, *i*, which is also the same as *I*, *I*, *I;* where *ic* means "I," as well as it does "each" or "both," and *iv* is also for "the first life," or "first person." Since X is the same as *ch*, and since this is the same as *cv*, which means double *v*, we see that the two V's in X are thus indicated.

The twenty-first letter, Φ, has been already accounted for in alpha. The analysis of its name in the Roman characters will, however, render more evident what has been said of it. It is written, and very correctly, thus, *phi*, of which the analysis is *ip-iv-i;* and this means, "in the first life one," or "one thing in the first life;" meaning, "one thing in the O;" that is, "one thing named *half*," and which is clearly indicated by the exact division made in the character ϕ. But, critically speaking, there is no such number or portion as *half*, that is,

as we understand it, since every fractional part is *one;* hence it is that Φ is even a name for the Divinity, since, like *of* in English, it means, "one being or thing." If the reader has understood how it happens that a language can have no negatives, he can, for the same reason, tell why it can have no division less than one. By entering into the minds of the men who believed all things to be the Divinity, and that he is only *one*, we can easily conceive how impossible it is that there can be any thing less than one. Hence the names *one half*, *one third*, *one fourth*, &c. mean, "one thing of two things," "one thing of three things," "one thing of four things," &c. All numbers are therefore whole ones; for if we say, "John has the *one fourth* of a pound," the meaning is, that of the four ones which compose a pound John has *one;* and this, though not so great a *one* as the whole pound, is, however, whole or entire.

But what is the meaning of the word *fraction?* Nobody can tell. But does it not mean "what is broken?" It does. We, therefore, know what it means? Yes, if we can tell what is meant by *broken.* Surely, every body can tell that: *a broken thing*, for instance, must be something in *pieces* or *parts?* That is very true. We, therefore, know what is meant by *broken?* Yes, if we can tell what is meant by *pieces* or *parts*, but otherwise we know nothing about it. But *a piece* or *a part* is something less than *the whole?* That also is very true. We, therefore, know what is meant by *broken?* Yes,

provided we can tell what is meant by *the whole*, but otherwise we know nothing about it. Does not the whole mean *the entire?* It does. Then we have only to find out what is meant by *the entire*, in order to discover what is meant by *the whole?* Precisely so; but these two words are synonymous, so that it is just as difficult to account for the one as it is for the other; and hence, if we know not what is meant by the word *whole*, we shall look in vain for the meaning of the word *entire*. Then how are we to discover the meaning of the word *whole?* By analysing it, which has been done farther back; where it was shown to be another name for the Divinity, and that it can be reduced to a single *o*. But in the word *entire* there is no *o?* The first syllable of this word is equal to *on* or *in;* and as the former is for *oin*, and as this *oin* may be analysed thus, *o-in*, and then thus, *in-o*, which means an *o*, we find that it is equal to *o*. Here, as *in* stands in apposition to this *o*, it is consequently the same as an *o*, or a *one;* and this we can easily understand, by remarking that *n* is equal to these two parts (ↄ), which are also equal to an ***o***, so that *in* is really the same as *io*. But the final part of en*tire*, that is, *tire?* It is for *it ir*, which means, "head being," or "God;" so that these two words *it* and *ir* stand in apposition to *en*, and they are precisely the same as the French word *être*. This shows *entire* to be equal to the two French words *un-être*, or *être-un*, that is, "one being," or "the being one." Hence *part* or *piece* means also

"one," but *one* less great or bulky than the *one* signified by *whole* or *entire*. Of these two words the former is to be analysed thus, *ip-o-ir-it*. Here *ir-it* is the same as *it-ir*, or the French word *être* (the thing, or the being); and *ip-o* means "the *up-o*," "the high *o*," or "the high *one*," which is still equal to "God;" and when we arrange the whole word thus, *être-ip-o*, the meaning is, "the thing, the high *o*;" that is, "the little thing the high *o*;" because what is high up appears little, on account of its being far from us. Hence the French word *petit* might as well be written *potit*, which, analysed, makes *ip-o-it-it*, that is, "high *o* high high," or "the high *o* above above," meaning, "the high *o* very high;" in other words, it is "the Divinity very far off." Thus, too, the English word *poor* might as well be written *poir*, and this, again, might as well be written *par*, as we may perceive by allowing the *o* and the *i* to fall together, since this union will produce *oi*.* But the word

* This, I perceive, has happened in Latin, since *parvus* is, when analysed, *ip-o-ir-in-os*, and this analysis, when *os* is put first, and the *i* in *ir* changed to *o*, becomes *os ip-oor-in;* in which we have the English word *poor*, the latter being the contraction of *ip-oor*, formed by the *i* having been dropped. As the *os* means *the*, and that the *in* following *ip-oor* means *one*, *parvus* is, in English words, equal to *the poor one*.

From this we learn that the ideas *poor* and *little* are one and the same. But as *ip-o* is, notwithstanding, another name for the Divinity, it can, besides signifying what is poor or little, mean also what is very great or powerful. Thus *potens* means, "the high one," "the head being;" that is, in Latin, it has this meaning, but in some other language it may signify quite the reverse. Hence the word *power* in English, and *pauvre* in French, are really the same word. The former is, when analysed, *ip-o-iv-er*, which means, "high *o* being;" that is, "the great one

poor itself does not differ in meaning from *poir*, since, when analysed, it becomes *ip-o-o-ir*, which still means, "the high one," "the one being," or "the high one above" (*ip-o-oer*). Hence the word *part* means, like the word *whole*, "the Divinity," but the Divinity less visible; and, brought down to ordinary language, it is to be rendered by "the little one."

The word *piece* is to be analysed thus, *ip-i-is*, which means, "the high one being;" that is, "the being who is far away," and who, consequently, appears little; so that *piece*, like *part*, means also "the little one." The word *piece* may be also analysed thus, *ip-i-os*, for the *e* is equal to *o;* and, consequently, *esse* may, in some languages, be *osse*. Indeed, *esse*, to be rendered intelligible, should be analysed thus, *os-e;* and this ought still to be analysed thus, *is-o-e* (the *o* is), which means, "it is the *o*;" that is, it is the Divinity, who is existence itself.

Thus, from knowing that a thing broken is a thing reduced to *parts* or *pieces*, and from knowing that *parts* and *pieces* mean *ones*, we are led to dis-

being." Here we must remember that *iv er* is the same as *it er* or *être*. *Pauvre* is, when analysed, *ip-o-iv-iv-er;* and here the first *iv* is equal to *the*, so that *iv iv er* means "the being," and consequently the whole word is equal to "the being" or "the thing the high *o*;" that is, "the being or the thing named the high *o*," or, "the high one;" meaning by this, "the one far away." By entering into the spirit of the belief that all things are the Divinity, and that his name has not a negative meaning, that is, as we commonly understand negations, it can be easily conceived that *power* and *pauvre*, may be, when radically considered, the same word, just as *yes* and *no* may be found, when in like manner examined, to have the same meaning.

cover how men first named the idea *break*, and that they meant by a thing *broken*, a thing *in ones*.

But here I may be asked, What is meant by *one?* To which I can only reply, that it means *a unit.* And what is a unit? As this word becomes, when analysed, *it un*, and as this means "the *one*," I can still only answer, that it is the same as *one.* But has *one* no other meaning? It names the Divinity. Then what does Divinity mean? *One*, as we have already seen. But does not this great name represent all things? It does. Then it cannot mean *one?* It means *one*, and nothing more; just as the whole universe, of which the analysis gives "one eternal being," means only *one*, though it comprises all things. But to say that *one* means the Divinity, and that the Divinity means only *one*, is, in other words, to say that *one* means *one*, which is no definition? This is very true. Then we do not know what is meant by *broken?* We can trace it up to the Divinity, who is all things, but no farther; for of his hidden nature all we know is, that he is *one* and *all.* And how far can the meaning of other words be traced? Up to HIM. Then what are we to infer from not being able to penetrate farther? That, critically speaking, we know nothing, since we are wholly ignorant of his divine nature. But man can *create* or *invent?* The analysis of both these words proves that he cannot; since the former means "the eternal one," (*ic-er-o-it*, primitively, *it-ic-er-o*,) and the latter, "the head or first one being" (*it-in-iv-en*); from which we learn

that the extent of human wisdom can go no farther than the discovery of what has been already *created* or *invented*—I was going to say, *by the Divinity*—but now that I know the meaning of these words, I perceive that it would be just as great a fault to make use of such language, as to say, that whiteness is white. But we say that gunpowder, and clocks and watches, have been invented? We do. And it must be very correct to speak so? Just as correct as to say that gold, silver, or America, has been invented, but neither more nor less so. Are we the wiser for knowing that the meaning of all words can be traced up to *one*, or the Divinity? We are a great deal the wiser; since this knowledge forms, as far as words are concerned, the bounds of human wisdom: man is not allowed to penetrate farther.

The word *break* makes, when analysed, *ib-er-o-ik*, "the thing *o* each," or the *o* divided into *ics* or *ones*, which is signified by means of a straight line drawn down the O, thus, Ⓞ, and making of it two portions, each one equal in amount to the letter C. As to *ib-er*, in the above analysis, it is equal to *iv-er*, or *it-er*, or to the French word *être*. Here we discover, by the analysis of this word *break*, the original of the English word *stick*, and see that it is, when analysed, *est-ic* (it is the *ic*), which alludes to the straight line that *cuts* the O in two. Now, too, we discover the original of this word *cut:* we have already seen that *ut* and *the* make but one word; so that when we oblige *ut* to go first, the word *cut* will become *ut-ic;* that is, "the *ic* or *cut* in the middle

of the O; and in this way, I have no doubt, the same idea has been expressed in all languages. Here, too, we discover the original of *ico* in Latin, and see that it is for *io-ic*, "I strike," or, literally, "I stick." And here, again, we have two other words, of which we discover the original meaning also: they are *strike* and *tick:* the former is to be analysed thus, *estre ic*, "the thing *ic;*" that is, "the stick," with which men used anciently to *strike*, even as they do still. To *tick*, as a clock or a watch does, means also "the strike;" since, when analysed, it is *it-ic* (the stick). The Greek word εικων (likeness), and the corresponding one in Latin, *icon*, are also formed from the *ic*, or the division in the O; because the two halves of an O are very like one another. Thus εικ-ων and *ic-on* mean, literally, "each one," that is, each half of the O. At first sight, it may appear impossible that two ideas, so different as those signified by the words *strike* and *likeness*, could have ever been one word; yet that they were, there can be no doubt, and hence it is we still say, when alluding to a likeness very well taken, that it is *striking*, which means, that it is as like as the one half of a circle is like the other. I have already observed that such, too, is the origin of the English word *like* (resembling). But what is the original of *like* when it implies approval or approbation? It is still the same: for the meaning of our words, when we say, *I like a person*, is, "I am half to that person," "I would do *like* him;" or it means, "I am his double;" for *ic* represents *one* or *two*, just as

each stands for *both*, when we say, whilst referring to two persons, "*each* of them did so;" that is, "*both* of them did so."

The tenth letter of the Greek alphabet is K, named *καππα*, which, when analysed, makes, *ik-o-ip-a*, or *ik-o-iv-a*, and this means "the cut O" or "divided O" (Ⓞ or C), and "the first life or thing" in *a*, by the latter alluding to the *i* in *ic*, which, from its being a *one* (1), stands for "the first." Hence when we place a *c* and an I together thus, K, we have a *k* in its primitive state. From its being composed of the *c* joined to I, it is equal to the *ic* of which I have just spoken. The old English word *eke* (*and* or *also*) is no other than this *ic* or *ik;* and *kai* in Greek, and *ac* in Latin, which have a similar meaning, are still the same word. Hence *eke*, *ik*, or *ok*, for they are all alike, is for *o-ic* (one joined or added). *Kai* is for *ik-on* (one joined), since *ai* is composed of *oii*, and that these three letters are equal to *ou* or *on*, the *u* and *n* making but one letter. The Latin word *ac* is, analysed, *o-ic* (one joined); and here, when we allow the *o* to fall behind *ic*, and *i* in this word to be dropped, we have *co*, which also indicates *union* or *joining*, and has a meaning equal to the English word *with*. When we recollect that *p* is also the same as *f*, we discover that *kap* or *cap**, for both are equally cor-

* In the ancient Teutonic tongue this word is written with a *k*; that is, with an *i* and a *c*, thus, *kappe;* so that from *i* having been sometimes omitted, this word became *cappe*, now *cap*. Thus also, as we have seen farther back, *king* and *ken* were *cinge* and *cen* in Saxon, which must have happened from their having been at first *kinge* and *ken*.

rect, is, when analysed thus, *i-c-o-if*, *coif;* and this literally means, "each *o*," "*one* thing;" that is, "each one half of the *o*," which implies that a *cap* had anciently this form, C, or this, Ɔ, which when placed thus, ∩, is seen as it is worn. Hence if the Greek character *k* was made thus, C, it would have been called *cap* instead of *kappa;* but as it has an *i* attached to it, it was necessary that it should be named as it is. This opinion is confirmed by the Hebrew *k*, which is made thus, כ, and is no other than a C situated so; and as it is named *caph*, and as the *ph* is here of equal power with *f*, this Hebrew name is also *coif*, and it consequently means half of the *o* or a *cap*.

The fifteenth letter of the Greek alphabet is the short O, named ομικρον. This word, when thus analysed, makes *oin-ic-er-on;* and here *oin-ic* is the same as *unique* in French, or *unicus* in Latin, or the English word *alone*. As to *er-on*, it is the same as *er-in* or *ever*, and consequently as *être*, or *being*, as has been already shown; so that the literal meaning of *omicron* is, "the thing unique," that is, the "thing solely one," and no more. But it may be also analysed thus, *oin-icer-on;* and now *icer* means "being"—for it is the same as *is-er* or *it-er;* so that this analysis will give, "one, the thing one;" in which we may perceive by the repetition of the word *one*, that "one in the extreme is implied," and, consequently, what is "solely one," or "unique." It may be asked, if by the *ic* after the first one, half *o* or half *one* be not meant, in order to sig-

nify short *o;* but here by *ic* is rather indicated what is double, since we have frequently seen in the analysis of words this means employed for expressing ideas in the extreme; and hence *one one* may mean, "all," or "solely one;" and, consequently, as there are no negatives, it is also synonymous with "none." As I have farther back, when accounting for the French word *avec*, minutely explained the two words *oin-ic*, or "unique," I see no necessity for doing so over again.

T is the nineteenth letter of the Greek alphabet, and its name is *ταυ*, which, analysed, makes *it-oi-iv*, which implies that it is equal to *oi* or A, or "the first life," and to *iv*, or "the first life." Hence it is that in the analysis of words the *τ* is to be frequently found, like A and *iv*, as a name for the *Divinity*, or the *head*, and consequently for any thing very high up. But the A is when turned thus, V, and its bar in the middle taken out and placed before it thus, IV, the same as an I and a V; and hence it is that both A and *iv* are equal in meaning. We have already seen that the *τ* is only one I placed over another, and hence it is equal to V; since if we take the two parts of which this letter is composed, and arrange them thus, T, we shall have a T; and when we put before this T the I which precedes V in IV, in order to mean "the first," or "head life," we shall have IT, the well-known pronoun; since the A is also the same as this IV by which the word IT is formed, it follows that the A as well as IV forms the word IT.

It is in consequence of the T being thus formed, by means of A and V, that it is named in Greek *Tau*, since its analysis, when thus made, *it-ea-iv*, means, that IT the A and IT the V; that is, in the word IT we have an A and also IV. I have shown farther back, in the analysis of the French word *hache*, that the word IT is also formed from H; and this can be easily conceived, when we remark that in the three parts of the H we have an A and also IV; so that H is really an A or the word IV; and as the latter often becomes a W, so must the H also become one.

The twenty-third character of the Greek alphabet is composed of π and ς, two letters which have been already explained. Its name, which is *psi*, becomes, when analysed, *ip-is-i;* and this may also become *in in i*, and, consequently, *io io i*, which is still equal to *I*, *I*, *I*, or *one-one-one*. Hence *psi* is another great name for the Divinity. When we recollect that *ip* is for *up* or *in*, and that *is* stands for "existence," and *i* for "one," the three words *ip-is-i* may mean, "in existence one;" that is, "in life or existence there is but one, namely, the Divinity." The sign for *existence* or *life* may be also made thus, υυ; by placing between which the I thus, υIυ, or thus, υ|υ, we shall have, when we allow them to meet, Ψ and ψ, the two signs or characters of the name *psi*. Hence the meaning just given ("in existence one") is also expressed by the form of either of the above characters, since through the figure indicating *existence* (υυ) is drawn an I.

The name of the Greek *u*, formed thus, Υ, and thus, υ, is *upsilon*, which may be analysed thus, *iv-iv-iv-iv-o-iv;* and as the *o* is also equal to *iv*, it follows that the six words which compose the name of this letter are all equal to one another, and as these six words may stand also thus, *iu-ip-is-il-io-in*, we discover the different letters for which *u* is frequently a substitute: they are *p*, *s*, *l*, *o*, and *n*. As we have already had many instances in the analysis of words, showing how the *u* and the above characters make but one letter, it is needless to return again to the same subject. But when we analyse the name *upsilon*, without considering the relation between *u* and its other letters, we find that it means, "the *u* in existence the great one;" that is, the character *u* is the principal sign by which *life* is indicated. The analysis which gives this meaning is to be made thus, *iv-u-ip-is-il-on*. Here the first word *iv* is for the *h*, understood before *u*, and represented by (') the note of aspiration. The *il* means, "the first" or "greatest," it being equal to IV or IΛ, as the account given of lambda has sufficiently shown.

The fifth letter of the Greek alphabet is E and ε, and it is named *epsilon;* and hence it defines itself by the same letters we find in the name *upsilon*. Then what difference is there between these two signs? The latter is a diminutive of the former; and this can be easily proved by a comparison of these two Latin words, *annulus* and *annellus*. As the double *l* in the latter word might as well be a

single one, the real and sole difference between both words consists in the one having a *u* or *upsilon*, and in the other having an *e* or *epsilon;* but in meaning the difference is this, *annulus* means "a ring," and *annellus*, a "LITTLE ring." Hence, when we admit all the letters in one of these words to be equal to all those of the other, with the exception of a single letter on either side (*u* and *e*), we are, if we find a difference in meaning between both words, to look to these two letters alone for that difference; for if both of them were, whilst meaning the round thing worn upon one's finger, written exactly alike, there could not exist any difference between them as to meaning, no more than there does between the words *ring* and *ring* in English, when taken in the same sense, that is, when meaning the ornament which females, and female gentlemen, are accustomed to wear on their fingers. Hence when we say that *annellus* is the diminutive of *annulus*, our words mean, when logically examined, that *e* is the diminutive of *u*. But is not *epsilon* the diminutive of *Hta?* It is. And the diminutive of *epsilon* also? And the diminutive of *epsilon* also. But how can this be? It happens from the two letters *Hta* and *υπsilon* being one and the same letter, as I have often had occasion to show. Thus from knowing ε and υ to be radically the same, and that the latter is equal to an *o*, (as it is composed of its two parts, *c c*,) we see that ε must be equal to an *o* also.

This knowledge explains at once several apparent

singularities in the orthography of words not hitherto to be accounted for. We now see why *e* is often pronounced in English like an *o* or a *u*. Thus the English word *water* is pronounced as if written *wator* or *watur;* and this is very correct, since the *e* in this word is equal to an *o*, which is in its turn equal to a *u*.

We laugh at ignorant persons for writing *water* *wator* or *watur*, but such is the exact pronunciation of this word; and it is as correct to write it with an *o* or a *u* as it is to do so with an *e*. Now, too, we can tell why the words *shew* and *sew* are pronounced as if they were *show* and *sow*, and that one of these words (shew) is written as often the one way as it is the other. Hence, when we see two words equal in meaning belonging to two different languages, and only differing from one another by the one having an *o* where the other has an *e*, we are to consider this as no difference at all. Thus the English word *red*, and the Danish word *rod*, which are equal in meaning, are also equal in letters, since *e* and *o*, whether long or short, make but one letter. When accounting for *Dies* and *Dios*, I knew very well that these words were radically the same, and that the root of both was *Di*, which went to prove that *God* and *day* made only one word. But I was not then aware that *es* in the one word, and *os* in the other, were also the same, namely, as *os*, another name for the *sun* or the *Divinity*, and consequently for the *day*. It has been a great loss to me, when analysing words,

not to have discovered sooner that an O and an E make but one letter.

The twenty-fourth and last letter of the Greek alphabet is the great O, which is formed thus, Ω ω, and is named omega. In both these characters we have all that signifies what is double. The capital one, Ω, becomes when turned up thus, ʊ, a Roman U, and this accounts for the latter being in several languages pronounced like a double *o*. But though the letter U has the meaning of a double *o*, that is of a double *one*, since each of its two parts means *one*, still it should have never had the sound of a double *o*. And why so? Because when men wished in the beginning to signify in writing the double *o*, they could have had but three ways of doing so: the first and most simple of all was to write the double *o* itself, thus, *oo;* the second way was to write it thus, UO; and the third way was OU. The *oo* requires no explanation: every body can conceive that *o* and *o* put together ought to be equal to double *o*. As the character *u* signified what was double, from its being composed of a double *one*, men must have often employed UO instead of OO, since this also means double *o*, or double *one*. As to this form, OU, it cannot, as it is not the natural order, have been adopted but from the *u* having fallen behind *o*, just as words have fallen behind one another. Hence, when we give to the letter U the sound of *oo*, it does not arise from the U having such a sound, for this it could have never had, no more than *i*

could have had the sound of a single *o*; but it arises from this *u* having been anciently accompanied by an *o*, which it showed to be double; and afterwards, from the *o* having been wholly suppressed. Hence, in the two Greek characters Ω ω, we have no *o*, but a Roman U, and a Saxon double *u* (Ƿ), so that the *o*, which must have one time accompanied them, is now wholly suppressed. I have often had occasion to wonder at the great antiquity of the form of French words; and, with regard to this double *o*, I have occasion to do so again. An instance cannot be found in this language in which the U represents the *oo*, this combination being generally indicated thus, *ou*; and sometimes by a long single *ō*. The French orthoepist has, of course, ever supposed that in the diphthong *ou* the *u* has assisted in giving to these two letters their peculiar sound; but it is not by any means heard in this instance, its use being only to signify that here the *o* is double, and that in the *beginning* this syllable must have been written *oo*, then WO, and afterwards *ou*; this again having, in other languages, as in Greek, Latin, and English, been often shortened to the single U, from the *o* having, with time, been dropped. But when, instead of *oo*, men began to use *uo*, did this make any difference in the pronunciation? In the beginning it could have made none whatever; but when, with time, men forgot why they had, in such a case, employed *u*, affected speakers must, in very civilised countries, have begun to sound the *u* before *o*. Thus the Greek and Latin word *duo*

must have been first pronounced as if written *doo*, (the *o*, *o*, that is, the *one*, *one*,) the *oo* in this word having twice the length of a single *o*, in order to signify *two*. Here this English word *two* falls in my way very happily to verify what I have just stated. We see that this word is even still pronounced as it must have been at the time when written *too;* that is, before it had the *w*.

But what difference is there between U and W? None. For when U is analysed, it becomes *iv;* and from these two letters falling together, thus, *iv*, we have *ω*. Hence, in the two forms of omega, Ω, *ω*, we have only one letter, the U. But were it correct to write the word two, *twoo?* It were. For then the *w* and *oo* would stand in apposition to one another, and the analysed form and meaning of this word would be, *it-w-oo*, "the double thing (namely) *oo*;" that is, *one one*. Thus, in the Scottish dialect, this word is written *twa*, which, analysed, becomes *it-w-o-i*; and here *o i*, which has been contracted to *a*, is equal to *oo* in *twoo*. We have a similar instance in the English word *twins*, which, analysed, makes *it-w-in-o* (the double thing, *one one*). Here, in the analysis of the *w*, I have not put a vowel before it, since it is already *iv*, as we have just seen. The English word *twine* furnishes another instance similar to those already given. It is, when analysed, *it-w-i-in*, that is "the double thing, *one one;*" *twine* or *twyne* being composed of two threads put together. The word *twist* has a similar meaning, and it is to be analysed thus, *it-w-ist*, "the double thing is it," "it is the double thing."

The meaning of the name omega is O *great;* and this much of this letter the learned have known, because they knew that the word *mega* means in Greek *great.* But of the *o* itself, when radically considered, they have known just as much as they have of all the other letters; and I need not tell the intelligent and impartial reader the extent of this knowledge, for he knows as well as I do, that it solely consists in being able to say that A differs from B in both sound and form, and that the one letter stands first, and the other second in the alphabet.

But though the learned can pride themselves on their knowing that *mega* means *great*, they cannot tell what the word *mega* in itself means, or what first gave men this idea. It is to be thus analysed, *im-oig-oi*, of which the meaning is, "the high one;" that is, the Almighty. It can, of course, be still analysed several other ways, but the meaning will be ever the same. I have given this analysis of *mega*, in order to show that it is the same as the Latin word *magnus*, which is, when we take away the article *us*, *magn;* that is, *im-oig-in* ("the high *one*"), for the *in* at the end of this analysis is equal to *io* or *oi.* But I ought to have explained *oig.* The reader can easily conceive that if this word were written *oit*, it would clearly indicate height, as the T is for the head or top of any thing, so that *o-it* or *it-o* is visibly the head or high one. But we have already often seen that the same idea is also signified by *ig* or *iv*, because these words are

synonymous with *head*, from their meaning "the first life;" that is, "the head life," the "being," or "thing," which is "first above." We have also seen how the word *it* is formed from *iii* or *iv*, thus, *i ī;* and as G in Greek, when made thus, γ, is composed of the three parts that compose *iv*, we are to consider it as being precisely equal to the word IT; so that *oig* and *oit* have exactly the same meaning. As to the ε in μεγα being equal to *o*, it has been too often shown to need, in the present instance, any farther remark. But *mega* might be also analysed thus, *iv-ig-oi;* and these three words are equal to I, I, I, of which the meaning also is, "the high one." For here we may consider the first I as an article to the second, which we are to consider as an adjective, meaning "first," or "high," and so qualifying the third *I*, which is in this case to be rendered by *one*, so that the *I* thrice repeated means, "the first one," or "the high one." The English word *great* is, when analysed, *ig-ir-iv-oit*, "the first double being," "the life above." Here the *e* is equal to ε, and consequently to ω or *iv*. The French or Latin word *grand* (for when we omit the article in grand-*us*, it is as much Latin as it is French) is to be analysed thus, *ig-ir-oin-id*, "the high being," "the one above." If *grand* be analysed thus, *ig-ir-and*, we shall have the English conjunction *and*, and thus see confirmed the analysis already given of this word, of which the meaning was shown to be, as the reader may remember,

"one above," which is the same as one joined or added. Hence we see that the Latin and French conjunction *et* has, when analysed thus, *o-it* ("one above"), exactly the same meaning; and that this analysis of *et* is very correct, there can be no doubt. But is not *et* equal to these two Greek letters ητ? It is. And as these are equal to *vt*, of which the analysis is *iv-it*, "the first life above," we have still the same meaning to be found in *and*. We may also remark, that as *iv-it* is the same as *in-it*, and that *in* is here for *one*, we have, literally, in *iv it* what we have in *oin-id*, the analysis of *and*. But may not this *in* become also *io?* It may; and this clearly proves that *io* means *iv*, "the first life," and that between this word and *one* there is no difference in meaning; and as *io* is equal to 10, we see that ten is only another form of *one;* and that as it may be analysed thus, *it-on*, it literally means, "the head one," that is, the first *one* of all. I have made no remark with regard to the T being employed in *et* and the D in *and*, because it has been often observed that these two letters are used indifferently; but we can now tell the reason why: both letters mean the Divinity or the Head, and hence in the form of both, height is plainly indicated. This reminds me of an observation which I forgot to make when accounting for delta. This character is, when a capital letter, made thus, Δ; but I am pretty sure that it must have also stood thus, ▽, in which we have I above the V (V̄); it having first been beside it, thus, IV. Now, as Δ is, like the T,

a name for the Divinity, why should the top part be turned down? There is a wise reason for it: some men believed the Divinity to be under ground, instead of being over head; and in order to signify this, the head of Δ has been turned down (∇). Hence *Dio* is, when analysed, the same as *Dis*, as has been already shown; and the latter was a name given to Pluto, the god of hell. Thus the sign which indicates the head in both T and Δ must, in the beginning, have been placed above; and hence, as these letters have had the same origin and the same meaning, we can account for their being so frequently used indifferently.

I have done with the twenty-four letters of the Greek alphabet; and in the account given of them are to be found explained the letters of all the languages on earth. In a great and important discovery, we are not to look to the quantity of new matter brought to light, but to the system by which it has been found, for in this alone lies the real discovery. As all the letters of the Greek alphabet, and, consequently, of every other, have grown out of one, and as their powers are infinite, I cannot believe but that all things, no matter how vast, various, complicated, and endless they may now appear, must have begun in the same way. This belief establishes a principle which, if we closely adhere to it, as I have endeavoured to do in this work, may lead us, unknown to ourselves, to won-

drous things — to important discoveries and improvements in all the arts and sciences of which man has hitherto known any thing—for it must be the basis of all human knowledge.

I have remarked, in the account given of alpha, that this word means also, *all in a*, from which I inferred that all the other letters of the Greek alphabet are to be found in alpha. The analysis which gives this meaning is that which gives *all of a* (*al-if-a*); for *if* means also *in*, as I have shown in the explanation given of the conjunction *if*. When we bear in mind that the letter *a* is composed of these two parts, *o* and *i*, that is, of a circle and a straight line; and that these two parts make three, from the O being divided in two equal parts, thus, C Ɔ, each of which is equal to the other part of *a* (*i*), or to a straight line, it can be easily perceived, from what has been shown, how all the other letters of the alphabet are composed of these three signs, O, I, C, placed in various ways. Hence whenever it is said in this work, as it frequently is, that certain letters are equal to certain other letters, we are not by this to understand that they are not equal to all others, but that they serve more generally as substitutes for the letters thus referred to than they do for others. But *a* itself can be reduced; for as it is an *o* and an *i* put together, and as each of these two letters stands in apposition to the other, and that the one is consequently precisely equal to the other, it follows that they are but one and the same sign, since precise equality cannot

possibly exist between any two things. This we can the more easily understand, when we remark that O means one, and that I means one also. But O is round, is a circle, and I is a straight line? They must, however, be equal, or the wisdom of the ancient world would not have made the one stand in apposition to the other. But we have already seen something which may serve to account for this apparent impossibility.

I have, in the analysing of words, discovered that the *dot* which we put over the *i* is an *o*. Thus this word, when analysed, makes *it id o*, "the head head *o*," that is, "the very high *o*," or "very small *o*;" for diminutiveness is, as we have already seen, signified in this way, for the reason that what is very high appears small. The same word in French (*point*) makes *it-ip-oin*, which is, literally, "the tip one," but still more literally, "head up one;" which is equal to "head head one," or "up up one," or still, "the first first one," that is, "one in the extreme," "the least one," "the head of the head." But this meaning is very clearly rendered in English by the above analysis (*it-ip-oin*), of which the two first words, from the first *i* being dropped, become *tip*. As to the *oin*, it is, when analysed, *o-in*, or *in-o*, that is, an *o*: so that *point*, when followed up, is, after all, found to be an *o*. Thus, too, the English word *stop*, which has still the same meaning, makes *est-o-ip*, "it is the *o* up:" here *ip* not only means what is *high up*, but also what is *little*, because, as I have just stated, what is *high up*

appears to be little, from its being distant. But as I is equal to O, hence it is that the one character is as clearly meant as the other in those definitions. An analysis of the same word in Greek (σιγμη) renders this very evident: *is-ig-in-e*, which, when *e* is made to take its primitive place, becomes *eis-ig-in*, and this means, "being the first one;" for *eis* is here equal to *Be*, as, when analysed, it becomes, first, *eB*, and then *Be*. But *eis*, in Greek, means *one?* so does *eB* or *Be* mean *one*, since it is also equal to *oio*, which is equal to *ten*, or the *Divinity;* and *eis* is still, in Greek, another form of the verb *to be*.

It were, however, in this instance very correct to explain *eis* by the English word *the*, and then the meaning of the above analysis will be "the first one," or "the one one;" for *ig* is equal to *I*, as I have several times shown; thus, from knowing that the dot put over the *i* is both a *one* (1) and an *o*, it follows that a *one* or a straight line, is an *o* or a circle. But will not mathematicians admit that this figure, I, is composed of dots or points added to one another, thus (⁞), and so allowed to meet, and become this straight line (I)? And will they not also admit that a circle is composed of the same materials? Now what is this little figure (·), which we put over the letter *i*, and by means of which these other two figures, O and I, are formed? I do not here mean any thing imaginary, but what is real; and of this there can be no doubt, since I show the figure of which I desire to have a definition. Is it a straight line? If so, this figure O

must be a straight line, since, in this case, it is composed of straight lines added together; for if we join several things of the same kind together, so that they all make but one, how are we to name this one thing? If we have, for instance, several books bound in one, what is every body in the world likely to name this one thing? Will they not name it a book, and admit that it differs only in size from any one of the books of which it is composed? And must not the same thing happen with regard to all other things that become one? We may, for the sake of distinction, give them sometimes, whilst appearing under this single form, another name than that which each one of them bears whilst standing apart from the others; but this name can, after all, be only an augmentative of the other.

Now what is this little sign which we place over an *i*? Is it a straight line? If so, it is evident that this figure O is composed of straight lines, and that a circle is nothing more than a compound of straight lines, and that it is, after all, a certain straight line; just as a book that has been made by the addition of several others is, after all, but a certain kind of a book. Or is this little sign we put over the *i* a circle? If so, it differs only in size from this figure O; and hence what is commonly called a circle is a compound of many other circles. And as this figure I, which is named a straight line, is made in the same way, that is, by the addition of dots or points, it follows that it must also be a

compound of many circles, and, consequently, one great circle.

But the analysis in several languages of the word *straight* goes to prove that a straight line is composed of circles. In the Teutonic language this word is *stracke*, and analysed, it becomes *est-ro-ic*, which means, "it is the double *o*," "it is *ic*." The word *ic* is equal to the two halves of the *o*, or to only one of them; and hence it means "each," or "both," as has been already shown. We have also seen that it is equal to *ig*, and that it must, like this word, consequently be the same as the pronoun I, which is a straight line. The account given of the letter R shows that it indicates what is double; hence *ro*, in the present analysis, must mean the double *o*, that is, *o* and *o*: from which we are to infer, that a straight line is formed by the addition of one *o* to another, thus, ∞. The Saxon word *strace*, since it is, when analysed, *est-ro-ic*, does not in any way differ from *stracke*. The analysis of the Greek word ορθος is *os-o-ir-it-iv*, "the *o* double," "the head life," or "the head one." The Latin word *rectus* gives *us-ir-ec-it*, "the double *ec* it," that is, "the two halves of the *o*:" for *ec* is the same as *ic*, and it is also here for *oc*, which means "the double *o*." Hence *rectus* may be also analysed thus, *ir-oc-it-us*, which, by giving to *us* its primitive form of *o-is*, and by making *is* take its place before *ir*, will become *is-ir-oc-to*, and of this the literal meaning is, "the thing eight," in which we have still the double *o*, since *o* and *o* put one over the other, make 8

(eight). The French word *droit* is, when analysed, *id-ro-it*, that is, "the double *o* it;" but literally, "the double *o* high, or ahead;" meaning still the one *o* placed over the other; and this is so evident, that when we analyse *droit* thus, *id-er-oit*, and remark that this *id-er* is the same as *it-er* or *être* (the thing), and that *oit* is literally "eight," not only in meaning, but even in sound, as many persons with whom the ancient pronunciation of Great Britain has remained do still pronounce this number as if written *oït*, we shall have for *droit* "the thing *eight*," that is, an *o* and an *o* (8). When *droit* means "rectitude," it is still "the thing eight," "the double high life;" that is, "the Divinity"—"He who ever was, and who is"—for we must not forget that the *o* means "life." The English word *straight* may be analysed thus, *estre-aight;* and as *aight* differs neither in value nor sound from *eight*, these two words (*estre-aight*) mean, also, "the thing eight," that is, 8 or 8.

The analysis of the word *circle* in Greek, Latin, French, and English, does not, like that of the word *straight*, add to our knowledge of this figure, since we are ever told that it is composed of the double *ic*, or of all the *ic*, meaning by this the double C. But it is evident from what we have seen, that these two figures, I and O, are of equal import, and that each means *one*, and that they are both compounds of the same materials, and that they do not, though they appear as different figures, and bear different names, and have attributed to them

a different value, make, after all, no more than one and the same figure. Hence the one can never exist without the other, and for the reason just assigned, namely, that though apparently two things, they are in reality but one. Then a dot or a point, no matter how small it may be, will be found to have in it all that constitutes what we name a *circle* and a *straight line;* that is to say, the *smallest point* — and this is both a circle and a straight line — is composed of an infinite number of other points, which are also circles and straight lines, composed of an infinite number of others. But how easy it is to prove that a point is both a circle and a straight line, by remarking that the dot over the *i*, which is in itself a perfect figure, is evidently both a straight line and a circle, since nobody can with truth say that it is the one and not the other, or that it is more the one than the other.

In all the alphabets in the world there is but one; and in all the letters of which this one is composed there is still but one. Hence as all words are composed of letters, it follows that in all words there can be but one letter, and this is A. Of this letter the two most simple parts are I and O; that is, IO, a word that signifies "motion," or "life," and which also names MAN, WOMAN, and their CREATOR, in which we count THREE lives, yet there is only ONE.

As the elements of all figures and forms are to be found in letters, and as all letters make but *one*, it follows that all the figures, forms, signs, cha-

racters, shapes—name them as you will—make, after all, when radically considered, but *one*, and this is still the first letter of the alphabet, of which the two most simple parts are I and O. But as these two parts are *precisely equal* to each other, and as *precise equality* cannot possibly exist in any two things, it follows that it is only in appearance I and O make two, and that they are in reality but one and the same thing. But if this be true, they must have one form in which both are to be clearly seen, and the one not more so than the other; that is to say, this single form must be to all appearance a circle, and to all appearance a straight line, without being in the slightest degree more the one than the other.

By showing the form which all must admit to be equally a circle and straight line—and it is no other than this little sign placed over the *i*—we see the truth of what has been already advanced, namely, that a dot or a point is evidently both these figures, since nobody can with truth say that it is the one and not the other, or that it is more the one than the other. Then, as in this little sign we have the two parts of *a*, since it is both an O and an I; and as it consequently is precisely equal to A, it follows that it must have given birth to as much; and this is to say a great deal, for it implies that all the languages and letters ever known, as well as all the figures and forms of things ever seen, traced, or imagined, are, when followed up to their birth, but the dot over the *i*.

And though this sign appears very small to our eyes, it might to the beings of another world appear an immense circle, just as a circle of great magnitude with us might to some other beings appear less than a dot. As the truth of this latter observation is too rational and evident not to be admitted by all, it proves that even a circle of great magnitude is as much a straight line as it is a circle, since were our powers of vision less acute than they are, it would appear to us less than a dot, which is clearly both a circle and a straight line; that is, two things in appearance, but in reality only *one*.

Iota is thus analysed*, I-O-et-A, of which the meaning is this, "I is O and A," that is to say, it is both the one and the other; and when we bear in mind that alpha under this form (A) is, though composed of I, I, I, yet only one, it will be admitted that I, since it is also only one, must be equal to A; and as these two parts of alpha (I and O), which compose its other form, are one and the same thing, as we have just seen, and each meaning *one*, it will be also admitted that I, since it is at least one of them—which nobody who has the use of his eyes can deny—must be the one and the other, since they both make as evidently but one as that the dot over the *i*—which is also both a circle and a straight line—makes only one.

When I gave the above analysis of iota, I made

* Vol. ii. p. 125.

a promise of referring to it again, and as the passage in which this promise is made will explain why I did so, I beg to transcribe it here: "It must in this place appear very ridiculous to assert that the character I is both an O and an A, yet that it is the one and the other, nothing can be more true and evident; and of this statement I shall remind the reader in the proper place: for, no matter how strongly he may be opposed to it now, he will then admit, I have no doubt, that it is very correct, and can be easily conceived by all who have the power of divesting their minds of erroneous ideas long imbibed."

So many applications of the knowledge just acquired can be made, that I should here, at the close of my labour, feel embarrassed to tell which two or three instances ought now, out of such a variety, to be chosen, in order still to produce some additional proof of the reality of this discovery, did I not find myself obliged by past promises to grant the preference to a certain few. In the opening of this work it is said that the twenty-four letters of the English alphabet give, when read in the following order, A B C D E F G H I (or J) K L M N O P Q R S T U (or V) W X Y Z, this meaning—"This book is had of the Jews: it opens the mind, and is good breeding and wisdom."

The word *book* in Greek, Latin, French, and English, means, when analysed, "the first life," and it was in the beginning a single B, or, which is the same thing, *eb* or *ib*. The bark or rind of trees

upon which men anciently wrote, for the want of paper, happens, when analysed, to have a similar meaning; and it was also, in the beginning, only a single B. Had trees never existed, what meaning might the word book have received in all languages? The meaning it has at present; that is, "the first life;" and hence we cannot, with any degree of certainty, say, that a book is named after the substance upon which men anciently wrote. Children, though they are well aware that their first book is made of *paper*, never call it *paper*, but they do frequently call it their A B C, because these first letters, which they have occasion to repeat so often, attract their notice much more than the thing upon which they are impressed. The learned fancied they had made a great discovery when they had remarked that *bec* or *bece*, which, it appears, is the name of a beech tree in Saxon, must have given its name to a book; but in A B C, we have also *bec*, since *e*, *i*, or *o* is understood before *c*, so that if we allow the *a* to have been dropped, *b c* can become, *bec*, *bic*, *boc*, or even *buc;* for here the *e* is equal to ε, and consequently to *o* or *u* short, epsilon being used for both, as we have often seen. Thus A B C is, when analysed, *ea ib ic*, and this is the same as *ea iv ic*, which can, by contraction, easily become *avic* or *avec*, or *ea vic*, literally, "the first life;" for *vic*, as has been shown in the analysis of *victoire* and *victime*, was an ancient word for *life*, it having first been *ic vi* (first life, or the life). But the two first letters of the alphabet (A B) have a similar meaning,

since *beta* or *be* is, as we have seen, for "existence" or "life;" and if here also we allow the *a* to have been dropped, we shall have *b*, which is the same as *ib;* and this again is the same as *iv*, or "first life." Hence the Latin word *liber*, which means "a book," or "the rind of a tree," must have first been *il-ib*, that is, "the first life," or "first thing;" but as *ab* may have become *ib* by contraction, we cannot say that the Latin word for a book is named after the rind of a tree, and not after the two first letters of the alphabet. When these two words, *il-ib*, fell together, and became *lib* (which is the same as *liv* or *life*), they took *er* as an article before them, thus, *er lib* (the life), and it fell afterwards behind, and so *er lib* became *liber* or *liver*, in French, *livre*. But why did men in the beginning give this meaning to the bark of a tree? From their having remarked that when a tree was deprived of its bark, it declined and died, and so they concluded that its bark was its life. But what difference is there in English between the bark of a dog and the bark of a tree? There is none whatever, nor can there be in any language any other difference between these words than that of form. For to *bark*, to be alive, to guard, to be aware, or to watch, have all, in their analysed forms, the same meaning, and do radically make but one word. There is another word in English for *bark*, which is *bay;* but this was first *ea ib*, and when this *ea* fell behind *ib*, the whole word became *ba*, and then from *e* being added thus, *ba e* (that is, *ba est*), and from

its being replaced by *y* *, and from both having then fallen together, the *bay* has been formed. Had this word taken afterwards the article *ea* before it, thus, *ea-bay* (the bark), it would be another form of *e-oi-boi-e*, which is equal to *ab-oie*, and this in French means *bark*, its form in the infinitive being *aboyer*, that is, *er aboye* (the bark); nor does this latter form differ from the substantive *aboyement* in meaning, since here *ment* is for *it iven*, (the thing, or the being,) which has been already accounted for. When *bark* was yet only *bar*, it did not differ from *beware*, as we may discover by analysing it thus, *be-oir*, and by giving to *oi* its ancient sound of *wa*, since both words then literally are *be-war*, and this also means *the war*, that is, "double life or motion," as has been shown in the account given of *war*. When *bark* had this form of *bar*, it also meant "the being above;" for this is synonymous with "the first life:" it is to be then analysed thus, *be-oer* (the being over), and this word *oer* is to be analysed thus, *ovr*, because *e* is equal to *ε*, and consequently to *u* or *v* short; so that when in *ovr* we put before *r* the *e*, to which it is as a consonant entitled, this word becomes *over*. As bark covers the tree, this meaning of "thing over" is

* We can conceive why the *e* should be replaced by *y*, from remarking that it is equal to *ε* or to *u*—which is equal to *iv*, as *i* is understood before *u* or *v*—and that *iv* becomes *y* by the *i* being put under the v thus, ʏ, as we have already seen. Hence it is that in one language we may have *y* in words which in other languages have an *e*. Thus *beauté*, *bonté*, &c., which are for *beau-it-e*, and *bon-it-e*, (fine it is, good it is,) end in English with *y* and in French with *e*.

also very applicable. Hence this word in French is *écorce*, and means not only, when analysed, "the first life," but also, "the being," or "thing over." How evident this becomes, by the analysis of the word *cover* itself, which makes *ic-over*, "the first above," or "the first over." The Greek work for a book, which is βιβλος, was also, like the Latin word *liber*, only *il ib* (the first life), and these two words became, from the *il* having fallen behind, *ibl*, which is equal to "evil;" from which we discover that *evil* had not, any more than *devil*, always a bad meaning, and for this we shall know the reason farther on. The word *ibl* took then *ib* (the) as an article before it, and then *biblos* was only *bible*, of which the meaning still was "the first life." Here I have discovered unawares the origin of the name of the book which contains the sacred writings; the *os* it has now behind it in Greek is only an article, and before it held this place it must have gone first. From these observations it is evident that the first word for book was, in these several languages, only *ib*, which is the same as B, and as this letter is equal to IO or IV, it is evident that it means "first life," and that the literal meaning of A B is "the first life," or "the first book," or still, "this first book." The *a* serving here as an article to *ib*, is consequently equal to the Latin pronoun *ea*, of which it is a contraction.

The two letters which follow A B are C D, and these mean *is had*, but literally, *is God;* and this we can more easily understand by remarking, that

the latter word is the same as *Got*—the German word for the Divinity—because it is from HIM we get all things. Thus the English word *have* must have first been *ea-ib* (the first life); and these two words, which are no other than A B, must have become *ab* (which is the same as *av*) by contraction. As to the H, which has been made to precede *ab* or *av*, it stands here as an article, and is to be analysed by *iv*, which means also "the first life," or simply, as in the present instance, *the*. Hence the word *hab* or *hav*, for they are equal, is like *Got*, another name for the Divinity.

The reader can also easily conceive how *id* is the same as *had*, by his remembering the account I have given of the verbal termination *ed*, as in *loved*, *ruined*, &c., since I have proved it to be for *had*, and we know that if this termination was *id*, or even *od*, *ud*, or *yd*, instead of *id*, it would be still the same, and hence it is that the ancient Saxons gave it, as Dr. Hicks remarks, these different forms.

But how is the letter C for *is?* It is in the analysis *ic*, and this is, we know, the same as the pronoun I, which is still the same as *Io*, and consequently as *is*, since *o* is equal to S. Hence it is that C, from its being also equal to this letter, bears its sound, and is frequently used in its stead. If the Greek language has no C, its place is filled by K and S; and it is for this reason that we should, in the analysis of words, consider it in this double capacity. Hence, in the present instance,

it is very correct to say that *c* is as we hear it at the close of the English word *caprice*, which, analysed, becomes *caper-is*, or *caper-ic*, for the one is as correct as the other; or that it is as the *c* in *malice*, which is also for *mal-is*, or *mal-ic*. As this word *caper* is the radical part of the Latin for "goat," (which is *capra*, and becomes *caper-ea*, "the goat," when analysed,) we see what first gave the idea of *caprice*, as also of *capering*. We see, also, that *malice* is the same as *is mal*, or *ce mal*, that is, "the harm," "the evil;" and we have by this means a clearer notion of it than before. We should also remark, that the *is* or *ic*, at the end of *caper-is* or *caper-ic*, should, as in *mal*, precede this word, and serve as the article *the*. The word *caper* itself is, when analysed, *ic-oip-er*, or *er-ic-oip*, and it means "the thing high up," the goat being an animal of the hills. Thus also we see, that this word in English becomes, when analysed, *ig-o-oit*, and means "the first one above;" that is, "the one highest up," and thus must it be in all the languages in the world. But what is the primitive meaning of the radical part of *mal*ice, that is, of *mal?* This makes, when analysed, *iv-al*, and means, when *al* precedes *iv*, "all life;" from which we discover that this word is the same as *evil*, and that it had not, in the beginning, a bad meaning, but, on the contrary, a very good one, since it was a name for the Divinity. We shall soon see, as I have already remarked, why this word is no longer the same. Thus we discover that the four first letters of

the English alphabet mean, "this first book is had" (*ea ib ic id*).

The next two letters are E F; and when these fall together, thus, *ef*, we know that they are equal to *of*, as the *e* is then epsilon, that is, ε, of which the two parts co form *o*. Then A B C D E F mean, "this first book is had of" (*ea ib ic id ef*).

The next two letters are G H; and these, analysed, make *ig iu*, or *ig eu*; for H is the same as *iu*, *eu*, *iv*, or *ev*, as we have already often seen. If we consider *ig* and *iu* separately, each is a name for the Divinity; and if we make one word of the two, that is, if we consider the first as an article to the second, they will signify "the Divinity;" and in this case the meaning of the first eight letters will be, "this first book is had of the first life," that is, "of the Divinity;" but as the letter which follows H, namely, I or J, is another word for *iu*, or "the Divinity," since it cannot otherwise make sense, and as this would, from its being a repetition of the same word, form a plural number, and imply, "this first book is had of the gods," we are, before accepting this interpretation, to see if *ig iu* cannot bear a different meaning. We have already often seen that *iu* or *iv* is equal to *w*, since these two, when thus joined, *iw*, produce a *w*. We can, moreover, remark how just it is that these two letters should be equal to *vv*, since the I, as well as *u* or *v*, means "life."

Hence the two words *ig iu* are evidently equal to *ig* and *w*, which, from the dropping of the *i* in

ig, become *gw*, and—with the vowel to which consonants are entitled—*gew*. When to this word we add the next letter (*i*), it will be *gew-i*, that is, *gew one*, which is for *gew gew*, the *i* being here to signify the plural number, and hinder, like a pronoun, the repetition of *gew*. Of this truth we can be the more fully convinced by adopting, as we are free to do, the *j*, instead of *i*, since we know that this letter is equal to *is*, and consequently to *es*, which, as has been fully shown, is the original of the plural sign (*s*) in English. Then the letters G W J give *gewes*, or, which is the same, *gewis*, either of which words becomes, by the dropping of the vowel before *s*, *gews*.

Thus we have seen, when accounting for the letters of the Greek alphabet, that C and G are the same; and as we have since seen that C is equal to *is*, which we know to be the same as J, it follows that G and J, as they are equal to a third thing, must be also equal to one another. Hence the ancient pronoun *ig*, and the present French pronoun *je*, make but one word, nor does *ie* differ from either of these. The same may be also remarked with regard to *y*, since this letter has been also shown to be the same as gamma. Thus Chaucer writes *jemme* instead of *gem;* and *yeoman* was also in ancient times *jeman*, in which we have, moreover, an instance of *e* or *ε* being for *o*; for the *o* which we see in *yeoman* is put here as the definition of *e*; that is, it shows *e* to be in this instance for *o*.

We now write this word with a *j* instead of a *g*, yet both are equally correct. But *gw* might as well be *gm*, and this would give us *gem* instead of *gew*, since *m* and *w* are often used for one another; from which we must be led to suppose that these two words make but one. The truth of this opinion is at once confirmed by an examination of the same word in other languages; and from this it would appear that Jews did, in the most ancient times, deal in precious stones, since a *gem* is named after them. Hence the English word *jewel* is no other than *jew-el*, which must have first been *el Jew*, "the Jew," that is, "the thing Jew." The French word *bijou* is also for *bi-jou*, that is, "be Jew," "thing Jew." That this word *jou*, in French, is the same as *Jew* or *gew*, in English, there can be no doubt. Thus in the English word *gewgaw* and the French word *joujou*, which are alike in meaning, we have *gew* in the one corresponding with *jou* in the other, so that they are evidently the same word. And do we not also discover, from the second part of *gewgaw*, that this word *jou*, which is the second part of *joujou*, must be equal to *gaw*, which goes to prove that the latter must be also for *Jew?* so that the literal meaning of this word is, "gem-gem," or "Jew-Jew."

This word *gaw* becomes, when analysed, *ig-oi-w*, and this is evidently for *ig-oi-iv*, which, by coalition, becomes *igoiiv*, and this when the *i* is dropped, and that we use *j* for *g*, becomes *joiiv;* and as *oi* is equal to *ii*, this again becomes *juiv;* and as *v* is

used frequently for *f*, this word is still equal to *Juif*, in which we have the French word for *Jew*. Here too we discover that *joi* (joy) is equal to *Jew*, for in *Juif* the *if* is no part of the real word for *Jew*, this being *ju*, and of which we shall see the meaning presently. That *joi* or *joy* is another word for *Jew* we may be convinced from examining the other French word *joyau*, which is the French for "jewel," since this means, *au joy*, that is, *au Juif*, "to the Jew," "a thing belonging to a Jew." But if *jou* be the same as *Jew*, the French word for *play* must be also synonymous with *Jew*, since *jouer*, "to play," is for *er jou*, "the play;" and hence we discover that *joy* and *play* are also synonymous, and of which there can be no doubt, since "to play" is "to be joyous." The other French word for *play* (*jeu*) is still the same as *jou*, since here the *e* is no other than *epsilon* (ε), which is, we know, for *o*. Here too we should remark, that as *gaw* in *gew-gaw* is the same as *Jew*, and as *gau* in the English word *gaudy* is evidently the same word—for there is no difference between *gaudy* and *gawdy*—it follows that a *gem* gave first the idea we have in *gaudy*, which, analysed, becomes *gau-id-e*, meaning, "gaw it is," that is, "gem it is."

Thus when we know the meaning of *Jew* we shall know that of *joy* and *play* also. The Latin word for "jewel," *cimelium*, is, literally, "the thing jewel," for the *ium* at the end is for *iv-en*, and it means, "the being" or "the thing," as we have often seen already; and as *cim-el* is equal to *jim-el*, it is con-

sequently equal to *jew-el*, since *m* and *w* are the same letter. The Greek word corresponding with *cimelium* is κειμηλιον, and it is easy to see that they make but one word. Here we must remember that *k* is composed of *ic* (ⲕ), so that when the *i* is dropped we have only *c*; and as ι and μ in Greek are equal when put together to the Roman *m*, we perceive that the four first letters κειμ are, letter for letter, *cem*, which is the same as *jem*, and consequently as *Jew;* as to the remaining part of this Greek word, it is the same as *elium* in the Latin word, since *ion* is equal to *ivn*, from the *o* being the same as *v*, and from *ivn* becoming *iven* (even) when *n* takes its vowel before it.

Having thus seen that the three letters G H I, or G H J, mean "Jews," this interpretation is to be preferred to *gods*, since it is evident from the other circumstances which attend it as so many proofs, that such is the meaning attached to these letters. Though it be foreign to the present question to account for the word *Jew*, that is, to tell what meaning it has in itself, still as it is one of great importance, I wish to make some inquiry respecting it. The English and French forms of this word are far more ancient than those of the Greek and Latin tongues. *Jew*, which is in English pronounced as if written *djew*, is to be thus analysed, *id-is-iv*. Here each word is a name for the *Divinity;* and the two first united have also, since they are equal to *Dis* or *Dio*, a similar meaning. But as the period when letters were thus classed

must be of the greatest antiquity, we are to consider words as being then in their very infancy, compared to what they are now. Hence though *Dis* and *Dio* are far more ancient than *Dios* or *Deus*, they are, however, modern forms beside *id*, which we are therefore to consider as perfectly significant by itself. The two words *is iv* which follow *id* in the above analysis may be rendered many ways, but I cannot discover how the meaning can be changed, while we consider *id* as meaning "God." We may render *is* by *be* and *iv* by *in*, or, which is the same, by *on*, and these two will make *beon*, which is the same as *being*. In this case *id is iv* will mean, "God being," which must be for "the being to God;" so that *Jew* will, by this interpretation, mean, "the being to God," which is also the same as "the one to God;" for *be-on*, that is, *be-one*, does not differ in the least from "the one." Now every body will remark, that "the one to God" must be equal to "the son to God;" nor does this contradict in any manner "the being to God." In order to find this meaning it is not, I now discover, necessary to make even the word *is* change its form, since when we allow *iv* to be, as it is, equal to "one," the three words *id is one* will produce *idi-son;* in which case *idi* is a real genitive, and means, "of God," literally, "God one," that is, "one thing to God," to which when we add *son*, it will be as if we were to say, "one thing to God (namely) son." This meaning may be found even thus, *id's one*, in which also we have a genitive; so that here the

meaning is, "God's one," or "God's own." But if we allow *iv* in the analysis *id is iv* to be *in* instead of *on* or *one*, we shall, by allowing *is* to join with it, have *idi-sin*, which makes "God's sin;" and in this case *Jew* appears to have a very bad and ridiculous meaning, since the Divinity cannot own sin. But as I have already remarked that such words as *devil*, *evil*, and *mal*, were not at all understood in the beginning of the world as they are now, it is reasonable to suppose that *sin* had not, any more than these words, its present signification. . From this observation, and several others of a similar nature already made, the reader may begin in this place to anticipate something very extraordinary, since he must remember I have promised to show how it was that such words as those given above had not always their present bad meaning. And as when this promise was made I did not say they were replaced by any other words of a contrary import, and as even now I assert no substitution of this kind could have ever occurred, he must from this be led to infer that my discovery goes even so far back as the happy days when men from their being wholly ignorant of sin could not tell what it meant, and had, consequently, no such word. But of this I do not wish for the present to speak more positively, and so I allow the reader to form his own conjectures, and anticipate what he pleases.

Now when we allow *sin* to have had in the beginning no bad meaning, the above analysis (*id is iv*) may be rendered by *id is in*, as I have stated,

and of which the meaning is, "God's son," or "being;" so that the word *Jews* does really mean "God's children."

The learned may here tell me that the Jews are named as they are from their having inhabited a country named Judea; yet it is not so: but this country is so called from its having been inhabited by the Jews; so that instead of having taken their name from this country, they have, on the contrary, given it theirs. *Judea* makes, when analysed, *Ju-id-ea;* and here *Ju* is for *Jew*, and *id ea* means the "head," or "chief land," just as it also means the "head," or "chief thing;" for *ea*, as we have already seen, means "land;" and it also means "thing," or "it;" and hence, in Latin, it is a pronoun. Hence Judea is literally "Jew the land," that is, "to Jew the land," "belonging to Jew the land." We may also say that *id ea* is equal to *id est;* but this construction, which is also very correct, will not differ in the least from the one given above, since it will be, literally, "Jew it is;" that is, "to Jew it is." We may even render *id ea* by *of it* with great propriety, for *of* is, as has been shown in the account given of alpha, equal in meaning to *id* or *de*. And as *Judea* will, in this case, be *Jew of it*, the meaning is, "of it the Jew;" that is, "it is the land of which the Jew is." The French of *Judea*, which is *Judée*, is a very ancient form, and it is to be thus analysed, *Ju-id-e*, that is, *Jew it is*, meaning, "to the Jew it is." But if a Jew means "God's son," how, it may be asked, are

we to explain the sacred name of the Redeemer of mankind, Jesus? It has precisely the same meaning in Greek, Latin, French, and English; and, startling as it may appear, to all except one people, it is, literally, "the Jew." Its radical part, which is *Jes*, is to be thus analysed, *id-is-os*. Here the two words *id is* are the same explained above in the analysis, *id-is-iv*; and they, consequently, mean, as a genitive, "God of." The word *os*, by which they are followed, has been already referred to a great many times, and we know that it signifies "the sun," "the Divinity," and also "THE ONE." Hence *id-is-os* is, literally, "God's one," or "of God one;" and as *one* does not differ in meaning from *son*, *id is os* makes also "God's son." We have already seen that *dies*, the "day," is no other than *dios*, as *e* is equal to *o*, long or short, just as it may happen itself to be long or short; and as the *s* in *dies* is, from its being composed of these two parts c c, equal to *u*, hence *dies* is also *Dieu*, the French of God; so that between *dies*, *dios*, and *Dieu*, there is not the least difference. But why do I make this remark? For this reason: to show that the *es* in *dies* is the *os* in *dios*, and also the *eu* in di*eu*; and that, consequently, the analysed form of *jes*, that is, *id-is-os*, may, like *dies*, be made to be *id-is-es*, *id-is-os* and *id-is-eu*; and hence we discover that in *id-is-os* we have the word *jeu*, for the two words *id is* are the analysis of *j*, (that is, *dj*,) which, by the addition of *eu*, makes *jeu*. Even the English word *Jew* is very visible in *jes*; for when we

set down the two parts of the *s* in *jes*, thus, ω, and make this character take the place of the *s* in this word, we have, instead of of *jes*, *Jew*. But the *us* at the end of the name Jes*us?* I have already frequently referred to this ending, and have shown that it is in this situation to be ever rendered by the English word *the*, it having in the beginning preceded the words at the end of which we now find it. Hence *Jesus* is literally *the Jew*. But what difference is there between *Jesus* and *Saviour?* There is none whatever. Thus the radical part of *saviour* is *sav*, and this word, analysed, makes *io-oin*, that is, "God one," "one to God," "God's son," which is the same as *jes*. How evident this can still become by remarking that *io* is the same as *is*, and, consequently, as *j*, since *j* is nothing more than *is*; and that as the *n* in *oin* is equal to the two parts of an *s*, this word is the same as *ois*, and that this again is, by contraction, *os*, and consequently *es*, so that there is not in any way whatever the least difference between the radical parts of JEsus and SAviour. The ending of the latter word is to be analysed thus, *io-iv-er*, which still means, "God the being;" for *iv-er* or *ev-er* is another form of *it er* or *être*, so that it means not only "a being," but "eternity." From this we discover that these two parts of the name *Saviour* (*sav* and *iour*) are in exact apposition to each other, and have precisely the same meaning, so that the one part of this word is only an explanation or definition of the other. The same may be said of the two parts of *Jesus*

(*jes* and *us*), since the latter part is, when analysed, *iv-is*, where *iv* is here for God, and *is* for *os* or *one*, the *i* and *o* being equal, as has been clearly proved. We may even, to render this still more clear, say that here the word *is* equals *in*, since the two parts of an *s* are the same as *u* or *n*, in which case *iv is* becomes *iv in*, "God one," that is, "one to God," or "God's son." But is not this word *iv-en*, when taken altogether, a name for the Divinity? We have many times seen that it is. And is not the *iv* in this word also equal to *in*, that is, to "one?" It is. Then *iv-en*, or *iv-in* means "one one?" It does. Now what are we to infer from all this? That there is no difference whatever between God and his Son, since each is named *one*, and means "one;" from which we are to conclude that both make but *one* and the same being, as no two things can be precisely equal; and this we see confirmed by the name *even*, which, though it means, as we have just seen, both God and his Son, is also equal to only one of them, since it names the Divinity. This, too, becomes more evident by our analysing the English word *sun* thus, *is-un*. Here, as the word *is* equals *io* (God), and as *un* means "one," this word *sun* does not differ in the least from *jes* in Jesus, and it does, consequently, mean, "God's son," or "God himself." And as here the word *un* is the same as *vn*, and as these two letters (*vn*) become, with their vowels before them, *iv-in*, or *even* (the well-known name for the Divinity), we see that each of the two analysed parts of *sun* (*io-un*) is a

name for the Divinity. Hence it is that in English the words *sun* and *son* are but one and the same word, each meaning "one;" and in every other language the word for *son* will be found to have a similar meaning. Thus υιος is, when analysed, *iv-iv-os*, which, when *os* takes its primitive place, means "the one one," that is, "the one to one," "God to God," in other words, "God's son." *Filius* makes *us-iv-il-i*, and here *iv-il* is no other than the present English word *evil*, of which the primitive order was *il iv*, which is the same as *liv* or *lif*, that is, *live* and *life*, and it was, consequently, a name for the Divinity. Hence *fil-i* means "God's one," that is, "God's son," and the *us* at the end of *filius* is only the article. The French word *fils* is still the same, since, analysed, it is *ivil-is*, or *evil-io*, in which *io* is for *one*, or the Divinity, and consequently for *son*, and *ivil* is as before. Hence men looked upon a son in the *beginning* of the world (if I may say so, for its name implies that it had no beginning) as God's own Son. From thus perceiving that the sun was considered as the symbol of not only the Divinity, but also of his *Son*, or *One*, I have been led to discover that the figure of the sun can contain a word bearing this double meaning, as we may thus see . Here we have EIS, the Greek word for ONE; and, as it is equal to *ois*, which, by the dropping of the *i* becomes *os*, we still see that it is in every way both the SUN and ONE. The word in this figure con-

tains another important meaning, to which I shall refer farther on.

The six next letters of the alphabet may be taken altogether: they are K L M N O P, and make *ik il im in op*, meaning, literally, "it the mind opens," that is, "it opens the mind." Here the two first words *ik* and *il* need no observation, as they have been already frequently accounted for. They are still to be found together in old English writers, with this difference, that *il* precedes *ik*. Thus Spenser uses *ilk* in the sense of "the same," or "the which," and this is no other than the contraction of *il ik*. I have already shown that *k* is only *i* and *c* added together, thus, k; and hence Chaucer writes *iliche* for *ilike*, both of which mean "the like," "the same," "the which," or still, "the each." As to the *he* at the end of *il iche*, it is for *iv*, or *thing*; so that the three parts of *il-ic-he* literally mean, "the like thing." Nor need I remind the reader that it was the one half of the O, which, from its being very like the other half, that first gave men this word *ic*, now written *like*, for this, also, has been already sufficiently shown. The Latin word for *mind*, which is now *mens*, must, before it had this form, have been *is men*, "the mind," and it was from this *is* having fallen behind *men*, that the latter has become *mens*. As the *m* in *men* is composed of *i* and *u*, or three ones, this word must, in the beginning, have been *iuen*, that is, *iv-en*, or *even*, the name for the Divinity, so often referred to; and this *iv-en* is, we now know, equal to *one*, *one*,

which we may understand by "God one," that is, "to God one," in which each word is still a name for the Divinity, though both together have not a different meaning. This account of *men* throws an additional light upon the English word *man*, already explained. We see that it is also equal to *even*, as each of its two parts (*iv-an*) means "one;" so that we clearly see how, in its meaning of "one to Eve" is also to be found "one to God." In order to make this word have a plural signification, the *a* has been replaced by *e*, which is the same as the *u*, or the sign that indicates *life*, and this is double. But we should remark, that though *u* is visibly composed of *one* and *one* — that is, of *two* things — they make, after all, but *one*, since each part is equal to half of the O, and that the O itself is altogether only *one*. But is not each part of *u* equal to *o*? it is; and hence both parts are equal to *oo*, or *one one:* but here still the *oo* is to be considered as making only *one*, and which may be named the *double one*, just as it really is in the words *duo* (*id-u-o*), and *two* (*it-w-o*).

It may be asked, if this account of *mens* does not contradict the analysis already given of the English word *mind* (*im-i-in-id*), "the eye in the head?" But I cannot say that it does, though my knowledge of analysing has, since the above analysis was given, greatly improved.

If we analyse *mind* thus, *iven-id*, the meaning is, "one (to) God," or "one (to) head," for it is evident from the analysis (already given) of *un* (one)

that there is no difference between it and *even*, and that the latter word must consequently mean *one;* and as the word *eye* means also *one*, it follows that by *one to the head*, may be very well meant, "the eye to the head." When we analyse *mind* thus, *iv-in-id*, the meaning is, "life in head," but here by *life* may be still meant *eye*, since these two words are synonymous, as we have already seen. As Delta (Δ) is composed of these two parts, I and Λ, and as these are equal to IV, which is also equal to *in* or *one*, it follows that the entire word *mind* can be shown to be equal to *in-in-in*, that is, "one, one, one," in which we have *three*, and altogether but *one*. When the English *d* is made thus, D, we see that it is still the same as IU, and, consequently, as *one;* and when it is made thus, d, we have still the same meaning, since this form is composed of *oii*, which is equal to *ou* or *on*, that is, to *one*, the three parts *o-i-i* of *d* having fallen together thus oi, so that it literally means, "the head one," just as the T does. I have, I am aware, already accounted for the characters Δ, D, and *d* but as the notice taken of them here must, in some way, add to the reader's previous knowledge of them, this repetition cannot be called a useless one.

The two letters following M N, that is O P, compose, when added together, the radical part of the English word *open*, which must have first been *en op* (the opening). We have even still in poetry *ope* instead of *open*, and this is no other than *op*.

As *op* is, when analysed, *o-ip*, and as this means, "*o* above," and also "*o in*," that is, "one in the *o*," or half the O, (which is indicated by the character Φ, since we have here the figure I in the O,) it is clear that the space over our heads, that which the divine Spenser so happily names "heaven's wide hollowness," is meant by *op*, than which nothing can be more open.

Hence we discover that *open* and *over* have radically the same meaning, and this is, we find, fully confirmed by the analysis of *over*, which is no other than *op-er*, as the *p* and *v* are frequently used for one another, which has been clearly proved in the account given of the former letter. And as *o* is equal to *u*, hence *oper* is for *up-er*, now written *upper*, so that *er* at the end of this word must have first preceded *op*, just as *en* in *open* has done. This, too, accounts for the great similarity between the French word for *open* (*ouvert*) and the English word *over;* but when analysed, both these words become one. The former makes *ou-iv-er-it*, and as *ou* is here equal to *of* or *ov*, or still *o-ip*, it consequently means, "one in the *o*," that is, "half the *o*," indicated in Greek by Φ. As the two words *iv-er* are equal to *ip-er* or *ov-er*, hence the three words *ou-iv-er* mean, "the one thing *over*," and as the *it* with which this analysis ends means *head*, as we have often seen, hence the four words *ou-iv-er-it* are, literally, "the one over head."*

* We may here remark that *iv-er* or *ever* is, though meaning eternity, equal to *over*, but this we can easily conceive, when we

As the English word *over* may be thus analysed, *ov-vr*—the *e* here preceding the *r* being equal to *v*, —and as *vr* becomes with vowels *iv-ir*, it is evident that *ov-vr* is the same as *ov-iv-ir*, and this, as *v* is for *u*, is equal to *ou-iv-ir*, which still means, "the one thing over," so that *over* does not differ from *ouvert*, but by its not having the word *head* added to it. The Latin word for open, *apertus*, confirms the above accounts of *open*, *over*, *upper*, and *ouvert*. It should be analysed thus, *o-ip-vr-it-us;* here, as already shown, *o-ip* is for *o-in*, that is, "one in the *o*," "half the *o*;" and these two words may hence appear under these forms, *of*, *if*, *op*, *up*, *ov*, *ou*, *oph*, since the *p* is used for *f*, *v*, or *u*, and the *ph* for *f*, and that *o* is equal to *u*. Then as *vr* is here equal to *iv-ir* or *ev-er*, it follows that *o-ip-vr* is the same as *ou-ever*, which, by contraction, becomes *ouver* or *over;* and when to this is added the word for *head*, namely, *it*, which follows *aper*, we have, as in *ouvert*, "the one thing over head," so that *apert* and *ouvert* make but one word. As to the *us* with which *apertus* ends, it is to go first as an article, and then the meaning will be, "the one thing over head" (*us-o-ip-iv-er-it*). All this is rendered still more evident by our remarking that we have in English

observe that *ov* is the same as *one*, a name for the Divinity; and that as *e* in *ev* is another form of the *o*, since it is *epsilon*, there cannot consequently, be any difference between *ev* and *ov*. It is almost needless to add, that as *o* means *one*, *ov* must, consequently, mean *one life*, and that if we write *iv* instead of *ev* or *ov* the meaning must be still the same. As the *er* in these words means *being*, it cannot be wondered at that, as *the one being* means God, the word which offers this meaning should also mean eternity.

the word *overt*, that is, *over-it*, in the sense of *opening;* and as nothing can be more clear than that in this word *overt* we have the word *over*, there can be no doubt but *over* and *ouvert* are synonymous, and that the great space above us first gave men the idea of what is *open*. When the Latin word *apertus* was yet only *o-ip* (for it was by the falling together of these three letters that *ap* was made), it differed only from the English word *ope* by its having preserved the *i*, which has been dropped in the latter. By this we see that *open* and *apertus* are radically the same, since both were in the beginning *o-ip*.

Hence though *ik il im en op* means, "it opens the mind," we may, when considering the primitive signification of *op*, say that the above words are, literally, "it the mind," "the one over head;" that is, *the mind* becomes *the one over head;* meaning by this, "the open space above," that is, "the heavens."

Of what a number of grand images men must have been deprived when they first lost the meaning of their words!

The next six letters of the alphabet are Q R S T U or V W, of which the meaning is, "and it is good breeding;" in the old language of the time this being, *eque er is thew*.

I have already* accounted for the letter *q*, and have shown how, from its being composed of a *c* and the two ones, or double *i*, of a *u* joined to the

* See vol. ii. p. 61.

c thus, c|, it is ever followed by a *u*, which is done for the sake of explanation; that is, in order to let us see that the *c* is in this instance equal to *cu*. Hence had not some persons, when joining *i* and *i* with *c*, placed them thus, c|, and so allowed these letters to meet and form *q*, but had they always placed the *i* and *i* thus, *cii*, we should have never had this character *q*, and such a word as *question* would be now written *cuestion*, which would cause no change whatever in the pronunciation; and this clearly shows that a *q* is equal to a *c* and a *u* connected. For the other form of this letter, see the page referred to above.

The *eque*, in the words *eque er is thew*, is equal in meaning to the Latin word *que* (and), from which it only differs by the vowel that precedes the *q* having been lost. This word *eque* is also the same as the old English word *eke* (and), which might as well be written *eque*. The two words *er is* have been already too often accounted for to need here any further observation.

The letters that produce *thew* are *tuw* or *tvw*. These characters may in some language with which I am not acquainted be intelligible, and have, as they here stand, the exact meaning of *thew;* but as I can discover no sense in them under this form, not even when they are made to take the usual vowels to which consonants are entitled, it is necessary to change one of them for some other letter which we know it is often made to replace. When the *u* or the *v* is changed

for an *h*, the three letters *tuw* or *tvw* become *thw*, and this again, when the *w* takes its vowel before it, becomes *thew*, an English word of great antiquity, and by which is here meant "good breeding," though, when analysed—as it then makes *the-iu* or *the-iv*—its literal meaning is, "the life." But *life* and *good breeding* are often used indifferently. Thus *to know life*, is "to be well bred;" and in French *savoir vivre* and *good breeding* are synonymous.

Spenser, whose authority in the use of old words stands so very high, employs *thew*, or rather its plural *thewes*, in the sense to which I here allude:—

> "All so soon as life did me admit
> Into this world, and shewed heaven's light,
> From mother's pap I taken was unfitt,
> And streight delivered to a faery knight,
> To be up brought in gentle *thewes* and martiall might."*

Here by *gentle thewes* is evidently meant, "gentle manners," or "good breeding."

We have now but three letters remaining to complete our analysis of the alphabet. These are X Y Z, which are named *eks*, *wy*, *zed*. *Eks* analysed becomes *ek is*, which means, "and is" (eke is); this *ek* or *eke* being the same that has been referred to in the analysis of the *q r*. When the *wy* is joined to *zed*, both words make *wyzed*, which we shall find, however we examine it, to imply "wisdom." If we consider *ed* as being for *had*, which is very correct, since in "lov*ed*," "ruin*ed*," and all

* Faery Queene, b. i. canto ix. st. iii.

such endings, it is for this word, we shall have *wys had*, which means, "knowledge had," that is, "knowledge possessed;" for *wys* is the same as *wis*, "to know;" and *know* (since verbs are no other than substantives) must be the same as "knowledge." The word *wisdom*, when analysed, is precisely the same as "knowledge had," or "knowledge possessed, as we may thus see: *wis-ed-om*, that is, "knowledge *had of;*" for as the letter *m* is the same as *u* or *v*, the *om* becomes *ov*, which is the same as *of*. As to the *ed* in *wis-ed-om*, it is the same as the *ed* in *wys-ed;* and *by knowledge had of* is meant, "had of knowledge," "possessed of knowledge."

If we take *ed* in *wysed* for *head*, the meaning will be still the same; for between saying of a man, "he has *a wise head*," and "he has *wisdom*," there is no difference. This view of *wysed* would be also very correct, for the reason that it would show wisdom to be the head of knowledge. Now as *wysed* is composed of three words (*wy is ed*), we may, by considering *ed* as *head*, write these words thus, *wy's head;* and when we know that *wy* is for the single letter *y*, this will mean, "the head belonging to *y*," and this view of *wysed* is also very correct. But for what does *y* stand, the reader will ask, that it should be taken for the owner of wisdom? It is, as we have already seen, another name for the Deity, it being the same as the Greek character γ, which has been shown in the account given of this letter, to have a similar meaning.

Hence the word *wy* is composed thus, *iv iv;* the first *iv* making, when joined thus, *iv*, a *w*; and the second *iv* making, when joined thus I, the letter Y; and as IV is a name for the Divinity, we are to consider the first *iv* in *iv iv*, as an article to the other, and we are consequently to take a similar view of the *w* in *wy*, so that in this word the one letter is a definition of the other, and the entire word means God.

An analysis of the words for *wisdom* in Greek, Latin, and French, will not, as to meaning, differ in the least from the one given of the same word in English. Thus σοφια makes *is-o-ip-ia;* but here *is-o* equals *ip-ia*, and is a definition of these two words. Thus *is-o* means, "God one," that is, "one to God;" and *ip-ia*, which is the same as *iv-ia*, means also, "God the one," that is, "the one to God." Hence this word *sophia* was in the beginning only *so*, the contraction of *is-o*, of which the most simple form is *io-o: so* still remains with the Italians; for *io so* (I know) is nothing more than *I knowledge;* and when we give to the *e* in the Spanish word *se* (in *yo se*) its form of *o*, we perceive that the Spaniards have also preserved the primitive form of *sophia*, since *se* and *so* make but one word. The English word *know* is also composed of two parts, the one being a definition of the other. Thus, the two first letters *k n* are for *ik in* or *ik en*, and the meaning is, "God one," that is, "to God one," since *ik* is here for the first person *I*, or the Divinity, and *in* or *en*, which might

also be written *on*, means *one*. As *ow* is for *o-iv* (one God), we have still here the same meaning to be found in *ik en*.

By this account of *know*, we are led to discover that even in this word is to be found what nobody could suspect, namely, the old English word *ken*, which was once used for *know*, as "I *ken* that." I have just said that *en* or *in* in *ken* might as well be written *on;* and this observation leads us also to discover that in the two letters *k n* we have, concealed from view, the other English word *con*, for this does not differ from *kon* but by the *i* which preceded the *c*, thus, *i* having been dropped, whilst in *ken*, which is no other than *iken*, it has been preserved. How evident the truth of this statement is made, by referring to the Saxon tongue, in which the substantive *ken* (knowledge, sight) is *cen*, the *i* preceding the *c* having been lost. As this Saxon word *cen* may be analysed thus, *ic-on* (God one), and as this meaning may be even found in the single word *on*, it is clear that the latter must have once served instead of *ic-on;* the word *on* is consequently to be analysed thus, *io-in*, which has precisely the same meaning as *ic-en*, or *ic-on*. From the *i* in *io* having been dropped, *io in* became *oin*, of which we have still the pronunciation in *one;* and from the *i* in *oin* having been dropped, this again became *on;* and it is our present numerical *one*, as it is also the English conjunction *on*, and the French pronoun *on*. But from the *o* in *io* having on some occasions, whilst preceding *in*, fallen behind this

word, instead of *io in* (its contraction), the form *no* must have existed, so that men once said, *I no*, for *I know*. Hence it is that we still pronounce *know* as if written *no*. But this word *no* meant still *God one*, since it was equal to *in o*, in which we have two words each meaning *one*, or the Divinity. The word *knowledge* does not differ in meaning from *no*, in *I no;* and it has increased to this length from other words of equal import having been added to it, the one still serving as an explanation of the other. Thus when it was only *no*, *iv* preceded it, and then fell behind, making *now*, of which the meaning was still, *God one*, or *one one;* and when this word means in English *time present*, it has still the same meaning, *God one*, because HE is all time, and consequently *time present*. As the word *now* took at different times, as articles before it, the words *ik*, *el*, *id*, and *ig;* and thus, as all these, with the exception of *ik*, fell after the usual way behind, the entire word knowledge has been formed. But when *no* existed instead of this long word, it might have taken *el* instead of *iv* as an article before it, so that from *el* going behind, men would have had *Noel*, the French word for *Christmas*, instead of *now*, which must have once existed, and meant *knowledge*. Then what is the literal meaning of *Noel?* It has the same meaning which *no* once had, that is, *God the one*, from which we discover that *Noel* means *God's son;* and *mas* in Christ*mas* has the same meaning, since, when this word is analysed, it makes *in-ois*, in which we have still the

Divinity and *one*. The religious service named the *mass*, no matter how we write it, that is, whether *messe* or *missa*, is still the same word. Hence the word *Christ*, which means, when thus analysed, *ic iv er is it*, "it is the eternal one," means also, I now discover, "the eternal one, the one," that is, "the one to the eternal one;" in other words, "the Almighty's son."

When *kin* means a child, it is not different from *ken*, and this proves that a child, like a *son*, means "one to God." When this word signifies *relation* it is still the same, since a relation is *one* to *one*. When *ken* means sight, it is to be explained by "one one," or the "double one," in which allusion is made to the two eyes; and this analysis is also very correct, since each of the two parts of *ken* (*ik-en*) means *one;* besides that *ic* or *k* indicates what is double, from the *c* being half of the *o;* but though double, it is still only one, since *o* makes only *one*. Hence this word *ken*, when meaning sight, is precisely like the French word *vu*, which, analysed, becomes *iv-ii*, or *in ii*, either of which means "the double one;" and this accounts for what I have already advanced, namely, for a single *I* being equal to *eye* in meaning. The Latin word for *knowledge* began, like the Greek word, with *so*, for *sapientia* makes, when analysed, *so-ip-ien-it-ia*. In this analysis *ip* is the same as *if*, since *p* is used for *f* and *v*; and *ien*, which means *one thing*, might as well be written *ia*, for the reason that *en*, *in*, or *on* means *one*, just as *a* does. Hence

it is evident that *sapien* of *sapientia* is the same as *sophia*, since it cannot be said to differ from *sofia;* then the account given of the Greek word for *knowledge* will apply to *sapien*. As to the concluding part of *sapientia*, that is, *tia*, in the analysis *it ia*, it stands in apposition to *sapien*, and literally means, "God the one;" hence it serves as the definition or explanation of *sapien*.

The French word for *wisdom*, *sagesse*, means, when thus analysed, *esse-sage*, "the being wise;" but *sage* itself, which is the radical part of this word, is composed of *is-o-ig*, in which we still discover *so*, so that in the beginning this word appears to have been in all languages the word for *knowledge*. The *ig* in *is-o-ig* may have gone as an article before *so*, and have afterwards fallen behind; or, if we count the *e* in *sage* as not superfluous, and make, in consequence, the analysis to be *is-o-ig-o*, the *ig-o*, which is equal to *ig-e*, stands in apposition to *is-o*, and serves to define it. *Sage* might be even analysed thus, *is-ea-ig*, "being the first high one;" but no matter how we consider it, the meaning must be ever the same. The French word *savoir* is still, when radically considered, the same as *sophia* and *sapientia*, since, analysed, it is *is-o-iv-o-ir*. Here *is-o-iv* does not differ from the analysis of *soph* or *sap*, and the *o-ir* is still "God being," or "God one," or "the double one," so that, like the endings of the other words, it stands in apposition to *is-o-iv*. The other French word *connaître*, no matter how we write it, as it means "the thing *con*"

(*être con*), is, we see, the same as *ken*, *con*, and *know*, explained above. The Latin word *sagire* does not, when closely considered, differ from *sagesse*, for the reason that *ire* (to go), with which it ends, does not differ from *esse* (to be), with which *sagesse* ends, since *to go* and *to be* have the same meaning. When we consider *sagesse* as being composed of two parts only, *sage-esse* (*sage être*), *wise to be*, any body, one would think, might thus far discover its etymology, for this much at least appears to lie on the very surface; yet lexicographers, from their not having any more than any body else the least knowledge of this divine science, have not even known this much. They suppose that *sagesse* is derived from *sagire*, and they consider both these words as belonging to two different languages; which, if true, will go to prove that the Latin word *esse* and the Latin word *ire* are not two Latin words. For *sagesse* differs from *sagire* just as much as *esse* differs from *ire*, but no more. And *sagesse* is as strictly derived from *sagire* (and not from *sage-esse*) as *esse* (to be) is derived from *ire* (to go), but not more so. Surely it is not extravagant to anticipate that children eight or nine years old will, some short time hence, be able, with a very slight knowledge of this science, to show that *sagesse*, *sagire*, and all words that end so, are composed of two significant parts; such as *sage esse* and *sage ire*.

But why should I wonder at the etymology of so simple a French word as *sagesse* being unknown,

since that of all such infinitives as *connaître*, *naître*, *paraître*, &c. are equally unknown; yet they do not end with a foreign word such as *esse*, but with its literal translation, *être*, the word of all others the most frequently used.

Thus no matter how we consider *wysed*, or the parts of which it is composed, we find that it ever implies wisdom. It is really astonishing how the same letter can be made to have meanings so differ ent; there is in such a happy contrivance something very mysterious and wonderful; and if they were not divine beings (as I am often tempted to believe they were) who have laid the foundation of this science, man's mind must have surely degenerated since the distant times when letters and words were first made; for it is not easy to conceive how human wisdom, even the greatest on record, could have contrived any system for the composing of rational speech so logical and simple as the one which, unknown to ourselves, we have always had.

Thus we have seen that these letters, A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z, give the following words, *ea ib ic id ef guis; ik il im en op eque er is thew, eke is wysed;* of which the meaning is, "This first book is had of the Jews: it opens the mind, and it is good breeding and wisdom."

In which few words we have the history of the alphabet, since we are told whence it comes; and we have also its eulogy, since it is said to open the mind, and be good breeding and wisdom; and, in

this enumeration of the advantages inseparable from an acquaintance with this first book, which is the key to every other knowledge, we read a forcible exhortation, calling upon all men to make letters a study. It were difficult to say more in so short a space.

The inquiry into which I now enter is one of great interest, since by it is shown what men first understood by the ideas *being*, *animal*, *trinity*, *truth*, *eternity*, &c.; and the knowledge by this means acquired, when coupled with that of previous inquiries, allows us to see clearly the fundamental principles of man's first religion.

We have already seen that by the juncture of *an* and *im*, or male and female, and another word, namely, *al*, the entire name *animal* has been made. Here *an* is for the male kind, and *im* for the female; and the analysis of the former is *oin*, which means "one;" and that of the latter is *iv*, which means "double one." Hence the male is signified by *one*, and the female by *two*, both of which numbers when added together make *three*. As the radical part of *animal* is *anim*, we hence see that this word is equal to *three*. Let us now examine the name *Being*. Of this word the radical part is *be;* for *ing*, of which we shall see the analysis farther on, is here synonymous with *thing*, so that *be-ing* or *ing-be* may be fairly rendered by *the thing be*. In the word *Be* we have two letters, and in the beginning their order must have been *eb*, in which word *e* is the Greek epsilon (ε). But each of these letters

stands in apposition to the other, and serves to define the other; so that we might make a proposition of them, thus, "ε is B;" that is, "ε is equal to B." B is, we know, composed of these parts, I3, and ε of these, $\overset{c}{c}$; but when we connect $\overset{c}{c}$ thus, ε, there is a little ı in the middle, by which both these parts ($\overset{c}{c}$) are put together, thus $\overset{c}{\underset{c}{}}$. Hence ε may be analysed thus *io;* by which we see that it is equal to the parts that compose B, since these are also *io.* Then the sole difference between ε and B is one of size, and when we admit the latter to be equal to *one*, the former may be distinguished from it by being called the *little one;* hence B may be represented by IO, and ε by ıo. From thus seeing that in *eb* the one character stands in apposition to the other, we cannot say that the radical part of this word is composed of more than one character, and hence we reduce the word for *being* to a single sign, namely, ε or B, in which, as has just been shown, there are three parts. We have seen in *anim* that the male kind is signified by *one*, and the female kind by *two;* and in B or ε the same thing occurs, since here the I is for the male kind, and these two parts $\overset{\supset}{\supset}$ for the female kind; and when we consider them thus separately, we may not only perceive that they are equal to *three*, since *one* and *two* make *three;* but that we have by joining them together thus $\overset{\supset}{\supset}$, the figure 3. From this it is evident that the radical words for *animal* and *being* have exactly the same meaning. And what ought this lead us to suspect? That notwithstanding their apparent

difference in form, they are, after all, but one word; and hence we should, in order to see if such be really the case, do with *anim* what we have done with *be*, that is, reduce it to its primitive state. The *an* in this word is equal to *oin*, that is, to "one," and *im* is equal to *iv* or *double one*, that is, to "two;" yet both words stand in apposition to one another, and there might be a proposition made of them thus, *an is im;* that is, "*an* is the same as *im*." Hence if *an* means *one*, so must *im* mean *one;* and if *im* means *two* or double *one*, so must *an* mean *two* or double *one*. As *im* is the same as *iv*, and as *iv* is the same as *in*, and as *in* is the same as *one*, we hence see that *im* means *one*. But we may also find this meaning, by remarking what we have already seen, namely, that *im* is equal to *un*. Hence, when we say that *iv* is equal to *two*, we should understand by this word two, *double one*, and which the analysis of its name (*it-w-o*) proves to be its exact meaning; so that *two* makes after all but *one*, named the double *one*. When we analyse *an* thus, *o-iv*, we see that it also means "the double one;" and this we can see still more clearly, by observing that *iv* is the same as *w*, so that *o-iv* may become *o-w*, of which the literal meaning is, "one double;" and if we put both these letters thus, *w-o* (double one), we shall have them as they are to be found in *two* (*it-w-o*), so that the meaning between *an* and *im* is precisely equal. Hence we have in these two words only one, and in the beginning this one word filled the place which both fill now. Then when *o-in* (the analysis

of *an*) stood for *an-im*, it was the *o* which signified *one*, or the *male* kind, and *in*, which is the same as *iv*, that signified *double one*, or the *female* kind. In like manner *iv*, the analysis of *im*, is to be accounted for when it stood for *an-im*, it being the I in this word which signified *one*, or the *male* kind, and *v* which signified *two*, or the *female* kind. From thus seeing *an* and *im* to be exactly alike in meaning, we are led to suppose that they make but one word. When we consider their analysed forms (*oin* and *iv*), it is easy to perceive that this is a correct supposition. As *iv* is the same as *in*, this latter word does not differ from *oin*, but by its having no *o*. But this letter is in *oin* nothing more than a definition of *in*, to which it stands in apposition. Hence it can with great propriety be understood before the *in*, which is for *iv*, so that *oin-iv*, or rather *oin-in*, will become, when this *o* is supplied, *oin*, *oin*. But here still there is an ellipsis, as the *o* in *oin* has *I* understood before it, so that this *oin* is entirely *io-in*, these two words being still in exact apposition to each other. As the two words *an-im* make thus but one and the same word, namely, *oin*, we have now to compare this word with *eb* (be), in order to see if both these words correspond in form as they do in meaning.

Though *eb* is composed of two letters, we know that it has, when radically considered, only one, since the ε stands here in apposition to B, as we have seen. The word *oin* is, we also know, equal to *io in*, in which two words we have only one, since *io*

stands in apposition to *in;* and here the equality becomes very apparent and evident, when we recollect that *n* is equal to these two parts ↄ, and consequently to an *o*, so that *in* and *io* are in every way but one word. As the B, to which *eb* or *be* has been reduced, is also, from its being composed of I3, equal to *io*, it follows, since the radical part of animal, that is *an im*, is equal to the same thing, that these two words, *being* and *animal*, must be equal to one another; by which we are to understand, since perfect equality cannot exist between any two things, that *being* and *animal* do, notwithstanding their apparent difference, make but one and the same thing.

The more an object is complicated in its form, the more it is difficult to have a clear idea of it: by seeing *being* and *animal* reduced to *io*, or to the single character B, and by knowing the nature of these letters, we can more easily account for these two words. That *io* or *Be* can mean two things may be easily conceived, when we recollect that both *male* and *female* are here signified; and that the same word should, when otherwise considered, mean only one, may be also easily understood, since *one being* or *animal* is signified by it. But that it should also, whilst thus signifying *one* and *two*, signify *three* also, is not so easy to conceive. This is, however, so evidently the case, that there is not, I am sure, a language in the world of which the word for *three* does not also mean *being*, and consequently all which *being* means. In order to render

this intelligible, let me observe, that as *io* is made frequently to appear, as we have seen, under the form of *iv*, which means the Divinity, it follows, that the word for *three* must, in all languages, mean also the Divinity, since, when radically considered, there is, I contend, no difference between it and this word which signifies *being*. And as this word *iv* is the radical part of *iver* (which is the same as *ever*)—because *ever*, when analysed, means the thing *iv*, that is, *God*—it follows that the word for *three* must also mean *ever*. And as *iv-er* does not differ from *ip-er*, and as this word is the same as *père* (father), it follows that the word for *three* must also mean *père* or *father*. And as *iv-er* is also the radical part of *veritas* (truth), the analysis of this word being *ever-ita-is*, meaning "ever that is," it follows that the word for *three* must also in all languages mean *truth*. It may also be observed, that as *iv* means *one*, from its being the same as *in*, and as *one* is the same as *son*, it follows that the word for *three*, to which it is equal, must also mean *one* and *son*. Hence, without following up the word for *being* or *three* any farther, it is by this much apparent that either of these words, and it does not matter which, means *God*, *eternity*, *truth*, *father*, *son*, *three*, and *one*.

Let us now examine the word for *three* in Greek, Latin, French, and English, and see how far what is here advanced respecting it may be proved. Τρεις may be analysed thus, *it-er-eb*, in which instance *it er* is equal to *être* in French, and it conse-

quently means, *being* or *thing;* and *eb* is the same as *be* in English; so that *it er* stands here in apposition to *eb*, since, like the latter, it means *be*. The whole analysis may be rendered intelligible, if we explain it by "the thing *be*," which is very correct; and thus we see that the word for *three* has, in Greek, the same meaning as the idea *being*. But it may be also analysed thus, *it-vr-εις*. Here, instead of *e* before *r* I have put *v;* because the Roman *e*, whether long or short, is equal to *v*, for the reason that it is the same as upsilon or epsilon. As these two letters *vr* require vowels, they consequently become *iver*, so that *it vr* means, "God ever," or "the eternal," and as εις is, in Greek, *one*, hence τρεις means, "the eternal one," or "God ever one."

I have often had occasion to remark that, when examined, the words for *being* and *ever* are synonymous; hence, when we understand *ever*, in the analysis just given, as meaning "being," the three words *it iver* εις will mean, "the being *one*," that is, "the thing *one*." But this meaning is also obtained from the first analysis of the two letters τρ, which is *it er*, and evidently the same as *être* or *est re*. Thus we see that *treis* means also *one;* and as *one* and *son* are equal, as we have already seen, it follows that *treis* has also this meaning.

It must be still fresh on the reader's mind that when *one* and *son* were shown to be synonymous, they were also shown to be synonymous with *sun;* and even so, we may remark, is it in the present instance. Thus εις which in *τρεις* means *one*, is the

the same as οις, since this character ε is for an *o;* and when we allow the ι in οις to be dropped, this word becomes ος, the well-known name for the *sun*, as also for *one*. Hence *treis* means "the being *one*, *son*, or *sun*," for these three words do not differ in meaning. As *iv* is the same as *ip*, as has been already often shown in this work, it follows that *iver* in the above analysis is the same as *iper*, which does not differ from *père* in French, since the latter has understood before *p* an *i;* and this proves that *τρεις* means also, "the father being," or "the father," "the son," or "the sun," or "the father one," or "God." And when we consider that *iver* is the radical part of *veritas*, or *truth*, it follows that *treis* must also mean "the truth being," or "the truth the son," or "the sun," or "one." We should remark well that *iver*, which means both "eternity" and "truth," is itself, when analysed thus, *iv-er*, literally, "God being;" and when analysed thus, *in er*, "the one being." Thus we have seen how the Greek word τρεις means "God," "a human being," "eternity," "truth," "father," "son," and "sun," and also "three," and "one." As these several words are precisely equal, they do all, consequently, make but one and the same word; and by knowing this we discover what man's first ideas were of certain great truths. Thus, the Divinity, a human being, eternity, truth, and the great sun, made with him but one and the same thing, and this same thing he also named "father and sun," "three and one."

When we recollect that the English word *truth* must have first been *the true*, since it was from the word *the* having fallen behind *true*, thus, *true the*, that *truth* has been made, we may easily discover in the Greek word for *three* (τρεις) the radical part of *truth*, namely, *true*, since when we give to ε in τρεις this situation ω, we have, instead of τρεις, τρωις, that is, *true-is*, in which case the *is* at the end of τρωις holds the place of *the* at the end of *truthe*. And since the *tr* in *truth* may be analysed thus, *it-vr*, as has been seen, and as the *v* is here equal to *h*, we hence discover that the analysis *it-vr* is the same as *it-hr*, which, by contraction, that is, by the *i* alone being dropped, becomes *thr*, in which we have the three first letters in *thr*ee, that is, in the two first letters of *tr*εις, we have these three letters also, since they can in like manner be shown to be equal to *ib-vr*, and then to *it-hr*, and, finally, to *thr*.

We may observe that this word *treis* is composed of two principal parts, *tr* and *eis*, which are equal in meaning, and stand in apposition to each other. Hence when we put before *tr* an *e*, we discover in it the French word *être*, and when we make the *is* in *eis* take its form of *B*, and the *e* by which it is preceded to fall behind, we discover in this word the English verb *Be;* and that *eis* has this meaning we can have no doubt, since such is the second person singular of ειναι, the verb *to be* in Greek. The Latin word for *three* (tres) does not, when analysed, differ in any way whatever from τρεις, since the *es* at the end is for *eis*, the *i* having been

dropped. Nor does the French word *trois* differ in the least from τρεις, since when we give to ε in the latter its form of ο, this Greek word becomes *trois*. If I wanted to prove, which I do not, that ε is ο, how easy it were to do it by a comparison of τρεις and *trois!* for who could deny that these two words are letter for letter the same? The English word *three* appears to differ widely from the same word in Greek, Latin, and French, yet it does not differ from these words in any way whatever. Its three first letters, *thr*, are equal to *ter;* for this character *h* is, as has been clearly shown, the same as *e;* and hence it is that in Greek it still supplies the place of this letter. Then as *ter* has an *i* understood before it, by which means it becomes *it-er*, and as these two words are the same as the analysis of the *tr* in the Greek, Latin, and French words τρεις, *très*, and *trois*, it is evident that thus far the English word *three* does not differ in the least from any of these words. As the two letters (*ee*) with which it ends are equal to *es*, since ε is equal to *o* or to *s*, we see that *three* may, analysed, become *it-er-eis*, just as *très* does. Hence all the observations made respecting the Greek word τρεις are wholly applicable to the same word in Latin, French, and English, since these four words make but one and the same word. By this we see that between the ideas *being* and *three* there is no difference.

We may observe that in the analysis of *tr* we have both *ter* and *it ver*, and as the first is the ra-

dical part of *terra* (the earth), and the second the radical part of *vert* (green), it would seem that both these ideas are also synonymous with *truth*, *eternity*, &c. Hence the word *herbe*, which, since *h* is here equal to *v*, is no other than *ver-be* (the green thing), means, when thus analysed, *iv-er-be*, "ever being," that is, "ever during," which is also the literal meaning of *verdure* (ever-dure), that is, "ever endures;" this word *dure* being still preserved in French, in which language it signifies what lasts long. As the word *ter* (the radical part of *terra*) gives also in its analysis *it ever*, it would seem that men did not, when this word was first made, believe in the beginning or the end of the world; but that it had always been, and would ever be.

It will be also found that the word for *to be* has, in all languages, the meaning it bears in English; that is, of *one*, and, consequently, all that *one* implies. Thus ειναι is equal to *oin-ou*, or to *oin-on*, so that it is no other than *oin*, *oin* (one, one); and as the *n* in ειν is equal to *s*, hence this word is the same as εις, its other form for which I have already accounted. And as this εις is no other than *eb* or *be*, hence we see that between *ein* and *Be* there is no difference whatever, notwithstanding that these two words do, to all appearance, differ very widely from each other. As the radical part of the Latin word *esse* is *es*, and as this is but a contraction of *eis*, we see that it is still the same as ειν and *Be*. Then *esse* is for *eis e*, which means

"being is," or "the being." The French word *être* (since it is for *estre*, of which the radical part is also *es*, the contraction of *eis*) is still the same word; the *tr* by which *es* is followed being here equal to *the thing*, since, analysed, it is, *it ir*, or *it er*, so that *estre* means "the thing be." In the Saxon tongue *Be* was written *beon*, so that the *on* here added to the radical part is precisely equal to the *ai* in *ειναι*, since this is also *on;* and hence the Saxon and Greek words for *to be* are not only when radically considered, but in every other way, exactly the same word. Yet few words can, in appearance, be more dissimilar than *beon* and *ειναι*.

As in *estre it-er* is in apposition to *eis*, or *one*, we are also to look for this number in *it-er;* and when we reflect that the letter *t* is composed of *i i*—the one being placed above the other, thus *ῖ*—we see that it is equal to *v*, and consequently to *n*, so that *it* is, after all, the same as *in;* and *it er* must, consequently, be *in er*, and mean, "one being," or "thing," just as *eis* does. As the radical part of the English word *very* is *ver*, and as this is the same as *iver* or *ever*—which we have found to be the same as *three*, in the analysis given of this word in Greek, Latin, French, and English—it follows, that when we say *very good*, or *very bad*, our words imply "three times good," or "three times bad;" or still, "ever good," or "ever bad." How correct this observation is shown to be, by remarking that in Greek this word *very* is frequently rendered by the word for *three*, as

τρισαγιος (very holy), and that the French word employed, which is *très*, to name the same idea, is the Latin word for *three*. Hence the sign which indicates the superlative must, in all languages, be the word for *three;* or, which is the same, for *being*, or *eternity*. This accounts for such comparisons as are made by the word *ever* itself, as *ever so good*, *ever so bad*, which is still the same as *very good* and *very bad*. Hence when we say, "was he *ever* so good or *ever* so bad, he ought not to have done so," our words imply, "was he *very* good, or *very* bad, he ought not to have done so." Or we may here put in place of *ever* and *very* the words *truly*, *three times*, *eternally*, &c.

The English termination *est*, whether it belongs to a substantive or an adjective, becomes, therefore, when analysed, *eis-it*, which is the same as *Be-it;* that is, *the being*, and this we know is equal to *three*, *ever*, &c. *Most* makes *un-ois-it* or *un-eis-it*, which still means, "one being it;" that is, "the one being." The corresponding signs in Latin are *ssimus*, *rrimus*, and *llimus;* and of these, too, each means, when analysed, "the being one," or "the one," and this is equal to *the three*. Thus the word *trinity* must mean, in all languages, "the one being," or "the being one," which is the same as *the one three* or *the three one*, since *being* and *three* make but one word.

In Greek this word is τριας, of which the three first letters *tri* are the same as *être-i*, "being one," and it is also the same as *three*. The *as* at the end

of *trias* is, when analysed, *ois*, and this is the same as *o-is* or O-B; that is, "one being;" so that this word *as* stands in exact apposition to the three letters by which it is preceded, since they also mean "the one being." But what is meant by *the one being* itself? We may discover this by allowing the *i* in *ois* to be dropped, since we shall then have *os*, or the *sun*. We should also observe, that *ois* is the same as εις, which in Greek means both *be* and *one;* and we should also remember what has been already shown, namely, that the figure 3 and B, or *is* or BE, make but one and the same thing. Nor should we forget that the Greek word for *three* (τρεις) is literally *être-εις* (being one), and that in French this is *trois*, which means also, when thus analysed, *être-o-Be*, "being one being." When we remark well these circumstances, there can be no doubt on any one's mind, but men understood, in the beginning, by *the one being*, the *sun*. Hence *trias*, the Greek word for trinity, does really mean "the sun." The analysis of *trinitas* is, *it-er-in-ita-is*, which literally means, "the being one it-is;" or we may analyse it thus, *être-in-it-ois*, of which the meaning is still the same, though we may render it thus, "the being one, the sun." In order to understand how this latter meaning can be the same as that which precedes it, we need only remember that *i* and *o*, or a straight line and a circle, are one and the same thing; so that the English word *is* becomes *os*, or the *sun;* and this, too, we can easily conceive when we bear in mind that this word *is*

implies existence, of which the *sun* was believed to be the source. Thus, too, the English word *was* literally means, "the sun," since, analysed, it becomes *iv-ois*, in which instance *iv* is equal to *it*, and *ois* when *oi* is pronounced *wa*, as it ought to be, makes *was*.

In like manner the English word *Be*, which originally was *eis* or *ois*, as we have already seen, means "the sun;" so that the present time, which is signified in English by *is*, as, *God is*, means "God the sun;" and the past time, which is signified by *was*, as *God was*, means "God the sun;" and the future, which is signified by the word *be*, as, "God will *be*," means still, "God the sun." Thus we discover that the present, past, and future, are indicated by one and the same word, so that these three tenses make after all but one, and yet they are three! We should also remark, that this word, which here signifies *three* and *one*, when time is considered, does also signify *three* and *one*, when it represents *Being*.

As the *am* of *I am* may be thus analysed, *o-in*, it also means "the sun;" but literally, "the sun one," since *in* means *one*, and stands here in apposition to *o*, which means also *one*. But *in*, since it is the same as *iv*, means also "the first life," and it stands in apposition to *o*, which means also "the first life." Hence *I am* may be rendered thus, "I the sun, one;" that is, "I the one being, the sun;" or it may, with equal exactness, be explained by, "I the sun, the first life." The word *art* in *thou art*, means, as it may be analysed thus, *o-ir-it* (of which

the primitive order was *it-o-ir*), "the sun, the being;" that is, "the being the sun;" and *are*, which may be analysed thus, *o-ir*, means, "the sun being." From these observations it will appear evident, that with a people whose language has preserved its primitive simplicity, the words for *am*, *art*, *are*, *is*, *was*, and *be*, must be all names for the *sun*.

The French and English words for *trinity* do not differ in meaning from the Greek and Latin words, since they are *trinité* and *trinity*, the analysis of both being, *être-in-it-e*, "the being one it is."

But where in the word *trinity* are the *father*, the *son*, and *God?* They are all three to be found in it, no matter how we write this word. I have already shown how in the word *three*, in Greek, Latin, French, and English, we have the word for *father*, and also for *God*, *one*, and *son*, or *sun*.

The radical word for *father* is, in all languages, the same as the *Divinity:* thus the Greek and Latin word *Pater* means, "the being one, God," or, "the being above, God;" and it is to be thus analysed, *it-er-ip-oi;* and here the word *ip* alone were sufficient to signify *father*. This is confirmed by the French word *père*, which may be analysed thus, *er-ip*, "the being above;" and if these two words were *er-iv* or *er-if*, the meaning would be still the same, as they give, "the first life," and are frequently employed to name the Divinity. The English word *father* is to be thus analysed, *if-oit-iv-er*, which means, "the eternal God;" but literally

it is, "one life, God ever," or "the first life, God ever." And here also *father* might be signified by *if*, "the first life." Hence in the word εις alone, we have *father*, *son*, and *God*, as also *one*, and *three*, or the *sun*, with all the other meanings already shown, such as *male* and *female*, *truth*, *eternity*, &c.

The English word *Ghost* means also, when analysed, "the father, the son, and God," as we may thus see, *ig-iv-os-it*. Here *ig iv* means "the first life," or "father," and *os*, which is the same as *ois* or *eis*, means "son;" and the word *it* is for "God." But as each word is here in apposition to either of the other two, the meaning of the whole is, "the father is the son, and the father is God;" and if we begin with the word *God* or *son*, this can cause no difference, since here no word of the three has a more powerful or extensive meaning than either of the other two. We may also explain this analysis, *ig-iv-os-it*, by "the father is the sun," &c., instead of "the father is the son," &c., since *os*, *ois*, and *eis* (which make but one word) mean *sun* or *son*, which do also make but one word.

In Saxon this word is written *Gast*, of which the analysis is *ig-ois-it;* and here *ig* is for "father" or "the first life," and *ois* differs only from *os* by its having preserved the *i*, which the latter word has lost. In the Teutonic *Ghost* is written *Geist*, of which the analysis is *ig-eis-it*, which differs only from the Saxon *Gast* by its having the word for *one* or *son*, under its other form of *eis* instead of *ois*. But why, it will be asked, did men in the

beginning give to this one word these two forms, since there is no difference whatever in their meaning? This is a question which I have found very difficult to answer. The word *ois* means, the reader is now aware, not only *one* or *son*, but also *sun;* and as men wished to make these three letters represent by their form the great object which they name, and as they saw this could not be done whilst the *o* remained as it is in *ois*, that is, with its present round form, they made this letter become *e*, by which means they could make the figure of the sun contain its own name, thus, , and such must have been the origin of epsilon, so that this character is only the *o* made slender. This account of *e* will, if followed up, lead to the perfect discovery of the formation of other letters. How ingenious it was in the founders of language to show thus, in the object of their adoration, its name! But their wisdom did not stop here; for when we give to these same letters this form, , we have EB, which afterwards, from the E having been placed behind, became BE; and this word signifies *life* or *existence*, because the sun was believed to be the author of all existence. This figure is also very happily contrived. *Ois* was still made to take this form, , in which we have EID, the origin of *ed*, *id*, and *od*, which are names frequently given to the Divinity. We should

remark that in each of these three figures we have *three* letters, but which become *one*, so that each figure is a trinity, or three in one. Hence τριας may also be explained by *three one*, that is, "the three one," "the triple one;" and when we give to the *s* in *as* its form of *n*, we can understand this explanation still more clearly, since *trias* then becomes *tri-oin*, that is, "three one." The radical part of *trinitas*, *trinité*, and *trinity*, which is *trin*, is still the same word, since this is equal to *tri-in*, or *three one*. In all these instances allusion is visibly made to the three characters in the figure of the sun, and which so evidently indicate *one* and *Be*, that the word they compose, namely, εις, is even still employed in Greek to signify *one* and *Be*, in order to show that between these three ideas, *being*, *one*, and *three*, there is no difference. But we must remember, that the first of these three characters, εις, stands in apposition to the other two, and hence it is by itself, when thus placed, ε, equal to three; and as the other two (ις) are the same as IV, in which two letters we have male and female, or man and woman, and their Creator, so is this little sign ε also the same as IV, and such is the *trinity*.

But here, when otherwise considered, the word for *trinity* means *father*, *son*, and *God*. Thus IV means "the first life," or "father," and it is the same as *ip* (the radical part of *pater* and *père*), and also as *if*, the radical part of *father*. And when we remark that V is the same as *n*, we see that IV is equal to *in*, which means *one*, between which

meaning and that of *son* there can be no difference in any language. Hence when we also consider that IV signifies still the Divinity, we see plainly how these two letters, which are composed of three ones, signify *father*, *son*, and *God;* and in which, though there be apparently three persons, there cannot, after all, be more than one. For, as I have already observed, they are named in precisely the same way, and are shown to be precisely equal, and as precise equality cannot exist between several things, it is evident that these persons cannot make more than one.

We have seen that the words, *Ghost*, *Gast*, and *Geist*, mean the *father*, *son*, and *God:* in the Latin word *spiritus* we have still the same three. It is to be analysed thus, *us-is-ip-ir-it*, of which the literal meaning is, "the son," "the first being, God." Here *is* is for *eis* or *ois*, and *ip ir* is the same as *father* or *père*, and the word *it* is for God; so that *spiritus*, when thus analysed, means, altogether, "the son is the father, and God." The French word *esprit* does not differ from *spiritus* but by its wanting the article *us* at the end. The *es* in this word is for *eis*, and the *pr* for *père;* as to the *it* it is here as in the other words. I have in another part of this work given several other explanations of *spiritus*, *spirit*, and *esprit*, but even others may still be given of them, and all be equally correct.

How extraordinary, in all languages, this word *being* is! I say in all languages, because I am sure there is but one language in the world, and that

however we find this word in Greek, Latin, French, and English, so must it be with all people. And what are we hence to infer? Why that there was a happy time when all men had but one belief, and that it was only when they first lost the meaning of their words that they became divided amongst themselves. Then what a great misfortune visited the earth when men knew no longer what they said! What disunion, and hatred, and bloodshed, have grown out of this single evil! The word *Trinity* alone, which is one of the greatest antiquity, and which no human being can have understood since at least several thousand years, must, in cruel times, have cost millions their lives, and, judging from the excited inquiry it has ever created, it must have also filled madhouses with its pretended expounders.

I have not yet accounted for the *ing* in *being* otherwise than by saying it signifies *the thing*, so that the whole word *being* means "the thing *be*." As *ing* stands here in apposition to *be*, it follows that it must be equal to *be* in meaning, so that to know one of these words critically is to know the other. But *ing*, when analysed, becomes *in-ig*, in which we have still two words in apposition to each other, and, consequently, of equal meaning, so that they may be reduced to one.

In order to see how the *n* in the word *in* is equal to the g in ig, we must remember that an I is equal to an O, and that, consequently, the two parts of g have the same value we allow to the two parts of *n*, which is composed of *i* and *i*. We may even

remark, that the little sign, not greater in size than a comma, which is to be seen projecting from the right side of the first *o* of the g, has been taken from the under *o* of this letter, since we may perceive, by looking closely at the latter, which was anciently made thus, g, that it is not a complete *o*, as it wants near the top of its left side a very slight portion of its circle, just as much as the upper *o* has projecting from the top of its right side. Hence when we restore to the second *o* of g this portion of which it has been deprived, we shall have in this letter g an *o* and an *o*, that is, a one and a one joined together, just as we have a one and a one joined together in the letter *n*. Thus we see how *in* and *ig* are precisely equal. From knowing this, it is evident that we have only one of these words to consider; and when we adopt *in*, we perceive, since this word is equal to IV or to IO, that *ing* is reduced to the same form to which *anim* has been also reduced. And what are we hence to infer? Why that *ing* means also "the trinity," "the Divinity," "eternity," "truth," &c.; and as all the words and letters in the world may be so reduced, that they have all, when followed up to their birth, the same great meaning. When we find two words, like *in-ig*, standing thus in apposition to each other, we are, in order to understand them more easily, to consider one of them as an article to the other. Then the *in* in *in-ig* may be rendered by *the*, and the *ig* by the word *thing*, or *one*. As the *in* in *ing* may

be rendered equal to several other letters, such as B, W, M, &c., it follows that *ing* may become such words as *big*, *wig*, *mig*, &c., which three words might, with great propriety, serve as names for the Divinity; and there are probably languages in which they fill this office; for they all mean, "great," "high," or "first life;" or they simply mean, "the first thing." It may make a thoughtless reader smile to hear that such a trivial word as *wig* could have the powerful meaning here assigned it; yet it will be found, I have no doubt, to have a similar meaning in all languages. But when we analyse such a word, we are to allow *to*, that is, *belonging to*, to be understood thus, *w-ig*, "the thing (to) the *high* or *first* one," that is, "to the *head:*" for this word means also, "the high one," "the first one," "the great one," or "the Divinity."

Even a *hat*, which may be thus analysed, *w-oit*, must be a name for the Divinity in some language or other, for it literally means, "life high," as we might see more clearly had the *i* been dropped, for we should then have *ot*, instead of *oit*, which is the same as *haut* (high). Nor does a *hat* differ in the slightest degree from *wit*, which means, "life to the head," or "to God," or "life above." But the most trivial words can be shown to have these double meanings. Thus, an *oyster* literally means, "the sun being," that is "the being," or "the thing the sun;" for, analysed, it is, *ois-être*, so that the meaning is, "the thing in form like the sun," because either of its two shells is made like an O, which is

also the figure of the sun. The Greek word οστρεα (*oyster*) is to be analysed thus, *ois-ir-ea*, which means, "the sun, the double thing," that is, "the double thing (like) the sun," meaning by this, "the thing in the form of double O," in which allusion is made to the two shells. The Latin word for *oyster* (*ostrea*), which is to be thus analysed, *ois-être-ea*, has exactly the same meaning. Nor does the French word *huîtres* differ in the least from either of the Greek or Latin words, since it literally means, when thus analysed, *res huit*, "the thing eight," in which allusion is still made to the double shell of the oyster, since the figure eight is also composed of an *o* and an *o* placed over each other thus, 8. The truth of this observation may be clearly seen by the analysis of the Greek and Latin word for *eight*, which is οκτο and *octo*.* The one analysis, which may be made thus, *o-ic*, *et-o*, will serve for both these words; and here the meaning is, "*o it* and *o*," and in their natural order these words stand, "*it o* and *o*," that is, "the *o* and *o*."

In the English word *eight*, allusion is also made to the sun, since its analysis (*e-ig-iv-it*) means, "the first double life or double God," which means "O and O." The French word *huit*, of which the analysis is, *iv-iv-it*, has still the same meaning, since this is equal to *life life it*, that is, *the life life*, or

* This word does not differ from οκτο, but by its having dropped the *i* which preceded the *c*, thus, *oikto*; which is another proof, admitting of no doubt, that the letter *k* is an *i* and a *c* joined together thus, k.

double life, meaning by this, "the double O," or "the sun." Hence the old English word *eighn* (plural of *eye*) is to be explained like *eight;* and this accounts for *eye* being another word for the *Divinity* or *life*, and it throws an additional light upon the explanation already given of this word. It must in the beginning have been *og* or *oc*, or, which is the same, *oy*.

The old word *eighn* alluded to above, and of which the singular must have been *eigh*, leads to the discovery of the meaning of the English word *nigh*, which, analysed, becomes *in-igh*, and means, "in eye," that is, "in sight," for a person in sight is considered *nigh*. Hence, too, we discover what is meant by *near*, since this word, analysed, becomes *in-ear*, that is, "within reach of the ear," and this, too, is understood to signify what is not far off. Hence it is evident that since the time when men lost the meaning of their words, nobody has ever known the difference between *nigh* and *near;* and as these are words in very common use, it must have frequently puzzled correct writers and speakers to imagine how they ought to be employed with regard to each other. *Nigh* is, therefore, a contraction of *in eigh*, the *e* having been dropped; and this is proved by the word *sight*, in which the *e* is also dropped; for when we say *in sight*, this is evidently for *in-is-eigh-it*, that is, *in the eye it*.

The similarity between *nigh* and *night* must lead us to inquire into the primitive meaning of the latter word, since it is one of great importance.

From what we have just seen, it will appear evident to all persons, that in the word *nigh* the three letters *igh* mean "the sun," but literally, "the first life" (*ig-iv*), or "the first one," since the *iv* in *ig-iv* is the same as *in* or *one*. Hence we may perceive, that the *h* in *nigh* is for *iv* or *in*, that is, *life*, or the *Divinity;* and if we add the word *it* to this *h*, what have we still but another name for *life*, or the *Divinity?* We have hitherto often seen in the analysis of words, that the extreme of a thing is signified by the doubling or repetition of its name. But by this men often understood a total absence of whatever they qualified so. Thus *go go* must have signified not only double motion or life, but the total cessation of all motion or life, in short, *death*. This observation will throw a new light upon the explanation which I have already given of negatives. In the English word *no*, for instance, which, analysed, makes *in o* (one one), we have the repetition of *one*, or of an affirmative, by which means the ideas of plurality and totality were also named. If we examine other negatives, we shall find them to be thus all repetitions of affirmatives. Hence, by the addition of another name for the *sun* to *igh*, we are led to consider the added word negatively, though it might have quite an opposite meaning, just as the English word *no* might mean "several," or "all," instead of "none."

Then before men said *night* they must have said *ight*, of which the meaning was, "sun not," or "sun over;" for here the *t* (which is for *it*) signifies

not only the *Divinity*, or the *head*, but also what is very high up, or out of reach, and, consequently, what is gone or past. Thus in the English language the word *over* has happily preserved this primitive meaning, for we still employ it to signify not only what is above us, but also what is past or gone by; as when we say, for instance, "the rain is over," "the play is over." I have just said that *ight* might have had a meaning quite opposite to the one first assigned it; that is, instead of meaning "no light," it might have meant "all light;" and this statement is confirmed by the analysis of this word *light* itself, since it means, "the first life above," (*el-ig-iv-it*), which is the same as "the sun." Then how did men distinguish the *ight* which had this latter meaning from that which had a negative one? By placing a different word before it, and hence they must have said *el ight* on one occasion, and *en ight* on the other, and both these words became with time contracted to *light* and *night;* and the meaning of the former was equal to "the sun," and that of the latter to "the no sun," the *en* having been such an affirmative as men must, at this time, have begun to use negatively. But here I may be told that if this be true, it must follow, since there is no difference between *sun* and *one*, that *no sun* must be the same as *no one*, and consequently as *none*, or *not*, so that the word for *night* must in some languages be a real negative. Than this no observation can be truer; and hence between the German word *nicht*, which means "not,"

and the English word *night*, there is not as to meaning the least difference, because there is not as to meaning the least difference between *ic* and *ig*, as I have already shown. But how is the German word *nicht* to be explained? By *no icht*, that is, by *no light*, or in other words, by *no sun*, or *no one*. But is *icht* in German what *ight* is in English? It is precisely the same; and hence the English word *light* is the German word *licht;* but had the latter been even written *lucht* or *locht*, it could not be said to differ from *light*. From this similarity between *light* and *licht*, it is evident that there can be no difference between *night* and *nicht*, and that these two words are really what we call *negatives*, though there be in reality *no such words* as the latter kind. Hence the French word for *night* (*nuit*) must have also in the beginning been *uit*, which, when analysed, is also *iv it*, "the first life above," that is, "the sun out of reach or gone." Indeed this analysis *iv it* is precisely equal to *out*, which is also very happily preserved in English as a substitute for *extinguished;* but it is when thus employed a real negative, and does not differ in the least from *night*, since it also means, "the sun above," that is, "gone." This, too, I can confirm by the Greek negative οὔτε (*nec*), which is the same as the English word *out*. But how can the analysis *iv it* be the same as *out?* By *iv* being the same as *ov*, and by *ov* being the same as *ou*, so that *ou it* can become, by the dropping of the *i* before *t*, *out*.

But in the Latin word *nox* we have no *it* to in-

dicate height, or what is past? No; but we have a letter (*x*), implying a repetition, and this, as we have seen with two affirmatives, is equal to a negative. Thus, even in modern languages, this character (*x*) is still employed to signify what is gone or past; as when we say the *ex-king* or the *ex-minister*, which means, a person who is no longer king or minister. Hence *o-ic* must have been also a name for the *sun*, and to this was again added another name, which was *is*, this being the same as *io*, so that both these words (*oic-is*) must have meant, like *ight* in English, "all sun or light," or "no sun," or "no light." The truth of this observation is also clearly shown by the Latin word for *light* (*lux*), which must have first been *el ux*, or, which is the same, *el ox*. I need scarcely remark, that the single letter *x* represents *ic-is*, or "double existence." Hence, in order to distinguish *ux*, when meaning "all light," from *ux*, meaning "no light," different words (*el* and *en*) were, as in English, made to precede it, and hence we have *lux* (light) and *nox* (night). I have said that there is no difference between *ox* and *ux*, because *u* and *o* are frequently employed indifferently, from their being in reality but one and the same letter. But this statement respecting these words (*ox* and *ux*) I find verified by the Greek word for *night*, which is *nux* (νυξ) instead of *nox*. Then *nox* and *nux* are also what we call negatives, since they mean "no sun," or, which is the same, "no one." Since by *no sun* was meant "no God," the word for *night* must in all

languages have often had a bad meaning; and this accounts for such words as *nocere* and *nuire*, which mean "to do harm," but which, when analysed, signify "to be night," that is, "to be without God." It will be remarked, that if *night* be equal to a negative, *day*, since it is the contrary of *night*, ought to be equal to an affirmative; and so it is, and hence the word which means *day* in one language may often mean *yes* in another. Hence when we analyse the English word *day* thus, *id-ay*, we have the affirmative *ay* or *aye* with one of those words called articles, so that it is as if we were to say *the ay* or *the yes*. Hence, too, when we analyse the Latin word for *day* (*dies*) thus, *id-ies*, what is it but *id yes*, *the yes?* And as to the German word for *day* (*tag*), what is it but *it ay*, since, as I have already shown, the *y* and the *g* make but one letter, so that *ay* in the Greek characters is αγ. And as *dia* in *diary* is evidently for *day*, since this word may be thus analysed, *dia-re*, that is, *re-dia*, "thing (to the) day," we see that the Greek affirmative δια (*yes*) is also another word for *day*. By the analysis of this word δια, we have a proof that such a locution as *the ay*, *the yes*, &c. must have once existed, since it makes *id-ia*, in which we have the German affirmative *ya*, so that δια means also "the *ay*," and such must *ia* have been before the *a* fell behind. The French word *jour* does not differ in the least from *jur*, for the reason that *ou* means "*o* double," and that *o double* means "*one* double," which is also the meaning of *u*, this letter being

composed of *double one*, that is, of *i i*. Hence as *jur* is the radical part of *jurer* (*to swear*), and as this word may be thus analysed, *er jur*, "the oath," it follows that if we were to add *er* to *jour* thus, *jour-er*, it would have exactly the same meaning as *jurer*, so that it does not differ from this word but by its wanting the article *er*. I make this observation to show, that between the words for *day* and *oath*, an *affirmative* and the *Divinity*, there is really no difference. As *j* is equal to *is*, we may also see that *jur* might as well be written *sur*, and between this word and the English word *sure* there is also no difference, nor can there, consequently, be any between it and *jour;* and this accounts for the similarity in sound which the two French words, *jure*, *jour*, and the English word *sure* offer. As *jour* may be thus analysed, *is-ou-ir*, and as these three words are equal to *is-on-ir*, of which the meaning is, "the one being," we may perceive that the affirmative *oui*, which is also equal to *on-i* (one being), is radically the same as *jour*. But what difference is there in meaning between *sure* and *assure?* There is none; for *sure* is the contraction of *isure*, and here *is* is equal to *os*, the contraction of *ois*, which is the analysis of *as;* so that *sure*, when written in full, becomes *ois-iver*, in which we have two words standing in apposition to each other, and which are, consequently, equal in meaning, and they may be said to imply, "God ever," or simply "the Eternal." By our knowing that *day* is equal to an affirmative, and that it is also the name of the Divinity, we see

that every time men in the beginning affirmed any thing, they appealed to God; and as every negative means "no day," we also see that their language, whenever they denied any thing, was not less solemn and powerful. Hence it is evident that, had we never lost the meaning of our words, falsehood could have never been so common a vice as it is; for it would have had a great effect on man had he always known that, whenever he affirmed or denied, the Almighty was called upon in what he said to bear witness to the truth of his words. By this we discover the origin of the great detestation in which the sin of lying has been ever held by all people, since every affirmative and negative must have been considered, while the meaning of words was yet known, as so many grave oaths. We therefore see that men must in the beginning of the world have been continually swearing, and that they only ceased in some degree from doing so when they no longer knew what such words as *yes* and *no* implied. Hence at the time when our Saviour said, "Swear not at all"—"But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay*"—it is evident that no vestige of the primitive meaning of affirmatives and negatives could have remained, since they are real oaths, and cannot be used without our swearing.

This explanation of *night* has led me far from the inquiry with which I was engaged when this word happened to fall in my way. I was remarking, the reader may remember, how words very

* St. Matt. v. 34. 37.

trivial in appearance may, when analysed, have very great meanings; and such words as *wig*, *hat*, and *oyster*, have been quoted as instances of this fact. But I have yet to notice the word *big*, since it was, with the above words, also referred to. It may seem strange that such a word could have been once a name for God, yet nothing can be more evident than that it had this meaning, since it makes *ib-ig*, "the being above," "the being God." When these two words are made to change places, thus, *ig-ib*, and to coalesce thus, *igib*, and by the *i* being dropped, to become *gib*, which we know is equal to *give*, the meaning is still the same, so that to *give* is to do as God, who gives all things, and in this manner must the same idea be named in all the languages in the world. Thus δοσις must be the same as *dios-is*, that is, "God being," "being God;" and *dare* makes *id-oi-ire*, "it the great one to be." And the same word in French is *donner* (*id-one-er*), and means, "the head one to be;" that is, "God to be."

Then when a man, in the beginning of the world, asked another man to *give* him an apple, his words meant, "God me an apple;" that is, "be God to me for an apple." And when we inquire minutely into this form of language, how natural it will appear that men should speak so. They felt that there was a Divine Being who GAVE them the fruits of the earth, and all the necessaries of life; and it must have been from this belief, and from no other, that the idea of GIVING first came. Hence

when one man GAVE another an apple, it was very rational to suppose that he was then doing an action resembling what God does when he GIVES fruits to the earth, since he was then GIVING, of which the literal meaning is *Godding*, that is, "doing as God." It is utterly impossible that man could, in the beginning, have named this idea otherwise.

Such are the observations which the analysis of the termination *ing* have called forth.

I have also promised, in another part of this work, to inquire into the primitive meaning of the word *soul;* but in the minute account given of *anim*, the radical part of *animal*, the first idea that man ever had of *soul* is to be found. Hence it must be, the reader will tell me, synonymous with *truth* and *eternity;* and, like the idea *Being*, be composed of three persons, the Creator and two human beings, and yet be only one. The Latin word for *soul* is *anima*, which does not differ from *anim*, already explained, but by its having an article more (*ea*) at the end; and as this article is no addition to the meaning of *anim*, nor does in any way lessen its value, it follows that whatever has been already said of this word will apply to *anima*.

The same word in English is *soul*, and were it only *so*, as it must have once been, its meaning would be still the same. When *so* is analysed it becomes *is o*, which means *the o*, that is, "the sun," "the one," "the Divinity," &c. And when this word is used in English in such a sense as, "I told him

so," it is still the same word, and has precisely the same meaning; and were we to supply its place by *thus*, this would not cause the least difference, since the latter is in every way equal to *Theos*, the Greek word for God. Hence, when in the sentence "I told him *so*," we supply the place of *so* by *the one*, the latter means, "the certain one," and it is as if we were to say, "I told him that." The reader must therefore perceive that between *so* and an affirmative, just explained, there can be no difference; and this will account for the French word *si*, which means *so*, being frequently used instead of *oui*, as when we say, *Je crois que si*, instead of, *Je crois qu'oui*. And as it is not difficult to perceive that *so* makes, when analysed, *is o*, and that this is evidently the *sun*, it can be now easily conceived that the affirmative *oui* must, as I have already said, mean "the sun," since a word from which it does not differ has this meaning. Were *soul* to be written *sou*, this would still cause no change in its meaning; for as *u* is the same as *n*, this word would make *sou* become *son*, which is equal to *sun*, or *is one* (the one). Or were we still instead of *sou* to write *sol*, there would not be between these words the least difference; for as the letter L in Greek bears this form, Λ, which is the same as a *v* or a *u*, as I have already shown, it is evident that there can be no difference between *sou* and *sol*. Hence it is that, in the French language, the piece of money named a *sou* has been also named a *sol*, and of this the meaning is still "the one," or "the

sun." Now when the word *soul* was written *sou*, for this form it must have also had, it took *il* before it as an article, thus, *il sou;* and from this word *il* having fallen behind *sou*, thus, *souil*, the word *soul* was, by the dropping of the *i*, made. But had it, while it was yet only *so*, taken *il* before it, thus, *il so*, we should have now *sol* instead of *soul;* but from its having at this time taken *iu* before it, thus, *iu so*, and from this *iu* having fallen behind, the word *sou* was made. But what difference is there between *il* and *iu?* There is none whatever, since the latter is equal to IV, which is in Greek ΙΛ, that is, *il*. Hence we see that the word *soul* means, literally speaking, "the sun," and this implies the Divinity.

The French word for *soul* is *âme*, but the circumflex which we see over the *â* in this word indicates the omission of an *s*, so that *âme* is for *asme*, just as the French word *même* is for *mesme*. *Asme* is to be analysed thus, *ois-iv;* or thus, *ois-in;* or thus, *ois-un*. These different forms of the last syllable are found, by our allowing the *m* in *asme* to be composed of *in*, and then by our allowing *in* to be equal to *iv;* and this accounts for *iv* and *in*. As to *un* it is found from supposing *asme* to be a contraction of *asime*, which will render this word equal to *ois-un;* for *im* does not differ from *un*, as I have already clearly shown by instancing such words as *impolite* and *unpolite*, &c., and by showing that the four ones to be found in *im* are to be also found in *un*. I need scarcely remark, that there

is no difference whatever between *iv*, *in*, and *un*, since all equally mean, "God," "the sun," "one," &c., and that it does not consequently matter by which of them we explain the final part of the French word for *soul.*

As we have already seen the word *ois* a great many times, and as we know that it is the same as εις in Greek, which means both *one* and *Be*, and that it is also a name for the *sun*, appearing then, for the most part, under the contracted form of *os*, we see that it is, in all these respects, in exact apposition to the other word *iv*, *in*, or *un*, by which it is followed in *asme*, so that here the one word serves as an article to the other, and both mean "the sun," "the Divinity," "one," "truth," "eternity," "the Trinity," &c. When this word *asme* was yet only *as*, that is, *ois*, it was precisely equal to the English word *soul* when the latter was yet only *sou*, because the *oi* in *ois* means double *one*, and the *ou* in *sou* has exactly the same meaning, since the *u* in the latter qualifies the *o*, which stands for *one.* Now as *ois* must have first been *is oi*, it is evident that it was from the *is* having fallen behind *oi*, thus, *oi is*, and from its *i* having been dropped, so that *ois* alone remained, that the word *as* was formed, the three letters (*o*, *i*, *s*,) of which it is composed having fallen together. But had the *is*, when it preceded *oi*, gone over to this word thus, *isoi*, and so have lost the first *i*, it would, though remaining only *soi*, be exactly the same as *sou*, since, as I stated above, *oi* means "double one," and so does *ou;* so that by the great philosophers who

first put letters together, the word *soi* might sometimes be very properly written *sou*, or the latter be written *soi*. And this being admitted, it follows that, notwithstanding the great dissimilarity in appearance between the words *as* and *sou*, they are, after all, but one and the same word. I have, whilst analysing words, met with so many curious and wonderful things, that I can no longer feel the least surprise at any new discovery I happen to make in the application of my system: were it otherwise, I might here notice, as something very extraordinary, that the words *as* and *sou* are not only alike when meaning *the soul*, *the sun*, *the Divinity*, &c. but that they are both names of two pieces of money of equal value, the word *as* being the Latin for the French coin named a *sou*. I might also here remark, as something very extraordinary, that as the final syllable of *asme* is equal to *iv*, as we have just seen, and consequently to *il*, since *iv* is equal to *il*, as we have also seen, it must follow that in the two words *ois-iv* we have (since *ois* is equal to *soi* or *sou*) the two words *soi-il*, which, when connected thus, *soiil*, are equal to *soul;* or we may say that we have in *ois-iv* the two words, *sou-il*, which, by the dropping of the *i* before *l*, become, when they unite, *soul;* so that, no matter how we consider them, whether part by part or all together, the two words *âme* and *soul* are, in every way, notwithstanding the great difference between them in appearance, one and the same word.

The Greek word for *soul* is ψυχη, in which, though there are only four letters, we have, however, six words, since, when analysed, this word becomes *is-ip-iv-ic-iv-e*, the exact meaning of this analysis is *all life*, that is, "the Divinity," or "eternal life;" and this meaning does not differ in the least from that already found to belong to the Latin, English, and French words for *soul*. Indeed, *sol*, when analysed thus, *is-o-il*, makes *is al*, that is, *all is*, which means "all life;" and this we can the more easily perceive by giving to *is* its form of *Be*, which we know is also equal to *vie* or *life*, so that *all is* becomes "all being," or "all life." Nor does this meaning differ in the least from that to be found in *soul*, when thus analysed, *is-ail*, since, by the dropping of the *i*, this becomes *is al*, in which case it is exactly like *sol*. As the French word has been shown to be the same as *soul*, I need not observe that it must also literally mean, "all life."

The above analysis (*is-ip-iv-ic-iv-e*) of the Greek word for *soul* gives the meaning I assign it, namely, "all life," thus, "the life life, the life life." Here we have three words in apposition to three words, so that the one half of this word is only a definition or explanation of the other half, and the idea of totality is, we may observe, signified by the repetition of the word *life*. We can the more easily discover the six words forming the analysis of ψυχη, by writing this word in the Roman characters, thus, "psuche," and remarking that the *e* with which

it ends is *eta* or *life;* and that the *h* which precedes this letter becomes, with a vowel before it thus, *ih*, equal to *iv* or *life*. The rest of the analysis of this word requires no observation; for the reader needs not now be told that *p* and *v* are used indifferently.

Thus might I continue, and so fill volumes with the wonders of this divine science — divine it may well be called, since every particle of it is a name for the Divinity; and since the more its logical order and extraordinary simplicity are closely inquired into, the more difficult it is to believe that human wisdom alone can have laid the foundation of so admirable a system. That which we have hitherto known by the name of grammar, and according to the principles of which we have supposed language to be constructed, is, it must be allowed, of very ancient date, since all trace of its origin had been lost long before Plato and Aristotle flourished. To say that a system which has for such a vast length of time prevailed over the whole world, is devoid of considerable merit, were to oppose the judgment of not only the multitude of every clime and age of which we have any knowledge, but also that of the wisest philosophers and most learned professors that ever lived. Hence a very high authority asserts, that to have reduced language thus to rules is one of the greatest efforts of the human mind.* But if this system has till now appeared so perfect, it arose from nothing better

* See passage quoted from D'Alembert, vol. i. p. 47. of this work.

having been known; for, notwithstanding all its merits, what is it compared to the one now discovered? In it words are divided into several classes, for the most part into nine or ten, but of all these not so much as one has been ever known, since no definition has been ever given of any one of them that can, when put to the test, as I have shown, bear investigation. Thus, to consider only what appears to lie most on the surface, may we not, from what has been seen in this work, fearlessly assert, that not since the science of languages has been lost has any grammarian known so much as a substantive or an adjective, or the letter A or the letter B, or why words bear their present forms more than any others, or what these forms imply? Hence it were to argue an extraordinary want of common sense and judgment to compare the system by which no word can in any way be critically known, with that which, in this respect, leaves nothing to desire, since all words — and not only of one's own tongue, but of every tongue on earth — may by its application be thoroughly accounted for. Thus it can be shown how they make, not nine or ten parts, but only one; and then how this one part, though comprising all words, may be traced up to a single one, namely, IO; and then how this one word may be reduced to a single letter, namely, I or O — for these two, from their being equal, make but one; and then how this single letter may be reduced to a mere speck, to the minute sign placed over the letter *i*; in which, too,

we discover, as has been already sufficiently proved, not only the origin of all words and letters, but of all the figures and forms ever traced or imagined.

Here I do not remark how every word, besides carrying in itself its own happy meaning, contains an accurate definition of certain mysterious truths — the religious principles that must have once prevailed over the earth — for, without taking this extraordinary circumstance into account, there is in the mere simplicity of the logical order here shown to belong to this science, a great deal more than the human mind — that is, when we judge man from what he has already accomplished — appears capable of conceiving. Hence the thing hitherto called the science of grammar must seem, when compared to what is here discovered, gross and earthly in the last degree; and though we may not, without considerable difficulty, take the latter for any thing less than divine, it requires no great effort to conceive how the former may have very well been the production of human contrivance alone. Now are we to believe that this *real* science of languages, for the other is only nominally one, has been brought down to the earth by divine beings from above? There is no necessity for entertaining this belief; but there is one thing of which we may be certain, and it is this: the intelligent beings to whom we are indebted for this science must have had minds greatly superior to those of whose mental endowments we know any thing, for there is visibly in it a far richer vein of

pure wisdom than there is in any other labour ever achieved by man.

But what could render men more intelligent in those remote times than they have been since? The absence of vice; for this degrades and blunts the understanding, just as it enfeebles the body. This opinion brings me to almost the last important communication I have to make, and which may be gathered from this statement. I have analysed a great many words, but there is not in any one of them aught which can induce me to believe that when they were first made man was acquainted with sin; but I find, on the contrary, that words to which we now attach a very bad meaning imply, when analysed, *exactly* the reverse of what we understand by them. Thus *vice* means "life," which is synonymous with the Divinity; and *evil* has precisely the same meaning; or we may say that the latter is the same as "bliss," since the analysis of this word is *ib-il-isse*, which is, we know, equal to *ev-il-esse*, and means, "the thing evil." It is also for this reason that there were in the beginning no negatives, and that *poor* meant "power." When we analyse the word *misery* thus, *mis-er-e*, it has a bad meaning, since this implies, "want it is." But the word *mis*, which is the same as *miss*, (to fail, to want,) and which is here used as a negative, had not always this meaning, since, when analysed, it becomes *im-is*, which is equal to *un-Be*, that is, *unbeing*, or *not being*, and this *un* was once a real affirmative, and meant "one," or "the Divinity."

Hence, in order to make *mis* signify *want*, men were obliged to use *un* negatively, notwithstanding its being a real affirmative.

It is also in this way we are to account for *evil* or *iv-il*. The first word, *iv*, was used negatively; that is, instead of meaning the Divinity, it was made to signify no Divinity; and in like mannér, the word *Devil*, which may be thus analysed, *Dieu-il*, that is, *il Dieu* (the God), has been made to take a meaning quite the reverse of what it had in the beginning. But what word can show more clearly what I now advance than *sin*, which is the contraction of *isin*, and this is precisely the same as *Bin*, the German word for *am*, which means "the first life," or "the Divinity?" Who that knows and admits any part of this discovery will say that there can be the least difference in meaning between *sin* and *son?* Then, since the latter has been clearly shown to be the same as *sun*, or the Divinity, it follows that *sin* cannot have a different meaning. Here, too, we may remark, that there must be languages in which the word *sin* holds the same place we allow the word *Bin* in German, or the words *sum* and *am* in Latin and English. The Latin word for *sin* (*peccatum*) has precisely the same meaning as *iniquity* or *iniquitas*, or the French word *péché*, and, like the word *sin*, it signifies "the one," "the life," &c.; nor does any of these differ in the least from the word *peculiar*, as every reader who has been in the least attentive to what we have passed over must perceive. But the Greek word for *sin* (ἁμαρτημα)

must have always had, whilst bearing its present form, a bad meaning, since it is, literally, "the having war with God." But we have here several words added together, and no one of them has, when examined by itself, a bad meaning. The most forbidden of them is *war* (αρ), yet even this is a name for the Divinity, since it means "the double life," so that in the beginning it could not have had a bad meaning.* Hence it will necessarily often happen that the same word must have very opposite meanings. Thus in the French word *blessure* (a wound), the radical part, which is *bless*, means in English, when analysed, "the life," since it does not differ in the least from the word *bliss*, already explained. This arises from affirmatives being used negatively by some people, and affirmatively by others. Thus, as we have already seen, the word *un* is in English a negative, and in Latin and French an affirmative, but at its birth it must have been used in the latter sense in all languages. It is wholly useless to continue with such observations—they all lead to the same conclusion: of the multitude of words which I have analysed, not one of them can be found, when radically considered, to have a negative or bad meaning. Though the

* There is no difference whatever between the English word *more* and this word *war*, since the former may be thus analysed, *im-oir*, which is equal to *mar* or *war;* hence *more* means *double*. When it is analysed thus, *in-oir*, it is equal to *one over;* but even these two words do not, when examined with regard to meaning, differ in the least from *double one*. Thus the word *war* had once, it is evident, a very good meaning.

English word *murder* or *murther* (for both forms are equally correct) can mean, when analysed, *war hid*, yet we have nothing here to assure us that the crime of murder was known when words were first made; and the word *war* did not, as I have shown above, indicate in the beginning any thing bad, since it then meant "double life," "more," or "the Divinity." Hence when we allow it in *murder* to have still this meaning, we may, with great propriety, say that this word implies, not a loss of life, but "double life," that is, "life in abundance." Then when we analyse *murder* thus, *mur-ider*, it is equal to *mor-être*, that is, "more being," "more of life." Here the *u* in *mur* is, we know, the same as *o*, and hence in Saxon *murder* is written *morthre*. It is therefore evident that this word may in some languages have a very happy meaning, and be for any thing that implies double life or animation. We need not even, in order to prove the truth of this statement, look out for this word in foreign languages. Chaucer employs the word *murthred* to signify "made glad;" yet, as here the second *r* has a vowel understood before it, *made glad* is no other than *murthered*, that is, *murdered*, *murther had;* and as *glad* is for *glee had*, we discover that the word *murder* meant in the beginning "glee," or "fun." The analysis of either of these words proves that they do not differ as to meaning in the least from *murder*. The former makes *ig-il-ee*, or *ig-il-oo*, or still *ig-il-ii*, that is, *ig-il-u*, *ig-il-iv*, and this means "the first life," or "the being double." The word

if, I have already shown, is the same as *in* or *one* — in Greek this word is rendered so. Hence *fun*, when thus analysed, *in-un*, means "one one," that is, "life life," or "all life." By this we see that *murder* evidently means "an abundance of life." This account reminds me of the old English word *murth*, which signifies "plenty," or "abundance." We now see that this word is the same as *morth*, and this, we see, is no other than *more the*, that is, "the more," and hence it is, as we have seen above, that *murther* is in Saxon *morthre*. Here, too, we see fully confirmed what I have often had occasion to state, namely, that by the repetition of the same thing men signified in the beginning either *all* or *none* of the thing so repeated. And thus we see that in English *murther* means either a total privation of life, or all life, that is, "glee," or "fun." The same word in Greek is φονος, which, analysed, makes *os-if-on*, that is, "the life life;" and when we allow *if* and *on* to fall together thus, *ifon*, we have, when the *i* is dropped, *fon*, and as this is precisely equal to *fun*, we see that in Greek the word for *murder* is literally "the fun," and this is the exact meaning of *murther* in *murthred*, which latter word in Chaucer signifies "made glad."

The Latin word for *murder* is *cædes*, and of this the radical part is *cæd*, which is, *ic-oi-ed*, and this means, "life life had," or "life life above," that is, "life gone." This word is also equal to *coi-had*, and so means, "rest had," that is, "possessed of rest," or "being without life or motion." This

explanation we may easily understand, by remembering the account already given of *coi*, which means, "to be on one's hinder part, or seated." There is no difference whatever between this radical part of the Latin word for *murder* and the radical part of *cad*ere, "to fall," so that *cædes* altogether means "the being down," or "fallen," since the *es* at the end is equal to *is*, or *Be*, or *the thing*. Hence, too, the English word *slay* means *is-lay*, that is, "the lying down," and *slain* means *is lain*, that is, "is lain down," or "be laid down." As the French word *meurtre* is no other than the English word *murther* (this being fully as correct as *murder*), the observations which the latter word has called forth will apply to the former. Thus we see that the word which names the worst of all crimes was not in the beginning taken in a bad sense, from which we are to infer that murder had then no name. Nor is there any difference in meaning between the two English words *kill* and *glee*, for the latter might as well be written *klee*. Nor is there the least difference between the French pronoun *tu* and the same word when it forms the radical part of *tuer* (to kill), and in both instances it means "double life," or "the head life." It may be analysed thus, *it i*, *i*, and so mean "the life life," or "double life," or "all life;" or we may say this means, "head double life," or "over all life." If we analyse it thus, *it iv*, the meaning will not be different. Thus we shall ever find that all these words which have now a bad meaning were in the

beginning names for the Divinity, just as we find that all negatives were once affirmatives. The word *vanity* makes, when analysed, *iv-an-it-e*, and this is not different from *even-it-e*, which means, "it is God." The French word *voler* means, when analysed, "the whole life," so that it is evidently a name for the Divinity. Now when we say that this word means, at present, "to fly," every body can conceive that it may literally be "all life," or "motion," as this is implied in the act of flying. But this word means also "to rob," and its radical part (*vol*) is the same as *iv ol* (the first life all), which is a great name for the Divinity. Hence we see that it has in the same language both a good and a bad meaning, that is, at present, for in the beginning it could have only one of these two meanings, and that was certainly the good one. The Greek word for *robber* is φώρ, which, analysed, is *iv-over*, "the first life above," or "the double life;" and the same word in Latin (*fur*) does not in the least differ from this word in Greek, since its analysis also is *iv-over*.* I have already accounted for the words *rob* and *robber* in English, and have shown that Divine Majesty itself was once qualified so; and as nobody dares now call a king a robber to his face, it follows that if men did so in ancient times, it arose from this word having then a very good meaning. The English word *steal* is, when

* The Greek, Latin, and English words for *robber* imply also, like the French word *voleur*, flight, or double motion, as has been seen farther back.

analysed, *est-e-al*, and this also means, "is the whole," that is, "is the sun," "is the Divinity." But, as I have already said, it is useless to continue thus, since no word can be found that had, when language was first made, a bad meaning. From men having, as they saw the necessity for doing so, (that is, as vice grew up amongst them,) reversed the meaning of words, it must often happen that such as bear now a good meaning will appear, when analysed, to have a very bad one. Thus *hill* and *ville*, in which we have but one and the same word, appear, when analysed, as they then make *iv-il* or *evil*, to belong to this class; but we are to remember that *evil* means, "the first life," or "life life." We can understand both these words much better when we take them in this last sense; for every body can conceive that a *hill* should, on account of its height, thus signify what is double; and that *ville*, since it is a place of great resort, should, in like manner, mean "life, life," or "all life," that is, "great motion," is also very natural. But *vill* in *villain*, though the latter means, when thus analysed, *evil-oin*, "evil one," is still the same word, that is, "double life," "the first life," or "the Divinity." And though *hil* in *hilarity* seems also to have a bad meaning, since, analysed, this word takes the forbidden form of *evil war it is*, it does not at all differ from the word *hill;* and in this word *hilarity* we are to render the *it* by *the*, and the word *ar*, which really means "war," is to be rendered by "the double life," so that the whole word, when

thus analysed, *evil-ar-it-e*, means, "the double life it is," and hence it does not differ from the words *fun* and *glee*, already explained. I need scarcely again remark to the reader, that the word *the* was, like *evil*, *even*, *être*, &c., also a name for the Divinity. These few observations, tending to show how certain words have, like men, lost their primitive innocence, will, when we also remember how affirmatives have been used negatively, put every body in the way of making great improvements in the application of this science. As to affirmatives and negatives, they appear to offer no difficulty whatever. Thus who that has paid the least attention to the numerous instances of analysing already given, will not perceive that *inimicus* is the same as *un-amicus*, that is, *un-friend*, "no friend?" This can be very easily understood from remarking that *i* means "one," and that *a* has the same meaning, so that *imicus* might very well exist instead of *amicus*. The same observation applies to the French word *ennemi*, since this is for *in-ami*, that is, *un ami*, "unfriend," "no friend;" so that this French word might with great propriety be written *enami*, or *enimi*. The English word *enemy* is, it is scarcely necessary to observe, the French word *ennemi*, and it consequently means *un-ami* (a no friend), though it must have *once* meant "a friend;" but at this time *un* was in English what it is still in French, that is, an affirmative.

I have now to show how all numbers make but one. We have seen that in Greek, Latin, French,

and English, the word *two* means "double one," so here we have *one* qualified by the word *double*. But the character by which *double* is signified means "life," it being either *iv* (that is, *w*), or *u* or *v*, so that *two* really means "the life one;" and as the word *one* itself has in all languages the same meaning, we see that these two words differ only in form, in order to signify the difference in quantity between them. Then *two* is only *one* repeated, and it is as if we were to say *one*, *one*. Hence when we analyse *two* thus, *it-in-o*, which is as correct as *it-iv-o*, this literally means, "the one one." This can be rendered still more intelligible by our observing, that the plural number of words is made by the word *one*. Thus the Latin word *magister* is in the plural *magisteri* (contracted to *magistri*), so that the plural is formed by adding to the singular a word (*i*) which means "one;" and as it is evident that by *magisteri* is meant "several masters," it follows that the word (*i*) is here equal to *several*. Now this word *i* is a name for the Divinity, as I have shown a great many times; so that if we are to understand it as we usually do when it indicates the plural number, we shall be obliged to admit that, as in this case it means several things, it may, when referring to the Divinity, mean several gods, which meaning, it is evident from what we have already seen, it cannot possibly have. Then what are we hence to infer? That there is, in reality, no such thing as a plural number in any language on earth; and that, as the

words *plural* and *several* are represented by a word meaning "one," or "the Divinity," it follows that in all languages these words, *several* and *plural*, must also mean "one," or, which is the same, the Divinity. The Greek word for *several*, ενιοι, may be thus analysed, *en-i-o-i*, and here we have *en* standing as an article, in apposition to *i-o-i*, so that what *en* means, the three letters *i-o-i* mean also. We know that *en* means "one," and hence *i-o-i* must mean "one." Here we ought to remark, that *en* is composed of two characters: of *e*, which is equal to *o*, and of *n*, which is equal to *i i*, so that in this word *en* we have the three letters by which it is followed in ενιοι, and, consequently, the whole word might be written, εν-εν, that is, *one one*, which is equal to "the first one," or to "all," both of which we have often found to be names for the Divinity. As *i o i* is also the same as *i s i*, and as these three letters are, when thus arranged, *is-i*, equal to "is one," "the one," or still (since *is* can become *B*), "be one," we clearly see how they explain themselves, by telling us that they mean "one." These three characters (*i o i*) ought also to remind us of the number *three*, the *Trinity*, &c., which, we have seen, mean also, "the being one," although meaning "three." There is still another word in Greek for *several*, which is, πολλοι, and it may be analysed thus, *ip-ol-il-oi*. Here *ip-ol* is the same as *iv-ol*, or *evil*, which literally means, "life all," that is, "all life," or "the Divinity;" and to this *il-oi* (which is the same as *il o*, or *the sun*)

stands in apposition; so that πολλοι, like ενιοι, means also, "the Divinity." The Latin word *plures* may be thus analysed, *ip-il-iv-ir-eis*. Here *ip-il*, which is still the same as *evil*, or the *Divinity*, is in apposition to *iv-er* alone, or to *iv-er* and *eis* united. In the former case, these three words mean, "the eternal one," and in the latter they mean, "God, eternity, one," of which the meaning is, "God is eternity and one." But they are in reality three words for *one*, and here it is intended that they should signify, "one, one, one," that is, *three*, and this number means, we know, "the being one," just as *one* has been shown to mean *three*.

The French word *plusieurs* is, when analysed, *iv-il-us-i-ever-eis*. Here *plus* is rendered by *iv il us*, and this means "the one," *ivil* being here like an article, and *us* being the same as *os*, that is, *ois*, or εις, the Greek word for *one*. The remainder of *plusieurs* means "one, ever one;" so that the whole word may be thus rendered, "the one one, ever one;" in which we have two qualifying words, *the* and *ever*, so that when these are omitted, the meaning will be, "one one one," that is, "three," or "the being one."

The English word *several* is, when analysed, *is ever al*, in which we have three names for the Divinity, and consequently each means *one;* so that *several* makes also "one one one," or "three," or "the being one." The analysis of *plural* is *iv-il-iv-er-al*, in which we have again the three well-known names for the Divinity, *evil*, *ever*, and *all*, and,

consequently, "one one one," or "three," or "the being one."

Thus we see that in all these words, signifying what we call a plural number, the meaning is ever equal to "one," or "the being one," the latter having the meaning of what we conceive to be three, but which is the same as one. But nothing can show more clearly that a plural number is signified by *one*, than an examination of the French and Spanish articles, *le*, *la*, *les*, *lo*, *las*, *los*, which, analysed, become *il o*, *il oi*, *il eis*, or *il ois*, *il o*, *il ois*, *il ois*. Here every word has the same meaning, and this is, "the one," so that there is no difference whatever between the singular and the plural. Then *le livre* means "the one (namely) book;" and *les livres* mean "the one (namely) book one;" since the *s* in *livres* is for *eis*. In like manner, *the book* means "the one (namely) book," and *the books* mean "the one (namely) book one," the *s* being for *es*, and *es* being for *eis* or *ois*. As to the word *the*, it is also for *it-iv-o*, "the life *o*;" that is, "the thing one;" and if we do not account for the *e* in this word, but analyse it thus, *it iv*, the meaning will still be, *the one;* and if we make *iv* become *in*, the meaning will still be, "the one," or "the ten;" for there is no difference between these words, which arises from *one* being the first or head number, and from *ten* meaning also "head one" (*it en*). *Ten* is the same as *one*, from the word *it* being a name for the Divinity, and in apposition to *en*, another name for the Divinity; and as here

both words are precisely equal, they cannot, for this reason, make more than one, as precise equality cannot exist out of one.

Now if it can be conceived that the number two is a double one; that is, only one repeated, and that it cannot, for this reason, be other than *a one*, though less in quantity than the number commonly named one, it can just as easily be conceived that two millions are but one. But how can this be proved? Very easily, and in this way. If two be only a one, it follows that four can be only a two, since what the number two is to one, the number four must be to two, there being precisely the same difference between four and two which we perceive between two and one, for the reason that the number four is twice as many as two, and that the number two is twice as many as one. Hence as four must be equal to two, it must also be equal to one, since the number two is only one, and, consequently, the number four is only one. Now if four be only two (another name for one), it follows that eight can be only four, there being precisely the same difference between eight and four which we perceive between four and two, for the reason that the number eight is twice as many as four, and that the number four is twice as many as two; and if eight be only four, it follows that it can be only one, since the number four is equal to two, and the number two is equal to one. Then if eight be equal to four (another name for one),

it follows that sixteen must be equal to eight, and, consequently, to one, since the number eight has been found equal to one. It is unnecessary to continue; any body may follow up this train of reasoning for millions, and thus show, from its being admitted, that the number two is only another one, that all numbers make but one. This part of my discovery, which is, I have no doubt, very important, and it must lead to a great deal more, might have been made many ages ago, had men looked closely into the grand idea to be found in the Trinity; for if three be here only one, as it is believed, it follows that nine can be only three, and, consequently, only one, and that, in like manner, twenty-seven can be only nine or one; so that from our admitting three to be only one, we can, by following up this idea, as in the instance of two being one, show how millions, and, consequently, all numbers, make but one. Hence it is evident that every body who believes in the Trinity, or who can in the least understand how its three persons make but one, must, if this comprehension be real, and not affected, admit the truth of what I here state respecting all numbers. From our thus discovering the Trinity to be in all words and letters, it is clear that nothing can be of a more ancient date, and from its being thus known to all people who have ever made use of language, it is also very evident that it must have entered into every ancient religious belief in the world.

If we examine the ten figures, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0, we shall find that each of them means *one*. The 2 is composed of two parts equal to *in* or to *on*, that is, to *one*. This part of it ( ) is equal to *i*, and the part depending from this *i*, thus, |, is equal to another *i*, so that these two ones produce this much of the entire figure 2; and to this we need only add another *i*, thus, , and allow them to meet, in order to have a complete 2. But were this figure to be made with three ones, thus, , we should have still, when these met thus, , the form of a 2. The first one above is to be taken for the *i* in the word *in;* and the other two are to be considered equal to the *n* itself. We have already seen that this character N is only an I and a V connected thus, N, and as this can mean "1 double," as well as "the first life," since the V may be said to qualify the I, we can, by admitting this much, perceive more clearly how the three ones in 2, which are also equal to IV, are the same as *in*, and this becomes very visible when we allow *in* to take its Greek form, namely, ιν. Now as *o* is the same as *i*, if we replace the top part of the 2 by an *o*, thus, , allowing it to join with the rest of the 2, thus, , every body will take this character for the figure two. When we allow it this form, we may say it is equal to *on* or to ον. Indeed, when here the ο and ν are made to join thus, , we see clearly all that composes the figure two.

The figure 3 has been already accounted for, and we have seen that it is composed of three parts

(ʒ), which are, we know, equal to IO; and this word, besides its other meanings, has also that of "one."

The figure four, whether made thus, 4, or thus, 4, is composed of four ones, they being in the former instance arranged thus, ⊔, and in the latter thus, ⊿, as we have already seen. Then we have here all that is to be found in the figure 2, and one over; that is to say, we have three ones and one; and as the three ones are equal to IV, IΛ (the latter of these being the Greek form of IL), or to ιν, (that is, *in*,) which four words are all names for the Divinity, and mean "one," it follows that when another one is still added to them, the meaning becomes "one one," or "one over." *One one* can also mean "the first," or "all;" but as by *one over* is signified "the Divinity," *the first* and *all* will also apply to HIM. If we put the four ones of 4 and 4 thus, IΛ or thus, I⊿, and allow them to meet, we shall have the pronoun ιλ (*il*), which means "the Divinity," and ιΔ (*id*), which is also "one above," or "the Divinity." Hence it is that the English word *four*, if analysed thus, *if-o-ver*, literally means, "one over," since *if* is the same as *iv* or *in*, (that is, one,) as has been already shown. The two words *if over* mean also, "the double one being," and when we give the above analysis thus, *IV-over*, we have in the two first letters IV the number *four*, so that *over* may, in this case, be rendered by "the being," or "the thing," and *IV-over* will then mean, "the thing IV," which

can also mean "the one double," this being equally the definition of two.

The figure 5 is composed of three parts, which are these, 5. The part above has been taken from *o*, and it is the cause of this character being, in the present instance, made thus, ɔ; the second part is the figure 1, so that when the part taken from *o* is restored, we have IO instead of 5; that is, *ten*, which is also *one*.

The figure 6 is composed of these two parts, I and o, the former being placed above the latter thus, 6, so that when the I is brought down, we have again IO, which, besides its other meanings, is also for *one* and *three* (that is, 3.)

The figure seven, made thus, 7, is also composed of these three parts, 7; and these are equal to ⊢, in which we have also IV or N; that is, *in* or *one*. The English word *seven* makes *is-even* when analysed, and this is equal to *is-un;* that is, "the one." These two words may be also rendered by *Be one* or *io un;* but nothing can change their meaning. In Saxon the word *seven* is written thus, *sefon*, of which the meaning is, "is f one," that is, "it is the f and one;" which means, it is "seven;" for as the *f* is the sixth letter of the alphabet, we have by the adding of *one* to it the number *seven*. The *f* is also alluded to in the word *twelve*, which is in Saxon written *twelf;* the analysis of this word being, *two-el-f*, and this literally means, "two the f," that is, "twice f." Twice is the same as *two is*, and as *two is f* means also "two the f," since *is*

means "the," and is as much what we call an article or pronoun as it is a verb, we see that *two el f* makes, literally, "twice f." *Eleven* may also, notwithstanding that I have already otherwise accounted for it, be analysed thus, *el-even*, that is, "L being;" meaning by this that it is the letter L, which is the eleventh of the alphabet, the I and J not being accounted for more than one.

The figure 8 is, we have already seen, composed of o and o added together, thus, 8; and as *o* is equal to *one*, 8 may be said to be the same as double one, or as I and O, in which we have also double one. When 8 is considered as composed of I and O, instead of *o* and *o*, its form is to be found in these three parts, Iꝯ, put together thus, ꝯꓕ, and allowed to meet thus, ꝯ; and here, as ꝯ is equal to ꝯ, or to *o*, we have still IO, or IS or B, and visibly *one*.

The figure *nine* is made thus, 9, which, as this is no other than 0 and 1 added together thus, ꝯ, and which we also see joined thus, q, is still equal to *one one*, or double one, or to *all*, or the Divinity; so that it does not differ, as to meaning, in the least from any of the preceding numbers.

Though I do now account but for the form of figures, I cannot here avoid noticing the name given to the number *nine*, as the close resemblance it bears, in ancient and modern languages, to the word for *new*, has often attracted the notice of the learned. As the figure 9 is equal to *oi*, and as these two characters are equal to *one one*, and as

these two words mean "one in the extreme," or "the first one," and as the first of a thing is its *new* state, we discover how it happens that the French word for *new* and for *nine* do not differ, since both make *neuf;* and that the radical parts of *novus* (new), and of *novem* (nine), are still the same, since both make *nov.*

When we analyse the English word *nine*, we have *en-ine*, and here *ine*, when its sound is considered, is precisely equal to *eyne*, because *I* is equal to *ey* or *eye*, or even to *eg* or *ig*, as we have already seen several times. Then as *eyne* is the ancient plural of *eye*, and is, consequently, for *eyes*, it follows that *nine* really means, "the eyes," that is, "one one," and these two words, as stated above, mean also, "the first one," because the repetition of a thing implies that it is in the extreme. Now as *ey* is the same as *eye*, and as *y* is the Greek γ, from which it does not differ even in form, it follows that *eyne* might as well be written *egne*, and that the word *nine* might be also written *negne*, of which the analysis is, *en-eg-in;* and as *eg* does not differ from *egg*, it follows that *en-eg-in* means "the egg one," that is, "the egg egg," or "the eggs," for here the *in* at the end is for the plural, just as it is in *eyne* (that is, *ey-in*). Thus we see that *nine* means "the first one," or "the eyes," and that it is also the plural of *egg*, and, consequently, means "eggs." Hence there is no difference (since *eg* is equal to *ig*, and that both these words are equal to *I*) between the pronoun singular of the

first person and an *egg*. Then as *I* means "the first life," or "the first person," so must an *egg* mean "a first thing," and this it really does, since it is the first of fowls and insects. We have just seen that the radical part of *novem* is *nov:* this word *nov*, when analysed, makes *en-ov;* and as *v* is equal to *n*, these two words become *en-on*, which, when we make *e* take its form of *o*, are the same as *on on*, that is, *one one;* so that *nov* does not differ in meaning from *nine*, since the latter means the "eyes," and that this plural is equal to I I, or *one one*, as has been already shown. But *nov* means, not only "one one," which is equal to *the first*, but also *an egg*, since, analysed, it is *en ov;* and since *ov* is the radical part of *ovum* (an egg), and also of *nov*, (that is, of *en-ov*,) the radical part of *novem*, so that the real word in Latin for *egg* is *ov*. The reader must now know that the *um* in *ovum* is only an article which has fallen behind. Hence too, the French word *neuf* is, when analysed, *en-euf*, and of this the literal meaning also is, "one one," or "an egg." The French word for *egg* is now *œuf*, and this is very correct, but not a particle more so than *euf*, for the reason that the two letters in *œ* stand in apposition to one another, so that one of them may be very well suppressed; and were the *e*, instead of *o*, to be dropped, the remaining part (*ouf*) would be also very correct, since *o* is the same as ε or *e*. Hence the other French word, *nouveau*, might as well have been written *neuveau*, since this word is for *au neuf*, of

which the meaning is, "to the new," that is, "belonging to the new," "to what is new:" we may also observe, that *œuf* and *euf* are precisely equal in sound. But since *u* is the same as *v*, and that in Latin in the radical part of *novem* (*nov*), and in the radical part of *ovum* (*ov*), there is no *f* still added to the *v*, why are not the two French words *neuf* and *œuf* written *neu* and *œu?* In the beginning these words must have been written as in the latter instance, but then the *u* signified more clearly than it did afterwards what was double; so that when it began, from its being frequently employed to indicate single objects, to show its primitive meaning less distinctly, it was found necessary to increase its power by attaching to it another character of equal import. Hence *uf* is equal to *uu*, or to *ui*, or still to *iu*, and here each form means "double." Thus in English the word *neuf* is written *new*, because the *w* is exactly equal in power to *uf*, the latter being, as I have said, for *uu*, and, consequently, for *vv* or *w*. By this we see that the radical part of *new* was, in the beginning, *nev*, which, from the *e* being the same as *o*, is equal to the *nov* of *novem;* so that these two words, and the French word *neuf*, do not, when radically considered, differ from one another. By this account of *nine*, we may be sure that this word will be found, when radically considered, to be in all languages synonymous with *new*, *eye*, and an *egg*. It is because it signifies "one one" (from its being composed of *o*, *i*) that

it is the same as *eye*, which, from our having two eyes, has a similar meaning; and it is because *one one* indicates "the first," that *nine* and this word are also synonymous; and it does not, for the same reason, differ from *new*, since that which is new is in its first state. But as *one one* signifies, "one in the extreme," may not *nine* mean, when used negatively, "none?" It may; and such is the origin of the English word *none*, and hence there is not a shade of difference between it and *nine*, and it were very correct to have these two words exactly alike. Hence the Latin word for *ninth* (that is, "nine the," "the nine,") is *nonus*, and as this must in the beginning have been *us non* ("the nine"), we see clearly (as *non* is the same as *none*) that the Latin of *nine*, and the English word *none*, were written alike. But since we know that *i* and *o* are equal, why should we expect *nine* to differ from *none*, as it is only in these two letters the apparent difference between *nine* and *none* consists? The analysis of the radical part of *novem* (*nov*) has shown this word to be the same as *non* (*en-on*), and this analysis is here proved to be very correct, since in *nonus* ("nine the") the word *nov* takes this form of *non;* hence *nov*em and *non*us do not at all differ. As another proof of a statement just made, namely, that *eye* and *egg* must, in all languages, have, when radically considered, the same meaning, I now find that in the Teutonic language, of which I was not thinking when the above statement was made, the word for *egg* is *ey*. Many

curious observations might still be made respecting the words just examined, but enough has been said of them to put every body in the way of supplying here several voluntary omissions.

The figure which follows *nine* is 0, for which I have already many times accounted. From its having 1 understood before it, it is equal to *ten*, of which the meaning is, "head one." The termination *ty*, as, twen*ty*, thir*ty*, for*ty*, &c., means also, "the head *one*," since it may be thus analysed, *it-i* (head one); and the same meaning will be also found by analysing *ty* thus, *it-iv*, which is the same as *tin*, and, consequently, as *ten*, so that *twenty* is, literally, *twen-ten*, which does not differ from *twain-ten*, that is, *twice ten*. We can see how *ty* makes, when analysed, *tiv*, by remembering that Y is composed of these three parts, IV. The French termination *ante*, as, quar*ante*, cinqu*ante*, and which (as it is in *tr*ENTE) might as well be written *ente*, is also, when thus analysed, *en-it*, and that the *it* takes its place in front, *iten*, which, when the *i* is omitted, is, literally, *ten*. The English termination, *teen*, as, thir*teen*, four*teen*, &c., means, as every body knows, "ten." But nobody has ever suspected that this word is the same as *itiin*, and that this is the same as *itun*, or *tun*, which is still, as it may be thus analysed, *it un*, "the head one," or *ten*.* But the

* The English measure and weight, *tun* or *ton*, must have been so named (the head one) from its being the largest of its kind; or from its having in the *beginning* ten times the quantity of some other weight or measure.

most hidden form of this number is, perhaps, in the French termination, *ze*, as in trei*ze*, quator*ze*, &c. But children will henceforth find it very easy to account for this ending, as they must know, from what has been seen so often, that it is equal to IS, and that IS is the same as IO, or 10.

Thus, as I have said farther back, might I continue, and still swell volumes with the Divine wisdom which has, for so many ages, lain hidden in words; but here this work, which, whilst going through the press, has increased in bulk to about double what it was when at first thought sufficiently complete, must for the present close. The reality of the discovery it contains is, notwithstanding its visionary appearance, rendered sufficiently evident to convince every intelligent and just mind in the world, that it can be no dream.

That there will, however, be found individuals who cannot, after a patient perusal of this work, believe — notwithstanding the mass of incontrovertible evidence with which it abounds — that it does really contain the extraordinary discovery to which it pretends, there cannot be the least doubt; for every body in any way acquainted with the human mind must be well aware, that there are a great many men, even men that can boast of more than considerable learning, who have been both born and bred with views so confined, as not to have the power of conceiving the existence of any great truth beyond what they have been taught all their lives to believe. Yet even such minds

will at length be brought to be thoroughly convinced of the truth of this discovery; but when? About the time every body else will have believed it for them, but no sooner. And then, perhaps, with well-feigned astonishment at the dulness, indifference, or want of penetration in others, they will see by the means of borrowed light, but by none of their own, the truth of this discovery; and they may probably stand forth amongst its warmest admirers, just as if they, and they alone, had, on the first day of its appearing before the public, entered into the spirit of it, and made known all its merits. But this belief and admiration will come too late; that is to say, when it will not be needed. As feigned intelligence is, however, to be preferred to what we understand by dogged stupidity, just as affected modesty in woman is to be preferred to a recklessness of all shame, we should not — though a dislike for every thing in the shape of hypocrisy might, on first consideration, prompt us to act otherwise — look down with too much contempt on such pretensions to knowledge, nor censure the persons in whom we detect a similar weakness for their limited powers, since this were to be as unjust as to blame our friend for the disagreeable colour of his eyes or his hair, or for his being subject to any natural infirmity from which no man is free.

But what is there to hinder any body from believing in this discovery? A great deal — the power of thinking for one's self. And how diffi-

cult may it be to conceive clearly the truth of this discovery? About as difficult as to understand that one and one make double one. But this is what every body in the world can very easily believe? Yes, because every body happens to know it already; but if men could have remained ignorant of so simple a truth until now, the person making it known for the first time might not find more than one man in a hundred to believe in his discovery.

I may also assert, that he who cannot bring himself to believe in the discovery of the science of languages is born an atheist; by which I do not mean to say that he is now an atheist, or that he has the least disbelief in the existence of a God; but my meaning is, that if he had remained until now in such ignorance, he could not, for want of originality of mind, be brought to believe in this truth, than which, however, none can be more evident.

But such persons as cannot bring themselves to believe in this new science of languages, and who may treat what is here proclaimed to be such as a mere effusion of the fancy, will, by this act, bestow, unknown to themselves, greater praise upon its author than ever human being has received; for there is in this system, which, I have no doubt, is real, such wisdom as no mortal of whose labours we know any thing has ever approached, and much less equalled. How admirable that all the languages, words, and letters ever known, should be

reducible to the least point imaginable, and that this should name the Creator of all things! There is, without again considering that all words and letters, as well as this little point, do ever carry with themselves their own happy definitions, in the mere unity of this arrangement, something so extraordinarily wise, beautiful, yet simple, and so like the planning of a God, and unlike every thing of human contrivance, as to leave infinitely behind it all that man, as far as we know of him, has yet accomplished.

Now the more I reflect on this grand idea of unity, and feel convinced that there was a time when man had only one word, and that he was then in a happy state, the more do I firmly believe, when I dare to ask what language is spoken in heaven, that there, too, there can be no more than one word, but which is so wonderfully contrived, as ever to name the Divinity, and all things else besides.

Nobody can yet show all the advantages to be derived from the knowledge of this science; but they must be numerous, and of the greatest importance. To bring down men's ideas from a period so wonderfully remote as that when words were first spoken must throw such a light on the primitive state of mankind, as to enable the historian to correct many a gross error, and fill up many a blank in both the civil and religious history of the ancient world. The assistance this science will also lend in the study of languages must, even

now, while it is only yet in its infancy, be very great; but some short time hence I hope to see its principles so clearly methodised and well known, that even children may, with the knowledge of their alphabet alone, be enabled to decipher, with facility, the words of all languages. With such a diffusion of knowledge, and means of communication established between distant people, many happy changes may take place over the world, of which we can now form no idea. This discovery must also lay open a new way to the science of numbers. The petty mathematician will of course see little or nothing in what I have discovered respecting the point, the circle, and the straight line, which three I have proved to be all one and the same figure; and he must be equally embarrassed to conceive what advantage can be derived from our knowing that, in all numbers, there is only one; but were such a man as Newton now living, he could, with his extraordinary powers of penetration, perceive in these discoveries a great deal; and he would, I have no doubt, allow them to be, for the science of the mathematics, a valuable acquisition.

In like manner the learned, but not the bigoted, theologian, must, if he be a sincere lover of truth, admit that in this discovery may, from the minute explanations given of the Divinity, the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the Sun and the Son, the Soul, a Human Being, and Truth, and Eternity, be distinctly seen what man's most ancient religious notions were.

He will also admit that this discovery does more to confirm certain wavering minds in the belief of a wise Being who has created all things than any religious or philosophical work ever yet published; for he will remark, that it does not on this serious question show us the opinions of only one people, but what those of the whole world must have been, and this, too, at a time when the human mind was never, it would seem, half so enlightened. Nor can he omit alluding to that part of this discovery showing men to have at one time been in a state of innocence; and if himself unwilling to offer his opinion on a point requiring so much mature reflection and inquiry, he will at least lay great stress upon its importance, and remark how extremely curious and interesting it appears, and how every lover of truth should lend his assistance towards having it sifted to the bottom. The enlightened theologian must also agree with the opinion to be met with several times in this work, namely, that the loss of the science of languages was one of the greatest misfortunes by which the world has been ever visited, since to it, more than to any other cause, must be attributed the great disunion in both religion and love that has, since that fatal time, spread over the earth; and he will add, that if ever again all men are to have but one creed, it is to this discovery alone they will be indebted for the means of recovering so great a blessing.

And such writers as we call clever grammarians, that is to say, those men with whom the study of

words is a passion, and who sacrifice their whole lives in endeavouring to understand and define, for the benefit of the multitude, the various classes of words into which languages have been hitherto divided, must, with one accord, on beholding this discovery, honestly confess that of their favourite study they have until now known absolutely nothing, not so much as a substantive from an adjective, nor A from B. And these intelligent men will not fail to observe — laying, as they ought to do, great stress upon this important fact — how clearly it is proved in the opening of this work, that the most eminent grammarians on record have not left behind them so much as a single definition of any of the parts of speech that can bear a logical investigation; and this one circumstance, they will continue to observe, is the strongest proof that can be brought forward of our hitherto total ignorance of the science of grammar, as what men *do really know* they *can very easily define.* But the petty grammarian will not at first see in this discovery so much as the intelligent minds to whom I here allude, for the simple reason that his confined views will not allow him to look so far. He may, however, to a certain degree, understand some portions of it; but his knowledge can, after all, be only a schoolboy's, and not such as a master mind is possessed of, for he cannot feel thoroughly convinced that he *knows* what he really *does know;* and this doubt will be greatly increased by the apparent impossibility of our now making for the

first time such a discovery as the present. Hence, if his opinion be sought for on this point, he will give it evasively; and if pressed to answer otherwise, he will, for want of the master knowledge to which I refer, go against the evidence of his own senses, and think it safest to believe that what is now offered to the public as the science of grammar must surely be no such thing, and that it is probably, at best, but an ingenious contrivance. He will, therefore, give an answer in the spirit of this reasoning, but still with so much evasion as to allow every body of discernment to perceive that, however high his pretensions may be, or whatever he may affect to know, he has no real confidence in himself, and that both his knowledge and penetration are, after all, but second rate. This work can suffer more on its first appearance from the drivelling praise of such a grammarian as I here allude to, than from the open and direct censure of ten clever men; for the latter will not, in order to hide their own weakness, be obliged to employ petty subterfuge, but they will at once meet the important question, namely, *Does this work really contain, what its author feels convinced that it does, "The Discovery of the Science of Languages?"* Such is the question to which every body who may happen to make any inquiry on this subject must wish to have a clear and direct answer, and this will be granted by all minds endued with what may be called real knowledge—*the power of thinking for one's self.*

The learned lexicographer will also admit, on examining the meanings to be found in the analyses of words given in this work, that an entire dictionary, compiled on the same plan, would be, of all the productions of the mind, the most curious and valuable.

As to what great logicians and philosophers are likely to think of this discovery, I need give no opinion of my own, for we have theirs. Thus Locke, referring to words as well as to ideas, observes: — "Perhaps if they were distinctly weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic than we have been hitherto acquainted with." *

Dugald Stewart also, referring to the same subject, observes: — "The branch in particular to which the foregoing observations more immediately relate *must for ever remain in its infancy* till a most difficult and important desideratum in the history of the mind is supplied, by an explanation of the gradual steps by which it acquires the use of the various classes of words which compose the language of a cultivated and enlightened people." † We may hence safely infer that, had this discovery been known to Locke and Dugald Stewart, and all such writers, their works would have been quite different from what they are at present. We are even to believe, whilst admitting, as we ought to do, these statements quoted from them to be sincere, that could they, on the eve of the publication of

* See Vol. I. p. 29. of this work. † Ibid.

their works, have seen the present discovery, they would have confessed that all they had ever written on the human mind should, from beginning to end, be considered over again.

These latter observations remind me, that I should here make known the names of several works for which I am now collecting materials, to the end — as I mean to apply, in the execution of them, the knowledge just discovered — that all persons desirous of lending assistance towards bringing as near to perfection as possible "the science of languages," may favour me with their advice or communications, on a matter so likely to interest and benefit the public. The works to which I allude are to be "A National Dictionary," showing the meaning which every word carries in itself, as its own definition; "A National Grammar;" and "The Elements of Philosophy and Logic." *

As a single perusal of this work must enable many intelligent persons to analyse, in all the languages of which they know the letters, multitudes of words, with correctness and facility, and as such persons will, I have no doubt, amuse themselves sometimes this way, it would, were I favoured with

* These communications may, when made in England, be addressed to Messrs. Longman and Co., London, for the author; and, as he intends to publish similar works in France for the use of the French nation, they may, when made in the latter country, be addressed to the care of the Paris publisher, for Monsieur Charles Joubert, whose encouragement and enlightened opinions have been of great service to the author during the progress of the present discovery.

their productions, be *soon* in my power, with the trouble of revisal alone, to lay before the public by far the most curious and valuable dictionary ever yet published; but which, without some such assistance, must be the labour of years.

By this means I should be also enabled to contend with the many competitors I am likely to have in the application of the principles of the science of languages to such works as I have in contemplation; for, though there may be many persons of views so confined as will not be able to raise themselves to the height of the present discovery, and who can, consequently, neither understand nor adopt its principles, it is impossible for me to conceive how persons of enlarged minds, and whose belief in it will be sincere, can any longer follow a system by which they must be well aware — for it has been clearly proved in this work — that not so much as one word can, without the grossest contradiction and violation of common sense, be accounted for.

But it is to the respectable members of schools and colleges — to all institutions founded for the diffusion of useful knowledge — to self-taught students (for these at least have thoughts of their own) — and to the estimable parents who make their children's education the study of their lives — that I look most for the advice I now claim; well aware as I am, that such persons must, of all others, take most interest in the advancement of this discovery.

As to the form of this work, no advice can be justly given. My discoveries, it has been already stated, are set down in the rude but natural order in which they have been made; and as they were put together in the midst of haste and interruption — and the greater part whilst going through the press—it can be easily conceived that unless I were, when at the last page, to begin the whole work over again, its form could not have been improved. But had this been done, it would no longer show, as it does now, the way in which this discovery was made, nor its regular progress throughout; although this mode would have enabled me to have given all its parts in an equally finished and correct state, which it has not been in my power to do, for the reason that, as I advanced, my knowledge increased. Hence any body of the least penetration may, from a single perusal of this work, remark, that he can analyse words much better than I did myself in the beginning, when my knowledge of this art was yet very faint, compared to what it is at present — but I have, of course, still many things to learn.

Of the members of the press I ask no advice, as it were impossible to do so without begging a favour of them, and in this quarter I do not wish for any. If my discovery be real, I shall stand in need of no indulgence, and if it be not, I should have none. To speak indulgently of such a discovery were, for the reason that it so nearly concerns public instruction, the most criminal act of

which a reviewer could *perhaps*, in the discharge of his duty, be guilty. I say *perhaps*, because, besides this criminal act, there is still another, fully as bad, and of which certain respectable gentlemen of the press—I mean those who wish nobody to be thought any wiser than they are themselves—might very well be guilty; and this were to endeavour, by affected indifference, or mutilated reviews of it, to keep this discovery as much as possible out of the reach of public notice. But were I to crave any indulgence for this work, it ought to be for its form; and the more so, as in our days the wretched art of book-making is greatly prized and practised, and is brought to so high a state of perfection that some men appear—and these, I am told, are the most popular writers—to have discovered the happy means of filling as many volumes as they please with nothing at all.

Hence such persons as are smitten with this wonderful art, must find a work containing the science of all the languages ever spoken, with a great deal of other hidden knowledge besides, a very unsightly production compared to one made up after the fashion of the day, out of nothing; and they may, in their hearts, pity the simple man who could allow himself to be so won with making such a discovery, as never once to think of making a book. Every body, they will remind me, has been delighted with Horne Tooke's wonderful account of the Verb; and yet nobody can understand what he means by it, as he never, notwithstanding

all he says about it in his two large quarto volumes, gives, it is remarked, a definition of this word. I shall be also told, that it does not appear nowadays the fashion to have minds sufficiently enlarged to conceive the plan of a work so grossly contrived as mine is; one of so extensive and varied a range, and which takes in such a multitude of discoveries respecting both the forms and meanings of words and letters. Horne Tooke, they will again remind me, has astonished all philologists by his celebrated account of the word THAT, though he never knew what it means; whereas my account of the same word will attract no notice at all — though I do show what it means — on account of the vast number of other far more important discoveries by which it is surrounded. Had this work gone no farther than the Substantive and the Adjective, this were surely sufficient matter, with numerous quotations, for two large quarto volumes, and more than enough, in our days, to fill a mind of great capacity; but the discovery of the real nature of these two words will also, notwithstanding its importance, be soon lost sight of by nine readers out of ten, in the many other discoveries equally important, by which it is still followed. The same may be said of the contents of almost every page in the whole of this work; each new discovery being, through its importance, calculated to banish the recollection of all that went before. Such a superabundance of matter, will, I am aware, be very prejudicial to this discovery with such minds

as cannot find room for an idea more than they have had all their lives. Hence these minds will ever, when thinking of this work, see but a fraction of it, and perhaps the one least worthy of notice; yet with this fraction all its defects (of which they will of course be more tenacious) must bear a comparison. If the minds to which I here refer belong to petty reviewers, they will, from being aware that my discoveries are set down in the rude but natural order in which they came to me, and that the greater part of them has been made whilst this work was going through the press, dwell, with great emphasis, on carelessness of style, want of method, conciseness, &c., wholly forgetting that it is an important discovery brought out in the face of many difficulties, and not a tinsel volume of the day made up of studied words and phrases, but nothing else, of which they have to give an account.

But the man of enlarged ideas will take a very different view of this work. He will in the beginning start at its title, like every body else; but he will not — like the man of confined views — for this individual thinks nothing possible but what his own little mind can grasp — pronounce such a discovery impossible, though he cannot yet imagine how it is to be made. Hence he will endeavour to read the first pages of this work with an even mind, and when, by this means, he perceives that I am fully aware of man's incredulity with regard to the possibility of such a discovery, he

will be led to read farther, with some degree of curiosity, in order to see in what way it can possibly be shown and proved that men have no such science as that called grammar, nor even the most distant notion of the real nature of any one of the words called the parts of speech. The inquiry respecting the substantive and the adjective alone will convince him, even before he comes to the place where their real nature is shown, that of these two parts of speech, which are by far the most simple of all, the greatest grammarians, and logicians, and philosophers, that ever lived, have known, critically speaking, nothing. For he will make a remark similar to one I have made, namely, that to be able to tell whether a word is singular or plural, or masculine or feminine, from looking at its form, argues no more a knowledge of grammar — for a man must have the use of neither his eyes nor his ears not to know this much — than it argues a knowledge of astronomy to be able to tell that the sun shines by day, and the moon by night. He will clearly see that our pretended science of grammar is nothing more than an admission of what our eyes and our ears tell us, and that we know the cause of nothing, not even why the plural number of nouns is signified in English, and several other languages, by an *s*. He will also observe how clearly it is shown, in the opening of this work, that the meanings assigned to words by the most learned lexicographers cannot bear investigation; and he will instance such familiar

words as *mine*, *thine*, *ours*, *yours*, *theirs*, *his*, and *hers*; adding, that not even when grammatically considered can these well-known words be in any way accounted for, since, in proof of this fact, the highest authorities are brought forward, and their weakness plainly shown. All nouns in the genitive or possessive case will next attract his notice, and draw from him a similar admission. He will wonder how men could have remained until now without ever once suspecting their profound ignorance of these things, and he will remark, even before he knows how they are to be accounted for — which will, of course, excite, in no small degree, his curiosity — that did my work stop here, even this little, by its merely showing that of the science of words we know nothing, is calculated — as this knowledge of our ignorance is the first step towards the present discovery — to throw a greater light on philology than any other work ever yet published on this subject has done. But when he comes to the unfolding of all these difficulties, and to the discoveries connected with them, how he will wonder at their uncommon simplicity, and the want of penetration in man at not perceiving them sooner! But what will fill him with the greatest astonishment is, that Englishmen never knew substantives to have in their language, like pronouns, two possessive cases, and that the grammarians of no language ever suspected substantives to be only adjectives in the fourth degree; for these are facts of all others the

most evident, and that seem to lie open to the dullest penetration.

But however curious and important he may consider these discoveries, and those of the pronouns by which they are immediately followed, they will be soon almost banished from his memory by the many others still more curious and important to be found farther on, with all of which the reader is already acquainted. Notwithstanding the variety and number of these discoveries, the intelligent reviewer will endeavour, by a few happy instances, to give his readers a general idea of them all; but this he can more effectually do by stating what his own impressions are with regard to the truth and importance of this work; and he will conclude, by calling upon all lovers of science, to lend, by their advice and literary contributions, the assistance I claim towards the perfecting of a discovery from which, if we only consider the light it throws upon the study of languages, all civilised nations must derive great benefit.

But though I may have fallen upon days so evil as to find no mind so far capable of entering all at once into the spirit of this discovery as to rouse, on its first appearance, public attention in its favour, still I feel as confident as I do of my own existence, that such total blindness and profound apathy cannot possibly endure. And this strong assurance I receive both from the mathematical demonstration by which every body must admit this discovery to be supported, and from the hope

that though the human mind is at present in a very low state, it cannot, however, be so low as not to dare to think so much for itself as to have the power of conceiving the simple truth which is here made known.

Then all the consummate ignorance, littleness of mind, and affected indifference, with which the enemies of truth are likely to meet this discovery on its first appearance — for it is in this way that by them every thing great is met in the beginning — cannot, in the least, remove my unbounded confidence in its ultimate success. Nor will such individuals, however they may affect the contrary, wonder at my presumption in daring to doubt whatever they advance; for they must confess in their hearts, though openly they will not do so, that to the many great men of every clime and age, with whom, by what is here done, I have not only ventured to struggle, but whose weakness I have even dared to show, it were for them an honour to kneel.

But the lover of truth, when he hears of this discovery, and knows it to be real, will lend it his voice; and though in the beginning his words may not be heard — for perhaps he will stand alone — they must in the end prevail. Hence my final conviction is, that whatever now may happen to it, this discovery cannot be kept back. It must, in spite of every obstacle, make its own way, and become known to all men, and amongst the great things done by them hold a high place. For by

it a treasure has been found, one that has, for thousands of years, been lost to the whole world; and it has also enabled a weak mortal to enter into the spirit of the Sacred Wisdom, which, we are told, confounded in the beginning men's words, and made the one language of all the earth appear as a great many.

If I had, at certain trying periods of my life, been allowed to know, that, from among all the human beings then living, so humble an individual as myself had been designed by Providence to be one day the author of such a discovery, how this knowledge would have taught me to bear, with thanks and resignation, all I have since endured, and how it would have urged me to prepare my mind, by incessant thinking and study, for the accomplishment of so great a labour! But it has, as I have said, come upon me in the midst of difficulties; yet even in its present rude form it must, such as it is, on account of the secret it contains, endure. For it has matter in it, as thinking men will one day, if not immediately, discover, to create in man another mind, and give birth to new systems, and cause changes in more things than one. Hence, in many ages to come, this discovery may be referred to, as forming a new epoch in the history of the world and the human mind, and that I now breathe may be then not only known but felt. But whatever it may effect, it must, at least, endure; so that if I have ever had "immortal longings in me," they ought

to be satisfied, for of the endless future I cannot be deprived, since what I have done must, wherever civilisation is known over the world, live as long as words themselves; or only with their science — if many ages hence it is to be again forgotten — find a grave.

THE END.

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